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Axiomatization and Incompleteness in Arithmetic and Set Theory
Wesley Duncan Wrigley
I argue that are (at least) two distinct kinds of mathematical incompleteness. Part
A of the thesis discusses Go¨delian incompleteness, while Part B is concerned with
set-theoretic incompleteness. Both parts are concerned with the philosophical jus-
tification of reflection principles and other axiomatic devices which can be used to
reduce incompleteness, and in particular with the justification of such devices from
the philosophical standpoint of Kurt Go¨del.
In Part A I consider Go¨del’s disjunctive argument. In chapter 1, I argue that the
non-mechanical mind considered by Go¨del is best modelled by a theory constructed
using the transfinite iterated application of a soundness reflection principle to PA.
I argue that Feferman’s completeness theorem shows this account of the mind to be
incompatible with some elementary assumptions in the epistemology of arithmetic.
In chapter 2, these considerations are developed into a positive argument for the
existence of absolutely undecidable arithmetical propositions. The consequences for
the indefinite extensibility of the concept natural number are then discussed. I ar-
gue that properly understood, Feferman’s theorem refutes Dummett’s position in
the debate.
I begin part Part B in chapter 3, by reconstructing a version of Go¨del’s pla-
tonism, called conceptual platonism. I then examine how such a position relates
to various means of reducing set-theoretic incompleteness. In chapter 4 I argue
that there is some prospect for this position of effecting a limited reduction in in-
completeness by means of reflection principles justified by mathematical intuition.
However, such priniciples are incompatible with Go¨del’s commitment to platonism
about properties of properties of sets. In chapter 5 I argue that conceptual platon-
ism does not lend support to the view that a substantial reduction in incompleteness
can be effected by large cardinal axioms justified using extrinsic methods analogous
to the principles of theory choice in natural science. This undercuts the traditional
justification for many large cardinal axioms, so I end with a sketch of how conceptual
vi
platonism could be modified to rehabilitate the large cardinals program.
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Kurt Go¨del as a Philosopher
In 1931, Go¨del published the incompleteness theorems, two results which are now
widely acknowledged as amongst the most profound in twentieth century mathe-
matical logic. Moreover, the significance of these results has not been confined to
mathematics; they have also become the subject of a number of philosophical con-
troversies. A dizzying variety of implications have been attributed to the theorems,
not least by Go¨del himself. These implications concern the nature of the human
mind, mathematical proof, the concept natural number, the existence of mathemat-
ical objects, and the shape of the set-theoretic universe.
This thesis is about all of these issues, but perhaps most of all it is about reading
Kurt Go¨del as a philosopher. Go¨del was certainly a cautious writer of philosophy,
who was keenly aware that his philosophical views were not mainstream during his
lifetime. Indeed, he saw the philosophical landscape of his career as largely domi-
nated by empiricists, sceptics, and conventionalists (1961/?, p.375); by contrast his
own views are characterized by a deep-seated belief that rational reflection by the
human mind can yield genuine knowledge of mathematical objects ‘despite their
remoteness from sense experience’ (1964, p.268).
The unfortunate result is that what has survived of Go¨del’s philosophical writings
at times comes to little more than fascinating snippets of information from some-
what unconventional sources. For instance, it is not unusual in secondary literature
about Go¨del to encounter citations of his views which are sourced from conversations
with Hao Wang, published decades after Go¨del’s death (the present work is of no ex-
ception in this regard). Much of the more formally published material nevertheless
consists of drafts or lecture notes, which are brief or rough. Coupled with Go¨del’s
almost unfailing caution, it is easy to despair of the lack of detailed exposition of,
or clear argument for, some very interesting views that can be found in his corpus.
That said, clear themes and positions run throughout Go¨del’s philosophical work,
and in this thesis four of those will be explored with particular reference to the ax-
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iomatization of arithmetic and set theory, with a view to reducing the incomplete-
ness of those theories. Indeed my central question will be: how can we strengthen
our axiomatic mathematical theories so as to reduce the degree to which they are
incomplete? In answering this question, the Go¨delian themes with which I’ll be
particularly concerned are anti-mechanism about the human mind, rationalistic op-
timism about mathematical proof, mathematical platonism, and Go¨del’s analogy
drawn between the methods of mathematics and the natural sciences. These all
play a central role in Go¨del’s account of mathematical objects and mathematical
knowledge, though the role they play is often less than transparent.
This thesis, in grappling with these aspects of Go¨del’s thought, is at its heart a
philosophical endeavour. I want to know whether there is a compelling argument for
anti-mechanism grounded in the incompleteness theorems; I want to know whether
any arithmetical propositions are absolutely undecidable; I want to know whether
large cardinal axioms are implied by the concept set, or can be inferred from some
analogy between mathematics and the natural sciences. Technicalities and mathe-
matical results will play a crucial role in some of my arguments, but no proofs will
be found in these pages. Similarly, though much of the thesis involves close engage-
ment with text, it is not primarily a historical endeavour. There is no archival work
present, for example, and getting clear on what Go¨del himself thought about these
issues is a secondary concern for the most part. The reason for this is simply that
I do not believe there to be enough evidence to make confident judgements about
the nuances of Go¨del’s thought at several key junctures.
The result is that at times I will not be able to ascribe views directly to Go¨del,
and will only be able to describe them as ‘Go¨delian’. For example, Go¨del himself
never claimed to have an argument which refuted mechanism in the philosophy of
mind; but in chapter 1 I’ll examine a Go¨delian argument which promises exactly
this. Such arguments draw out the implications of core commitments in Go¨del’s
thought, but with some of the details filled in and explicit arguments provided.
While I do my best to motivate a textual basis for such arguments, the reader is
asked to bear in mind that ‘the Go¨delian’ does not always offer what we find in the
actual work of Go¨del. Indeed, the Go¨delian often proposes arguments that I have
been sorely tempted by, but cannot quite seem to make work to my satisfaction. It
would be gratifying indeed if the reader has also been tempted by such arguments,
The Significance of Incompleteness xiii
though I believe the views discussed are of interest in their own right.
The Significance of Incompleteness
The position that I’ll argue for is, in brief, that there are (at least) two distinct
kinds of incompleteness, namely Go¨delian incompleteness and set-theoretic incom-
pleteness. In part A, I’ll argue that Go¨delian incompleteness is ineliminable because
there are very good reasons to think some arithmetical propositions are absolutely
undecidable. The situation is less clear with respect to set-theoretic incompleteness,
though I will argue in part B that the two means of reducing the degree to which set
theory is incomplete offered by Go¨del, namely the use of mathematical intuition and
quasi-scientific methods, both fail to effect a significant reduction in incompleteness.
A consequence is that much of the large cardinals programme in set theory is left
without adequate philosophical support. In the course of arguing for these claims, a
motley of other topics will be discussed in varying levels of detail: anti-mechanism,
indefinite extensibility, platonism, mathematical intuition, the concept set, second-
order logic, mathematical data, large cardinal axioms, and theoretical virtue.
What unites these seemingly disparate topics is that they each bear on claims
made by Go¨del in the extraordinarily rich paper Some basic theorems on the foun-
dations of mathematics and their implications, Go¨del’s 1951 Gibbs Lecture. This
paper will not be the primary focus of each chapter (for instance, the study of math-
ematical intuition draws heavily on the 1964 version of What is Cantor’s Continuum
Problem? ); but in the Gibbs lecture Go¨del proposes his famous disjunctive argu-
ment, argues that the incompleteness theorems support platonism, and that such
realism forms the basis of importing quasi-scientific methods into the foundations
of mathematics. Each chapter does, therefore, address some aspect of the Gibbs
lecture, and attempting a comprehensive evaluation of it on my part was the genesis
of the entire thesis.
xiv Introduction
Part A: Go¨delian Incompleteness
Chapter 1: Minds, Machines, and Reflection Principles
The first two chapters of this thesis address Go¨del’s disjunctive argument: the in-
completeness theorems imply that no Turing Machine, the mathematical model
behind the digital computer, can be used to prove all arithmetical truths. Hence
those theorems imply that either human beings equally cannot prove all arithmetical
truths, or that human means of producing arithmetical proofs cannot be modelled
by a Turing machine. Go¨del’s own view was anti-mechanism; although the argument
in the Gibbs lecture officially goes no further than the disjunction, he thought that
any arithmetical truth was provable in principle, and hence that no Turing machine
could model the mathematical capacities of the human mind. Similar views have
been expressed both by philosophers such as J.R. Lucas, and by working scientists
and mathematicians such as Roger Penrose.
I argue that this anti-mechanist project is doomed to failure. Firstly, I clarify
the notion of a non-mechanical mind at work in Go¨del’s argument, and show that
the conception of mind underlying it is best modelled by a theory constructed from
the transfinite iterated application of a certain reflection principle to Peano Arith-
metic. In the second part of the chapter, I argue that no human being, in respect of
their mathematical abilities, could plausibly be regarded as the kind of non-machine
that the Go¨delian argument employs. This is because the anti-mechanical model
of our arithmetical capacities has unacceptable implications for the epistemology of
arithmetic. The first attempt at reducing incompleteness therefore achieves only
a modest degree of success: our ability to iteratively apply reflection principles to
arithmetic is limited, because the unlimited ability implies an untenable form of
anti-mechanism about the mind.
Chapter 2: Absolutely Undecidable Arithmetical Propositions
In the second chapter, I develop these anti-anti-mechanist considerations into an
argument for the existence of true arithmetical propositions which have no humanly
recongnizable proof. Go¨del offers a number of cryptic arguments against this idea,
which I reconstruct and criticize. The evidence argument claims that, since the po-
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tentially unprovable propositions code certain information about arithmetical theo-
ries, they are exactly as evident as the axioms from which they are constructed. I
argue, however, that Go¨del’s argument is valid only in special cases, not in general.
Secondly, the irrationality argument claims that human reason would be, in some
sense, irrational or inconsistent if there were absolutely undecidable propositions. I
explain why, if such unprovable truths exist, no recognizable example of one can be
exhibited. Hence we can never be in the kind of irrational scenario envisaged by
Go¨del.
I go on to detail exactly what ability we would need to possess in order to vindi-
cate Go¨del’s view, which I call the Recursive Ordinal Selection Ability. I argue that
we have no good reason to believe we possess this ability, or anything equivalent to
it, and every reason to suppose that we do not.
I finish this chapter by showing how the mathematical apparatus of reflection
principles previously examined can be deployed to refute Dummett’s claim that the
concept natural number is vague. In particular, I argue that Dummett’s position is
not stable even in the context of his constructivism.
Part B: Set-Theoretic Incompleteness
Chapter 3: Conceptual Platonism
One aspect of Go¨del’s thought which plays little direct role in the Gibbs lecture
is mathematical intuition. Given the centrality of the notion in Go¨del’s later phi-
losophy, and in order to better understand Go¨del’s claims that the incompleteness
theorems support platonism, I undertake the interpretative task of clarifying Go¨del’s
view. I argue that there is no one unified position adopted by Go¨del across the ma-
terial available to us, but that a sensible Go¨delian position can be reconstructed. I
call this view conceptual platonism.
According to the conceptual platonist, the existence of mathematical objects is
a consequence of facts about the concepts under which they fall. In certain cases,
such as that of the concept set, reflecting on the features of the concept can give
us non-deductive and non-empirical intuitive knowledge of the truth of sentences
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which axiomatize that concept.
I make the textual case that this position is representative of Go¨del’s views,
and defend it against charges of ‘mysticism’ or ‘theology’. However, I highlight one
respect in which the account is deficient as regards our mathematical knowledge;
namely it is deeply unclear under what conditions a concept has objective content
(i.e. is such that some objects must fall under it). Although Go¨del gives us some
hints, there is no remotely precise procedure for distinguishing concepts having this
type of content from those that lack it. Despite that, I conclude that conceptual
platonism is clear enough that we can address the question of whether reflection on
the concept set can effect a substantial reduction in incompleteness, according to a
platonist of this kind.
Chapter 4: Intuition and Reflection Principles
Go¨del proposes two distinct means by which we can reduce the degree to which
set theory is incomplete. The first such method is by the use of mathematical in-
tuition. I examine Go¨del’s (still popular) idea that reflection on the concept set
allows us to gain non-deductive knowledge of certain set-theoretic principles. Such
knowledge might allow us to extend the axioms of set theory, and hence reduce their
incompleteness. I argue that the conceptual platonist might be able to regard ZFC
extended by stronger versions of the reflection principle as known intuitively, if they
are willing to pay a hefty philosophical price as regards the extent of their platonism.
However, using recent mathematical results in the area, I support Koellner’s claim
that principles of this kind (that might be justified by reflecting on the concept set)
cannot strengthen the axiomatization of set theory in such a way as to significantly
reduce its incompleteness, in a sense that can be made quite precise.
I then turn to Go¨del’s claim in the Gibbs lecture that the incompleteness the-
orems support platonism, which I understand to be conceptual platonism. I ex-
amine three arguments offered by Go¨del, plus an additional argument tailored to
the specific features of conceptual platonism. I argue that in each case, the incom-
pleteness theorems does lend platonism support, but that the degree to which this
holds is extremely limited. In essence, the incompleteness theorems serve to refute
anti-platonist positions which involve commitments not shared by platonism’s most
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prominent rivals, including intuitionism and formalism.
Chapter 5: Quasi-Scientific Methods of Justification in Set Theory
In the final chapter, I examine the justification of large cardinal axioms going beyond
what could possibly be regarded as justified intuitively. Axioms positing very large
cardinals can be used to substantially reduce the incompleteness of set theory, but
the justification of such axioms is a persistent problem. Go¨del thought that they
were justified by his platonist interpretation of mathematics: if the existence of sets
is independent of us, then, according to Go¨del, certain methods for the justification
of positing unobservable entities in the natural sciences can be imported into set
theory and used to justify large cardinal axioms.
Go¨del’s thought here draws heavily on Russell’s regressive method, which I
present in order to clarify two different analogies offered by Go¨del between mathe-
matics and the sciences. According to the first analogy, mathematical objects play
a role in making sense of mathematical experience similar to the role played by
material bodies in making sense of our perceptual experiences. I argue that such
an analogy could not be used to justify large cardinal axioms, by highlighting the
peculiar sense in which positing material bodies allows us to make sense of our ex-
periences generally.
According to the second analogy, large cardinal axioms are analogous to laws
of nature in physics, in that they receive a posteriori verification by accounting
for data and enhancing theoretical virtue. I argue that only a very limited class of
mathematical propositions could be regarded as data, and demonstrate that on such
a conception large cardinal axioms do not permit the deduction of more data than
can be obtained by much weaker hypotheses, namely the consistency of the axioms
in question relative to ZFC.
Lastly, I discuss Go¨del’s proposal that large cardinal axioms can be justified when
they endow set theory with substantial theoretical virtues, using criteria analogous
to those employed in science. I argue that the methods of theory choice in the sci-
ences typically involve some minimizing ontological principle (e.g. Occam’s razor),
and a principle of theoretical economy. Since large cardinal axioms automatically
bloat a theory’s ontology and ideology, they can be expected to perform poorly when
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assessed relative to such standards. I conclude that the analogy between science and
mathematics has little to offer in terms of justifying particular large cardinal axioms
or the large cardinals programme more generally.
Concluding Remarks
To whatever extent the methods of theory choice from the natural sciences can be
applied in set theory, the justification for the large cardinals programme is weakened.
Hence an entirely different perspective on set theory is required to vindicate the
programme. I end the thesis by outlining a direction for future research addressing
this topic, and suggest that a version of the multiverse interpretation of set theory,
consonant with remarks made by Go¨del in the 1930s, might put the programme on
firm philosophical footing. I outline how a Go¨delian multiverse view might differ





Minds, Machines, and Reflection Principles
Introduction
In his 1951 Gibbs Lecture delivered to the American Mathematical Society, Go¨del
claimed that the incompleteness theorems entail the following disjunction: either
the human mind is not a machine, at least in respect of its ability to prove mathe-
matical truths, or else there are number-theoretic problems which are in some sense
absolutely unsolvable (1951, p.310).
In this first chapter, my aim is to present a problem for Go¨delian anti-mechanism,
which I take to be the view that the mathematical capabilities of the mind cannot
be modelled by any Turing machine, and that this conclusion is established as an
implication of the incompleteness theorems (as opposed to an argument from, e.g.,
neuroscientific considerations). The argument proceeds as follows:
In §1, I’ll review the most well-known argument for Go¨delian anti-
mechanism, given by Lucas. I’ll argue that, despite plenty of potential problems,
Lucas’ argument is valuable for revealing something of the structure that any argu-
ment for Go¨delian anti-mechanism should employ.
In §2, I’ll argue that this Go¨delian conception of the non-mechanical mind re-
quires a certain kind of mathematical model, built from a transfinite reflection se-
quence of a certain kind based on PA (the first-order Peano axioms). The salient
technical details are presented in §3.
In §4, I’ll introduce Feferman’s completeness theorem, which serves two pur-
poses. Firstly, it vindicates modelling the anti-mechanist’s view by a transfinite
reflection sequence. Secondly, as I’ll argue in §5, it highlights exactly which abilities
the Go¨delian anti-mechanist must suppose are possessed by the idealised mathemati-
cian. I’ll argue that the need to posit such abilities puts a substantial explanatory
burden on the Go¨delian, which at present we have no reason to believe can be of-
floaded.
4 Chapter 1. Minds, Machines, and Reflection Principles
In §6, I’ll present some further mathematical properties of reflection sequences
based on PA and use them to argue that the anti-mechanist must suppose that the
idealised mathematician has inexplicable access to certain arithmetical truths, mak-
ing Go¨delian anti-mechanism an unworkable model of our arithmetical capacities.
Finally, in §7, I’ll deploy Turing’s completeness theorem to show that the argu-
ments given apply also to substantially weaker forms of anti-mechanism than that
to which Go¨del was inclined.
1.1 Lucas’ Dialectical Argument
In the Gibbs lecture, Go¨del argues for his famous disjunction, that either the math-
ematical capabilities of the human mind do not correspond to any Turing machine,
or that some mathematical problems are unsolvable in an absolute sense. He does
not offer an argument for a particular disjunct. It is well known, however, that the
disjunct which Go¨del was inclined to accept was the anti-mechanical one (Wang
1974, pp.324-326). My central aim in this chapter is to reconstruct what I think
is the most plausible version of a Go¨delian argument for this view, and show that
it fails. Given Go¨del’s characteristic caution on the matter, the reconstruction will
have to start outside his own writings. The most well-known argument for the anti-
mechanist disjunct of Go¨del’s disjunction is the Lucas–Penrose argument. In this
section, I’ll take a closer look at Lucas’ anti-mechanist argument.1 Lucas’ argument
is notable for being dialectical in form; rather than present a knock-down argument
that minds are not machines, Lucas offers an argument schema to refute the mech-
1I’ll set aside Penrose’s version, largely because the aims of his argument, insofar as it differs
from Lucas’, are orthogonal to our present concern. My aim is to address the question of whether
the idealised arithmetical output of human mathematicians can be shown to be distinct from
the output of any Turing machine. On the other hand, Penrose aims to establish that ‘[h]uman
mathematicians are not using a knowably sound algorithm in order to ascertain mathematical
truth’, and to demonstrate ‘something very significant about the mental quality of understanding ’
(Penrose 1994, p.76). The present discussion is somewhat removed from concerns about what
actual human mathematicians are, or are not, doing. This is because the total output of all past
and present human mathematicians is finite, and hence there is certainly a Turing machine which
enumerates the Go¨del numbers (under some suitable coding) of all the arithmetical truths that
have been proved by us so far. Additionally, my concerns are purely extensional, do not speak to
any kind of mental quality.
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anist (1968, p.156).
The schema is as follows: the mechanist comes along, and puts forward a thesis
of the form ‘the human mind can be modelled by machine M’, where a machine
models a mind if and only if the arithmetical output of the two is coextensive under
suitable idealisation. Given that some human beings are arithmetically proficient,
we assume that M enumerates the Go¨del numbers of the theorems of PA, and per-
haps other things too. The output of any Turing machine codes the theorems of a
recursively axiomatized theory, so we’ll say that M can prove a sentence if and only
if it is a theorem of the corresponding theory TM. Thanks to Go¨del’s theorem, there
is some sentence GM which, provided that TM is consistent, is true and which M
cannot prove. Lucas then takes up the potentially very tedious task of constructing
GM, and proves it (or at least claims to). Lucas and the machine can both prove
ConTM → GM, where ConTM is some canonical consistency sentence for TM under
the presentation of that theory coded by the output of M. Assuming that (the the-
ory corresponding to) the machine is consistent, then by Go¨del’s second theorem,
the machine can’t prove ConTM , and can get no further. But Lucas, ‘standing out-
side the system’, as he puts it, can prove that the Go¨del sentence GM is true, since
it ‘says’ that it is not a theorem of TM, which indeed it isn’t, by the assumption
of the machine’s consistency (Lucas 1961, p.117). Since Lucas can prove something
that the machine cannot, the latter cannot model the mathematical capabilities of
the former. The same goes for any other suitable machine, including the one corre-
sponding to TM +GM. Whatever thesis the mechanist offers, Lucas claims that he
can disprove it via the same technique (1961, p.117).
In the decades since it first appeared, Lucas’ argument has gained a remarkable
degree of notoriety, and attracted criticism from all quarters in the philosophy of
mathematics. I won’t go into details here, because for our purposes, we need not
concern ourselves with the particulars, or even validity, of Lucas’ argument. Rather,
we are concerned with its structure.
Although I don’t want to endorse Lucas’ argument, I think it embodies a struc-
ture that should be common to Go¨delian anti-mechanism of any type. A key feature
of Go¨del’s anti-mechanism is that any arithmetical truth is provable in-principle; no
incompleteness is ineliminable. Although his support for the view is only cautiously
hinted at in the Gibbs lecture, it was later confirmed as Go¨del’s own view in (Wang
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1974, p.324-326). This rationalistic optimism, narrowly speaking, is the view that
any well-posed mathematical proposition can be proved or can be refuted. More
broadly, it is the view that ‘for clear questions posed by reason, reason can find
clear answers’ (Go¨del 1961/?, p.381).
Hence the Go¨delian must think that (subject to sufficient idealisation) the hu-
man mind has the ability to overcome any incompleteness it may encounter. Lucas
thinks, rightly or wrongly, that he can do this by proving a Go¨del sentence. Go¨del
himself might have said that rational intuition enables us to overcome the prob-
lem. But my point is that the particular anti-mechanist account doesn’t matter for
our purposes; what is important is that the anti-mechanist motivated by Go¨del’s
theorem must think that we can iteratively overcome incompleteness where it is
encountered, be that in conversation with a mechanist, or in the course of ordinary
mathematics, or elsewhere entirely. We encounter a well-defined proposition that we
are currently unable to prove or refute, and then find some means of overcoming it
(assuming Go¨del’s rationalistic thesis). It is a little unclear how much idealisation is
allowed in this debate; unless otherwise stated, I’ll be operating under the standard
assumption that the idealised mathematician has an arbitrarily large (though finite)
stock of materials, time, and brain-power available for their reasoning.
The only alternative to an iterative view would be to think that the idealised
mind can overcome all incompleteness in one fell swoop, but it is difficult to imag-
ine how such a theory, whatever its merits or defects, could be motivated by the
incompleteness theorems specifically.
So the ‘dialectical’ nature of the argument offered by Lucas should be a common
element of any Go¨delian account of the non-mechanical mind, whatever we might
think of the details. In the next section, we’ll investigate what iterative abilities
a Go¨delian anti-mechanist might ascribe to us to ensure that incompleteness can
always be overcome, given a sufficient degree of idealisation.
1.2 The Non-Mechanical Mind
If we are to entertain the thought that the mind is some kind of non-machine in
respect of its ability to prove theorems (under a high degree of idealisation), it is in-
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cumbent upon us to ask: what kind of non-machine might the mind be? It would be
too much for us to demand from the anti-mechanist a complete account of the work-
ings of the human mind, but it is perfectly fair to ask for a sketch of how idealised
human theorem-proving works, if how it works is rather unfamiliar. Of course, we
do not simply want an extensionally adequate account of what is provable by such
a mind; according to Go¨del at least that would simply be {φ | φ ∈ LQ ∧ φ is true},
where LQ is the first-order language of arithmetic. Rather, we need an outline of by
what procedures such things might be provable, since they cannot be the familiar
procedures of a Turing machine or a formal proof.
Go¨del does not go into detail in the Gibbs lecture, but the ‘dialectical’ picture of
a mind able to successively overcome incompleteness wherever it is found suggests
an interesting model of idealised human theorem-proving. A reflection principle is
a statement which can be iteratively added to a theory, and the validity of which
follows from the soundness of the base theory to which the principle is added. For
example, Lucas’ argument starts with PA as a base theory, and at every step of the
dialectic, Lucas is (allegedly) justified in appending a Go¨del sentence to the theory
of present concern. More generally, a Go¨delian anti-mechanist can take the mind
to be modelled by a theory as strong as PA to which some reflection principle has
been iteratively applied.
A reflection sequence based upon a theory T is the result of the iterated addition
of some reflection principle to T. In the case envisaged by Lucas, the sequence is
based on PA, and is formed by the iterated addition of a canonical Go¨del sentence
to the theory at each ordinal successor stage in the sequence. We seem, therefore
to have made progress in giving an account of what the proposed non-mechanical
mind looks like with respect to its arithmetical abilities: the human mind can, un-
der suitable idealisation, iteratively apply a reflection principle and prove things
in the resultant theories.2 A virtue of this account is that reflection sequences are
mathematically tractable, and many results exist concerning them, beginning with
Turing’s paper on ‘ordinal logics’ (1939) and continuing in the work of Feferman
2As far as constructing a Go¨delian account of anti-mechanism goes, there are perhaps other
options that could be explored. But the application of a reflection principle fits well with the
dialectical picture under considerations, and has other features to be explored below that make it
suitable from a Go¨delian perspective.
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and others.
Unfortunately, the reflection principle implicit in Lucas’ argument that governs
the procedure by which the human arithmetically one-ups the machine is not strong
enough to do its job. Lucas’ reflection principle (for successor ordinals) is as follows:
Lucas Reflection: Tα+1 = Tα ∪ {GTα}
where GTα is the standard Go¨del sentence for Tα under some standard axiomatiza-
tion.3 Lucas’ proposed justification for his reflection principle is the pure confusion
that the ‘essence of the Go¨delian formula is that it is self-referring’ (1961, p.124).
The thought is that Lucas, unlike the machine, can reflect on the nature of the
constructed sentence, and hence deduce its truth.
However, as Putnam (1960, p.366) argues, the important point is that the theory
to which the machine corresponds is consistent. If it isn’t, then the machine can
prove GTα just as Lucas can. So if Lucas can claim to prove something that the
machine can’t, what he needs is in fact a means of determining Tα’s consistency.
If the theory is consistent, then Lucas, but not the machine, can prove its Go¨del
sentence. So it is Lucas’ (alleged) knowledge of the machine’s consistency which
does the work in distinguishing their arithmetical capabilities.
Rightly or wrongly, Lucas insists that the assumption of the consistency of the
theory corresponding to the machine is in play throughout the course of the dialectic.
So we might try the following reflection principle (for successor ordinals):
Consistency Reflection: Tα+1 = Tα ∪ {ConTα}
where ConTα is a canonical consistency sentence for Tα. But again, this won’t do,
since even if Lucas can use a reflection principle of this kind, there is no guarantee
that some machine offered by the mechanist in the course of the back-and-forth will
be out-performed by him at all. This is because there is, in general, no reason to
expect of a given consistent theory that the union of the theory together with its
canonical consistency statement is consistent. The key reason for this is that certain
consistent but unsound theories prove their own inconsistency. Suppose for instance,
3There’s no need to rehearse the details here, but it should be remembered that these notions
only make sense relative to a specified set of arithmetical axioms with a canonical means for
constructing Go¨del sentences. Your favourite textbook treatment will do the job.
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that T = PA +¬ConPA. The extension of T by its consistency sentence will prove
that T, and hence also PA, is consistent. Yet it will also prove ¬ConPA, since that
sentence is an axiom.
Clearly, if Lucas finds himself competing with a Turing machine the correspond-
ing theory of which is inconsistent, he will at most be able to match the machine,
and will never out-perform it. However, Lucas’ remarks suggest that the assumption
he intends to put in play is stronger than the consistency of the relevant machines,
since he writes that an essential part of the game is that ‘a rational being, standing
outside the system can see that it [the Go¨del sentence for the system in question] is
true’ (1961, p.117). While the consistency of a theory is of course sufficient for the
truth of its Go¨del sentence, the crucial assumption is that the machines offered by
the mechanist only prove truths, not merely that they are consistent. Once again,
I think this is at least structurally representative of the Go¨delian position: at the
heart of anti-mechanism is the conviction that we can know more than a machine
could ever prove, not that we can simply write down more sentences. Given that
knowledge implies truth, the model of the anti-mechanical mind should, I think, be
taken from a reflection sequence constructed by a soundness principle.
1.3 Feferman Reflection
Roughly speaking, our target reflection principle asserts some soundness property of
the members of the sequence preceding it. Franze´n favours the formulation of a single
sentence expressing the soundness of a theory in order to achieve this (2004, §14.1).
For present purposes, this presents a quite unnecessary complication. Instead, we
can take as our canonical reflection principle Feferman reflection (also known as
Feferman’s ‘principle II’), which says that, for any formula φ, if, of every number, a
theory proves that it is φ, then every number is φ. More formally:
Feferman Reflection: ∀x PrTα(φ(x˙))→ ∀x φ(x)
where PrTα is a provability predicate for Tα coded in the standard Go¨delian fash-
ion; and where φ(x˙) denotes the Go¨del number of the result of substituting the
numeral denoting x for the first variable appearing in φ. Feferman reflection should
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be understood without loss of generality as restricted to formulae of LQ with a single
variable (Feferman 1962, p.274). It should be noted that the arguments to follow
carry over with a variety of alternative reflection principles (see (Feferman 1962,
p.274) for details), but we’ll stick to using Feferman reflection for the sake of sim-
plicity, since the formal results that will later be of some importance are all stated
rather elegantly with respect to it. The essential point is that what goes for the
soundness principle discussed in this chapter goes for a variety of other alternatives.
The present selection is merely for convenience.
Feferman reflection is a principle that we should accept of theories we believe to
be sound with respect to domain N. For if a theory is sound, its proof predicate
actually represents the proof relation. So, if it proves φ of each number, it follows
by minimal semantic reflection that ∀x φ(x). Hence, if we accept Tα as sound, we
should similarly accept as sound:
Tα+1 = Tα ∪ {∀x PrTα(φ(x˙))→ ∀x φ(x)| φ ∈ LQ}
This is because Tα+1 is an extension of Tα by Feferman reflection for each φ, which
is soundness-preserving with respect to the domain. To sum up, according to the
present interpretation of Go¨delian anti-mechanism, the idealised arithmetical out-
put of the non-mechanical mind can be modelled by a theory constructed from a
Feferman reflection sequence based on PA.
There remains a question as to the length of this reflection sequence: how many
times can the non-mechanical mind apply Feferman reflection to PA? As Good
emphasises (1967, p.146), it is perfectly possible to produce a Turing machine corre-
sponding to PAω, which extends PAn by a reflection principle for all n ∈ N. Even
where that principle is Feferman reflection, PAω is recursively axiomatized and
hence corresponds to some Turing machine. So the Go¨delian anti-mechanist must
accept that the mind is modelled at the very least by a theory more powerful than
this. And so the dialectic continues at least to transfinite successor stages. Note that
this does not imply that the anti-mechanist must think that the idealised mind can
perform a transfinite number of reasoning steps in the course of the dialectic, since
it is not obvious that constructing the theory PAω requires doing infinitely many
things. All I’m arguing is that, according to the anti-mechanist, our abilities must
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be more powerful than the theory resulting from the ωth application of Feferman
reflection to PA.
At limit ordinals, we cannot apply Feferman reflection directly to a previous
theory, but instead must formulate a means of asserting the Feferman reflection
principle of all theories earlier in the sequence. But extending some sound theories
by the assertion of their soundness will result in a sound theory, so the use of Fefer-
man reflection at limits stages of the sequence must be acceptable to the Go¨delian
as well. This argument will only carry weight if we already accept that certain se-
mantic properties (in particular, the property of being an index of a sound theory
in a reflection sequence based on Feferman reflection) are suitable for transfinite
induction over the ordinals. But given the intimate link between the ordinals and
induction, this assumption can be readily granted.4
Since the theory PAω is recursively axiomatized, it has a finite presentation de-
spite an infinite number of axioms, just like PA. So thinking that we can reflect at
least this much is well within the bounds of ordinary idealisation where we do away
with finite limits on time and paper. However, the exact nature of the idealisation
involved in the anti-mechanism debate is somewhat unclear. It is therefore possi-
ble that applying the reflection principle even further than this may constitute an
infinitary idealisation going beyond what is ordinarily permitted in the mechanism
debate.5 If so, I think this makes my account no less Go¨delian. Go¨del himself was
quite happy to entertain the idea that a finite mind is capable of an infinite num-
ber of distinguishable mental states (Wang 1996, p.196) and can store an infinite
amount of information (Wang 1996, p.193). Hence whatever the true nature of the
idealisation here, I think my proposal still represents a reasonable reconstruction of
Go¨delian anti-mechanism from the meagre textual evidence that is available.
So, our Go¨delian thinks that our arithmetical capacities are at least as powerful
as the αth member of a Feferman reflection sequence on PA for some transfinite α.
Hence we need to define a transfinite Feferman reflection sequence up to some limit
ordinal λ greater than the index of any member of the sequence:
4For those who may have moderate scepticism on the matter, I should point out that (as we
will see later) we only require these properties to be suitable for induction in a small initial segment
of the recursive ordinals.
5My thanks to an anonymous referee from The Review of Symbolic Logic for pointing this out.
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T0 is the theory PA, which we recognize to be sound.
For each α < λ, where α is an ordinal successor, Tα+1 is Tα ex-
tended by the Feferman reflection schema.
For each limit ordinal β < λ, the set of axioms of Tβ is chosen such that
Tβ extends Tα by Feferman reflection for each α < β (including 0).
Though I’ve drawn heavily on Lucas’ own presentation of the anti-mechanist ar-
gument in this section, the arguments, I think, apply more broadly to Go¨delian
forms of anti-mechanism. If we can, in principle, out-perform any Turing machine
at the task of proving arithmetical theorems, then a natural articulation of our
abilities is that we can iteratively apply reflection principles. The ability to iter-
ate reflection principles weaker than soundness cannot guarantee that the idealised
mathematician out-performs a Turing machine. Since Feferman’s soundness princi-
ple is equivalent to the other plausible candidates for representing such an ability,
the arguments of this section show that the Go¨delian anti-mechanist should take
the idealised theorem-proving power of the human mind to correspond in some way
to a transfinite Feferman reflection sequence based on PA.
1.4 Feferman’s Completeness Theorem
In this section, I’ll explore some formal properties of arithmetics generated by trans-
finite Feferman reflection to show that this procedure really does generate the kind
of model of the mind which the Go¨delian wants. Transfinite reflection, in some form
or another, has appeared in the literature on Go¨del and Lucas before, though to my
knowledge it has not previously been used in an attempt to refute Go¨delain anti-
mechanism, a task which will be taken up in the next sections of the chapter.6 For
6The issue was originally raised by Good (1967, p.146) who emphasised that a finite machine
can be constructed corresponding to PAω, meaning that the one-upmanship must be continued into
the transfinite if Lucas is to refute the mechanist (which, for the record, Good did not believe was
possible). The issue is also discussed by Shapiro (1998, pp.285-293), who concludes that ‘running
up the ordinals’ doesn’t help the anti-mechanist at all. As I’ve already argued, the anti-mechanist
is to some extent obliged to run up the ordinals, since their model of the mind, in its mathematical
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now, we must note four important properties of reflection principles and reflection
sequences.
The first is that reflection principles in general are sensitive to the particular
axiomatic presentation of a theory to which they are added. In ordinary cases, the
addition of a new axiom to two extensionally equivalent theories (i.e. sets of ax-
ioms with the same deductive consequences) results in two new theories which are
extensionally equivalent to one another. The addition of reflection principles to ex-
tensionally equivalent theories does not, however, preserve extensional equivalence
in this way. This is because reflection principles code information about axiomatic
theories (such as their consistency or soundness) under some particular description
of those theories. Consider the following example based on Feferman’s early discus-
sion of the issue (Feferman 1960, pp.36-37): suppose we have two consistent sets
of axioms, A and B, both of which extend PA. Suppose further that A and B
are extensionally equivalent, but that they are axiomatized very differently to one
another (though both recursively so). As a result, these two theories have non-
identical canonical consistency sentences. By Go¨del’s second theorem, A 0 ConA,
so by construction B 0 ConA, and vice-versa. Given the difference in the description
of the sets of axioms, we can finally suppose that ConA and ConB are not prov-
ably equivalent. This means that when applying a reflection principle, the choice
between extensionally equivalent theories is crucial, since in scenarios of this kind,
A ∪ {ConA} isn’t extensionally equivalent to B ∪ {ConB}.
A second important matter to note is that the members of a reflection sequence
are theories in the language of arithmetic. Hence when we formulate instances of
Feferman reflection for theories constructed by transfinite iteration of that principle,
like ∀x PrPAω(φ(x˙)) → ∀x φ(x), we need a means of representing transfinite ordi-
nals arithmetically. The language of arithmetic does not include symbols like ‘ω’ for
such ordinals, so in this language we cannot define PAω as the ω
th extension of PA
by iterated Feferman reflection. But we need to define this theory’s proof predicate
in order to formulate the relevant instances of the reflection scheme. Hence the need
for a coding mechanism. An ordinal ‘notation’ system fixes a map between the nat-
ural numbers and the order types of recursively well-ordered subsets of N, in order
capacity, must be at least as powerful as some member of a reflection sequence with a transfinite
index.
14 Chapter 1. Minds, Machines, and Reflection Principles
to code information about these recursive ordinals in the language of arithmetic. In
the original work on the subject, Feferman (1962) uses Kleene’s O notation, so we’ll
use that too. In this system, O is a subset of the natural numbers ordered by the
transitive relation <O. Where n ∈ O, the ordinal it represents is |n|, determined as
follows: 0 ∈ O and |0| = 0. If n represents α, then 2n represents α+ 1 and n <O 2n.
Where {e} is the e-th partial recursive function, if {e} is total, its range is in O,
and for all n, {e} (n) <O {e} (n+ 1), then 3 · 5e ∈ O, for all n, {e} (n) <O 3 · 5e, and
the ordinal |3 · 5e| is the supremum of the ordinals | {e} (n)| for all n.
Thirdly, it is vital to note that in the language of arithmetic, we can’t represent
the structure of the recursive ordinals (i.e. ordinals < ωCK1 ) uniquely. Each limit
ordinal < ωCK1 has infinitely many notations in O, so the order <O is partial, and
branches infinitely at all and only limit ordinals. There are thus infinitely many
totally ordered paths through O which assign a unique notation to each recursive
ordinal. So for any given base theory and reflection principle, there are many differ-
ent reflection sequences up to a given limit ordinal, corresponding to different ways
of coding the indices of the theories in the sequence in order to correspond to a path
within O up to that limit.7
A transfinite recursive progression on PA, for a given reflection principle, is the
set {Tn|n ∈ O}. We can then construct a total recursive function f from numbers
to theories that, when the argument is some n ∈ O, takes as its value the theory
T|n| (under the particular description given by n).8 Hence when presented with a
machine corresponding to a particular theory by the mechanist, the Go¨delian can
‘easily’ trump it, if it is known to be sound, by using Feferman reflection, because
in Kleene’s O it is a simple matter to find the next ordinal notation after a given
one. Having done so, applying f gives us the next theory in the sequence. The anti-
mechanist will then have a theory in hand stronger than the previous one which
is known to be sound (since PA is sound and Feferman reflection is soundness-
7To clarify, this means that there are two distinct senses in which we can talk about the index
of a theory. On the one hand, we can mean by ‘the index of a theory’ the ordinal position of that
theory in a reflection sequence. On the other hand, talk of ‘the index’ might mean the ordinal
notation used to code the required ordinal information in some presentation of the theory in the
language of arithmetic. In most cases, context will make the intended sense clear. Where both
senses are relevant to a single point, letters in vertical bars will stand for the ordinal index, and
unadorned letters will stand for the notational index.
8I owe much here to Shapiro’s presentation of the matter (1998, p.287).
1.4. Feferman’s Completeness Theorem 15
preserving).
Finally, a theorem of Church and Kleene shows that there is no recursive enu-
meration of the recursive ordinals, from which it follows that O isn’t recursively
enumerable either. Consequently, the property of being a member of O, and hence
of being a member of a transfinite reflection progression, isn’t definable by any for-
mula in the language of arithmetic.
That concludes the technical preliminaries. A central mathematical result which
bears on the current issues is the following:
Feferman’s Completeness Theorem: For any transfinite recursive




Although a number of different results go by the name of ‘Feferman’s completeness
theorem’, the result so named above is a restatement of his theorem 5.13 (1962,
p.308). Moreover, for any progression, some particular path b in O is such that⋃
n∈b:|n|<ωωω+1 Tn is complete, meaning that a reflection sequence up to a small
ordinal proves every arithmetical truth (Franze´n 2004, §14.3). So as promised, Fe-
ferman’s theorem provides a small bound in the recursive ordinals on the length of
the reflection sequence required to satisfy the anti-mechanist. Indeed, the bound
can be reduced further to ωω
2+1 (Franze´n 2004a, p.386).
This result is certainly a striking one. Notably, it vindicates the use of transfinite
soundness reflection as an explication of the Go¨delian non-mechanical mind: Go¨del’s
own argumentative strategy was to refute mechanism by way of his rationalistic op-
timism (Wang 1996, p.185), so a properly Go¨delian interpretation of anti-mechanism
should be one under which no arithmetical propositions are absolutely undecidable.9
And indeed, if the mind is the sort of thing which in its mathematical respects can
be modelled by a suitably rich theory obtained from a transfinite recursive progres-
sion of PA by Feferman reflection, then it follows by Feferman’s theorem that no
true number-theoretic proposition is absolutely undecidable (just take the modelling
theory to be some arithmetically complete
⋃
n∈b:|n|<ωω2+1 Tn for suitable b). More
9Of course, there are interpretations of Go¨del’s disjunction under which both disjuncts are true,
but Go¨del himself accepted the anti-mechanical disjunct and denied the existence of absolutely
undecidable arithmetical propositions.
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importantly, Feferman’s theorem makes it easy enough to see how a dialectical pre-
sentation of anti-mechanism ascribes extraordinary mathematical abilities to the
idealised reasoner. This will be the subject of the next section.
1.5 Enumerating O
Thanks to Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems, no arithmetically complete theory is
recursively axiomatizable. If such a theory is to be an explanatory model of our
idealised arithmetical capacities, we need an account of by what non-recursive pro-
cedure an idealised agent can determine the axioms of such a theory in order that
they might be used in a proof. If no account of such a procedure can be given,
the non-recursive theory in question will fail to explain our idealised arithmetical
abilities.
Consider, for example, the theory TA, or ‘true arithmetic’. This theory is (non-
recursively) axiomatized by every true sentence of the language of arithmetic, i.e.
TA = {φ | φ ∈ LQ ∧ φ is true}. TA fails as an account of idealised human proof
procedures because we can’t actually use TA to prove anything we didn’t already
know, since we have to use some other means of proof to determine what the ax-
ioms are. Even the Go¨delian who thinks that the theory is extensionally correct
as a model for our idealised arithmetical knowledge must recognise that it isn’t an
epistemically viable arithmetical theory like PA. We take PA to successfully model
(at least part of our) arithmetical knowledge because, limitations of time and paper
aside, anything provable from a canonical presentation of PA is thereby provable by
us too. The axioms can be recognized by an effective procedure, and the tractable
inference rules are ones that we can apply for ourselves.
By contrast to TA, an arithmetically complete theory constructed out of a Fe-
ferman reflection sequence on PA, which I’ll call a ‘Feferman arithmetic’ for brevity,
might have looked much more promising as a model of our idealised arithmetical
capacities. We can follow proofs in PA, the base theory, and the axiom schema
for Feferman reflection appears to be something which we can easily recognise, and
use to extend any theory in order to overcome some incompleteness. Indeed, no
matter what theory a mechanist might present to us, we might be tempted to think
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that, if it is sound, we can extend it by Feferman reflection and thereby prove some-
thing which the machine corresponding to that theory is incapable of demonstrating.
There is no corresponding temptation to think that we could defeat such a machine
by inferring a consistency sentence for its corresponding theory from TA!
But our ability to apply Feferman reflection to a theory presented to us by the
mechanist rests on our ability to recognise (by proof or other means) when natural
numbers represent recursive ordinals in some fixed notation system, because such
natural number notations appear in the instances of the axiom scheme for Fefer-
man reflection for a given theory. If we cannot recognise whether a presentation
of a theory given by the mechanist is indexed by a member of O, then we cannot
tell whether that theory is an extension of PA by a soundness-preserving reflection
principle. And if we cannot determine whether a theory presented by the mechanist
is sound, then we have no justification for extending it by the relevant instances
of Feferman reflection in order to prove something that the machine in question
cannot. The issue for the anti-mechanist is that there is no recursive procedure for
identifying notations for ordinals, since O is not recursively enumerable. We are
therefore owed an account by the anti-mechanist of what procedure we might use,
under idealisation, in order to recognise notations for recursive ordinals, and hence
employ the axioms of a Feferman arithmetic in our proofs.
To my knowledge, no Go¨delian anti-mechanist has supplied such an argument.
Lucas (1996, p.111) seems to think that we have have such an ability, but offers no
argument for thinking so. He remarks that the mechanist isn’t entitled to assume
that we can’t non-recursively enumerate the ordinal notations on the basis that the
mind is limited to mechanical operations. The problem is that the mechanist needn’t
make such a question-begging inference in this case; the fact that no one has the
slightest idea how such an enumeration could be performed is sufficient to place the
burden of proof squarely on the shoulders of the anti-mechanist.
Lucas also cites Go¨del and Wang as rejecting mechanism because we can enu-
merate ordinal notations (1996, p.111). Go¨del certainly had this view, although he
acknowledges that the notion of a non-recursive procedure is far from clear. Indeed,
he cites ‘the process of defining recursive well-orderings of the integers’ as a known
example of such a procedure (quoted in Wang 1974, pp.325-6). Since the recursive
ordinals are exactly the order types of recursive well-orderings of the natural num-
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bers, Go¨del’s view is unambiguous. It is notable, however, that Go¨del does not offer
an argument for his view here. The ascription of the view to Wang is somewhat
suspect, since earlier in the chapter Lucas cites, Wang claims that considerations
relating to the supplementation of theories using reflection principles ‘are of little
help with regard to establishing the superiority of man over machine’ (Wang 1974,
p.320). The anti-mechanical argument for our ability to enumerate O remains elu-
sive.
Lucas does, however, offer an argument to the effect that the anti-mechanist
needn’t claim any such ability for the idealised mathematician. As remarked above,
if n ∈ O is a notation for α, then 2n ∈ O, and 2n is a notation for α+1. So, although
enumerating O is a non-mechanical matter, calculating the next ordinal notation
after being presented with some previous notation is a mechanical matter. Lucas
claims, therefore, that he doesn’t need to enumerate ordinal notations; rather, he
just needs to calculate the next ordinal notation, whenever the mechanist presents
him with a theory indexed by such a notation. And we have good reason to believe
that he can do so (Lucas 1996, p.112).
This argument, however, is unconvincing. Even if it is a requirement of the
dialectical scenario that the mechanist put forward a machine the corresponding
theory of which is actually an extension of PA by iterated Feferman reflection, it
seems unreasonable to require that the mechanist be able to prove that the their
favoured machine has this property. After all, mechanism is not itself a mathemat-
ical thesis, but a hypothesis that the human mind is limited in various respects.
So the mechanist, in the dialectical scenario, should be able to put forward some
machine, and tentatively claim that they believe it can prove anything a human
could prove. Lucas, when presented with such a machine, can out-perform it if he
can determine the theory corresponding to the machine, verify that it is indexed by
an ordinal notation, and then apply Feferman reflection to it get a stronger theory.
Verifying the index is crucial; without doing so, we have no reason to believe that
any sentence Lucas produces which the machine cannot is actually true. So Lucas
doesn’t simply need to know how to calculate powers of 2, as he claims. Rather he
needs the ability to recognise ordinal notations when presented with them, which
comes to the same as the ability to enumerate O.
The need for the anti-mechanist to posit such an ability has proved to be just
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as contentious as the initial claim that we can ‘see’ the truth of Go¨del sentences.
Turing highlights that non-mechanical ‘ingenuity’ is required to recognize a num-
ber as representing an ordinal (though not in that terminology) (Turing 1939, §11).
Lucas cites this point, along with some remarks by Go¨del, in support of his view
that the human ability to recognise ordinal notations outstrips that of any machine
(Lucas 1996, p.111). The problem, of course, is that whether ‘we’ can perform some
ingenious operation which no machine could ever do is precisely the point at issue.
Citations from Go¨del and Turing should prompt us to take the issue seriously, but
they should not on their own be taken to settle the issue.
Shapiro (1998, p.289) argues that there is a weak and a strong disambiguation
of the claim that an idealised human can out-perform a machine at the game of
enumerating ordinal notations. The weaker claim is that given any machine that
enumerates ordinal notations, there will be some recursive ordinals it doesn’t denote
that a human could produce a notation for. The stronger claim is that an idealised
mathematician can enumerate O.10
Shapiro claims that the weak version is hopelessly vague, since it involves ‘ma-
chine enumerating ordinal notations’ as a parameter. For my part, if it is just the
weaker claim being made by the anti-mechanist, then I can’t see how the dialectic
is any different from the initial Lucasian scenario. Although O is not recursively
enumerable, for any n ∈ O, {m|m <O n} is recursively enumerable. So, for any
machine that enumerates notations, there will be some recursive ordinals that it
doesn’t denote that a machine could produce a notation for. So the weak anti-
mechanist thesis is too weak to distinguish humans from machines in the required
fashion. To do this, the mind must be ascribed the ability to enumerate O, or some-
thing equivalent. In other words, the Go¨delian must make Shapiro’s strong claim.
Strictly speaking, the Go¨delian must claim the weaker ability to enumerate a subset
of O forming a path such that the Feferman reflection sequence whose members are
indexed by it is arithmetically complete, but such a claim would be remarkably ad
hoc.
With respect to the strong claim, that an idealised human reasoner simply could
enumerate O by a non-recursive method, Shapiro has a rather different response.
10Essentially the same point is made in less detail by Good (1969, p.357).
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He claims that this amounts to a view on which we are arithmetically omniscient,
since we could simply run through the indices of a transfinite recursive progression
on PA by Feferman reflection and come up with an arithmetically complete theory.
Shapiro concludes, I assume sarcastically, that this is a ‘wonderful thought’ (1998,
p.290).
My view is that Shapiro’s argument misses the point entirely.11 Crucially, claim-
ing that a human reasoner could, in principle, enumerate O is not to claim of anyone
that they are arithmetically omniscient (a claim which would be false). It is rather
to claim that every arithmetical truth is provable by the idealised reasoner, and
that was the view in play all along! I see no reason why the Go¨delian should be
bothered by Shapiro’s response, given that the anti-mechanist view was from the
start presented as an alternative to the view that there are absolutely unsolvable
number-theoretic problems.
A more generous reading of Shapiro’s complaint might perhaps be that if no
arithmetical proposition is absolutely undecidable, then that can’t be explained by
an appeal to an ability to enumerate notations for recursive ordinals. But again, I
think this would be incorrect.
Franze´n has proved (2004, p.191) the existence of a primitive recursive unary
function f such that for φ ∈ LQ, φ is true if, and only if, f(φ) ∈ O. Franze´n’s
result shows that if we could enumerate O, then by the simple application of a
primitive recursive function, we could prove any arithmetical truth, given time and
paper. Hence if we had a good reason to think that we could enumerate the ordinal
notations, we would have a good reason to believe that all arithmetical truths were
provable. So essentially the ability to enumerate ordinal notations could be used to
explain why all arithmetical propositions are provable.
Shapiro’s criticisms miss their mark, but this doesn’t change the fact that we
have no reason to believe that we can enumerate O, and hence no good reason to
believe that a Feferman arithmetic isn’t an unusable theory, just like TA, because
we have no way of determining its axioms. Despite that, it’s fair to say that any Fe-
ferman arithimetic would still be a better model of our arithmetical capacities than
TA, since we can readily determine some of the axioms of the theory, namely the
11Shapiro’s argument might be a successful ad hominem against Lucas. My point here is that
it does not present a general problem for Go¨delian anti-mechanism.
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fragment equivalent to PA plus the instances of the Feferman reflection scheme for
theories in the sequence indexed by a recognizable ordinal notation. Nevertheless,
we have been given no reason to believe that we can in general make use of the proof
relation in a Feferman arithmetic. Since that relation isn’t recursive, and we have
been given no alternative account as to how we might determine the axioms of such
a theory, we have no reason to believe that the proof relation of such a theory is
one we could actually make use of. And if the proof relation of a theory isn’t one
we could actually use to prove things, then that theory under its given presentation
cannot be part of a decent model of our arithmetical knowledge, however idealised.
An objector might insist, however, that the problem with TA is not that it isn’t
recursively axiomatizable, but rather, that the given axiomatization involves a prob-
lematic notion of arithmetical truth. Since axiomatizing a Feferman arithmetic does
not overtly involve such a notion, it is possible that this flaw of TA isn’t shared by
the kind of theory envisaged by the anti-mechanist. In the next section we’ll see why
this is mistaken, though this can only be seen in the proof of Feferman’s theorem,
rather than its statement.
1.6 The Failure of Autonomy
The proof of Feferman’s theorem is itself extremely long, and very mathematically
involved. Interested readers are advised to consult the original article; for now I shall
attempt to sketch a proof of the theorem that makes manifest its philosophically
important aspects.
The preliminaries to the proof will be familiar to anyone working in the general
area: give a canonical presentation of PA and arithmetize the syntax in order to
capture the required proof-theoretic notions. Then, select an ordinal notation sys-
tem for representing recursive ordinals as natural numbers, and use this to define
a reflection principle. The two central parts of the proof are as follows: First, de-
fine the required primitive recursive functions in order to prove the existence of a
progression using Feferman’s reflection principle and based on PA, generalizing on
Turing’s construction for proving the Π1-completeness theorem for ordinal logics (see
§7 below). These functions, informally speaking, verify that a given construction sat-
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isfies certain properties that we require a transfinite progression to have, and serve
to compute the ordinal bound on finding witnesses for these properties. Though
mathematically integral to the proof, from a philosophical perspective characteris-
ing these functions and proving their existence is essentially book-work (Feferman
1962, pp.296-302). The second part of the proof involves characterizing a ‘proof-
description’ for Shoenfield’s ω-rule to obtain the bound within the progression such
that for every true arithmetical φ, the union of earlier theories in the progression
proves φ.
We can distinguish amongst reflection progressions a special kind, which Fefer-
man calls autonomous (1962, pp.280-281). An autonomous progression is unlike the
general recursive progressions previously examined, because the definition of such a
progression is based on some formula, ψ, such that if ψ(x) is valid, then x ∈ O. In
particular, for every Tn in an autonomous progression, some earlier theory proves
ψ(n) (1962, p.262). Essentially then, autonomous progressions are those that we
can recognize to be reflection progressions using only techniques available during
the construction of the progression by a mathematician (in the more general case,
we will not have the ability to verify the indices of the theories, and hence won’t
know whether the construction of the progression has been successful). The formula
ψ, in this scenario, functions as a kind of oracle allowing the mathematician to verify
that the progression so far is indexed by a set with the required order properties.
However, proving Feferman’s completeness result ineliminably relies on non-
autonomous methods, as can be seen in the following way. Suppose we have O ⊆ O,
such that for every d ∈ O, there is some Ta such that a <O d and Ta ` ψ(d). Then
we can prove that
⋃
d∈O Td is recursively enumerable, and hence by Go¨del’s theorem
does not prove every true sentence of number theory (Feferman 1962, p.262). An-
other way of seeing this is that if the ordinals up to ωω
ω
have notations in O, then⋃
n∈O:|n|<ωωω Tn is recursively axiomatizable. If a completeness theorem could be
proved for autonomous progressions, then this theory would prove all true sentences
of number theory, so it would witness the falsity of Go¨del’s theorem. The essentially
non-autonomous character of the progressions required to obtain an arithmetically
complete theory is crucial to seeing why the Go¨delian anti-mechanist cannot formu-
late a satisfactory epistemology of arithmetic.
If mechanism is the view that the output of an idealised human mind is coex-
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tensive with the output of some Turing machine, then anti-mechanism is the view
that the idealised human mind can out-perform any Turing machine whatsoever.
We are, of course entitled to an account of how this is possible, and what human
theorem-proving might look like if anti-mechanism is true. I’ve argued that, from a
Go¨delian perspective, a natural account is that idealised human mathematicians can
generate arithmetically complete theories, by transfinite iterated Feferman reflection
from PA, and use them to prove things. I’ve already argued that without an account
of how the idealised mathematician can non-recursively enumerate O, this position
is little more explanatory than the bizarre claim that the idealised mathematician
can use TA to prove any arithmetical truth. This does not, however, preclude such
a procedure from being described.
Another explanation for the uselessness of TA as presented is that the given
presentation involves the notion of arithmetical truth. Since there is no recursive
procedure for determining of an arbitrary formula in the language of arithmetic
whether it is true, we cannot in general tell what the axioms of TA are, given that
those are just the truths of arithmetic. In other words, an objector might insist
that the TA and a Feferman arithmetic are in a disanalogous epistemic position.
According to the objector, the problem with TA is not merely that it has no re-
cursive axiomatization; after all, we should expect any anti-mechanist to think our
arithmetical abilities ultimately have no recursive presentation. Rather, the prob-
lem with TA is that it very specifically employs the notion of arithmetical truth in
the axiomatization, whereas a Feferman arithmetic does no such thing.
The problem with this suggestion, however, is that the ineliminable use of non-
autonomous methods means that any Feferman arithmetic actually does share TA’s
second flaw, the involvement of the concept of arithmetical truth in determining
which sentences are axioms. It is difficult to see that this is so, since the pre-
sentation of a Feferman arithmetic does not explicitly mention arithmetical truth.
Rather, the arithmetical truths are the deductive closure of a Feferman arithmetic,
but the axioms are just those of PA plus the instances of lots of Feferman reflection
schemata. The problem, put succinctly, is that making a selection of instances of
Feferman reflection to build an arithmetically complete theory requires prior knowl-
edge of certain arithmetical truths which are not provable during the construction
process. This point requires some explanation however.
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Consider exactly why it is that the anti-mechanist requires the idealised math-
ematician to have the ability to enumerate the whole of O, rather than the weaker
ability to simply follow a path through O. After all, don’t we just start with PA,
add the Feferman reflection principle at successor stages of the sequence, and extend
all of our previous theories at limits? If we need only the ability to follow a path
through O, the Go¨delian position might seem more persuasive, given the substantial
weakening of our idealised abilities.
Sadly for the Go¨delian, more than this is required for the construction of a
sequence of the correct kind. There are many different paths through O, which
branches infinitely at all and only limit ordinals. So after each limit ordinal in the
construction process, for example in the construction of stage ω+ 1 in the sequence,
we need to use one of infinitely many possible means of arithmetically representing
the axioms of the previous theory, in this case Tω (Franze´n 2004, §11.2). Since re-
flection principles are sensitive to the presentation of a theory, there is no guarantee
that any of these choices of arithmetical representations of the ωth member of the
sequence yield equivalent results further along in their respective paths. As it turns
out, the choice of path is vitally important:
Feferman–Spector Theorem: There are paths Z through O that
constitute a notation for every ordinal < ωCK1 , such that
⋃
n∈Z Tn is
incomplete with respect to the Π1 sentences (Feferman and Spector 1962,
p.384). Moreover, there are ℵ0 such paths (1962, p.389).
The Go¨delian claims that the totality of what is humanly provable includes all arith-
metical truths. The Feferman–Spector theorem shows that in order to construct a
reflection sequence which models this property, we can’t just choose any old path
through O when selecting indices for theories in the sequence. Indeed, we must pick
a path with very special properties. In order to progress along a path through O of
the desired kind, at limit stages in the reflection sequence the choice of formula defin-
ing the axioms of theories in the progression must be made very carefully indeed.
In particular, the construction must make use of highly convoluted ‘definitions’ of
axioms that are only even recognizably such if we already assume that the sentence
we are trying to prove at the given stage is true (Franze´n 2004a, p.387).
The need for non-standard definitions of axioms in order to apply Feferman
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reflection to theories corresponding to limit stages in our construction is deeply
problematic. When using these definitions, some formula is recognizable as an ax-
iom only on the assumption that a given sentence is true; the problem is that the
particular sentence in question is the very sentence we wanted to prove at that stage.
In consequence, we cannot even axiomatize the theory which the Go¨delian supposes
to simulate the workings of the mind without knowing in advance whether a given
sentence we seek to prove from those axioms is true (exactly what the sentence is
will depend on the path through O and the limit ordinal in question).
On no plausible epistemology of arithmetic is it a basic fact that we have knowl-
edge of such truths independently of the axioms. Thanks to the failure of autonomy,
the Go¨delian finds themselves in the following situation: for each sentence φ in the
language of arithmetic, some theory in the modelling reflection sequence is sound
only if φ is true. If φ really is true then they have a proof; if not then the index
of the theory fails to denote an ordinal and so the sequence fails to make proper
sense (Franze´n 2004, p.213). As Shapiro puts it, we’re no better off here than simply
adding φ to PA as an axiom; if it’s true, then we have a proof in a sound theory,
otherwise we have nothing to celebrate (Shapiro 2016, p.202).
This explains why using a Feferman arithmetic is only slightly more viable than
using TA to model our arithmetical powers: for some sentences we have independent
assurances of their truth (if, for instance they follow from PA), but for others all we
have is that they follow from our Feferman arithmetic if they are true. This is pre-
cisely what the above presentation of TA tells us about such unknown sentences.
The point, as we shall see in the next section, holds of weaker progressions too;
Turing went so far as to claim that his Π1-completeness theorem was ‘of no value’
(Turing 1939, §9) in the context of making an observation similar to Shapiro’s above.
Importantly, the Go¨delian cannot simply posit that we have the required enu-
merative abilities with respect to O in order to side-step the problem; this ability is,
in a sense, equivalent to the ability it is supposed to explain (as shown by Franze´n’s
function), and so is just as much in need of explanation. And although there is some
motivation for thinking that we can apply reflection principles justifiably (because,
for example, we know that PA is sound), positing a special ability to enumerate
particular paths through O is remarkably ad hoc.
The arguments of this section and the previous show not only that transfinite
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applications of reflection principles fail to help the Go¨delian anti-mechanist. The
Go¨delian anti-mechanist is obliged to deploy them, and this in turn serves to refute
the Go¨delian picture. If Go¨delian anti-mechanism were successful, then the idealised
mathematician would be able to prove any arithmetical truth by deploying an arith-
metical theory the axiomatization of which relies ineliminably on prior knowledge
of (certain of) its theorems. And I take it that this is a position which no serious
epistemology of arithmetic can tolerate.12
1.7 Modest Anti-Mechanism
In this brief section, I’d like to show that my arguments generalize to weaker forms
of anti-mechanism that don’t presuppose the in-principle decidability of every arith-
metical sentence. Call an anti-mechanist modest if they think that our ability to
overcome incompleteness by iterated reflection is restricted in some way. I’ll show
that any remotely strong modest position is still subject to the arguments given
previously. To do so, I’ll use Turing’s completeness theorem:13
Turing’s Π01 Completeness Theorem: For any transfinite recursive
progression extending PA = T0 using a reflection principle at least as
strong as consistency reflection, for any true Π01 sentence, ψ, there is
some a ∈ O s.t. Ta ` ψ and |a| = ω + 1.
The interest in the proof of Turing’s theorem is that, just as with Feferman’s theo-
rem, we make ineliminable use of non-standard definitions (in this case of the axioms
of PAω) that are recognizable as such only on the assumption that ψ is true in order
to carry out the proof. In other words if we don’t make that assumption, then we
can’t verify that the relevant index codes an ordinal. This is epistemologically sig-
nificant because it shows that, even so low down in the arithmetical hierarchy as Π01,
12This is not to claim that we have no knowledge of the consequences of the axioms indepen-
dently of deduction from those axioms. We might know, for example, that any correct axioms
arithmetical axioms prove that 2 + 2 = 4 (see chapter 5). However, these very obvious truths
are not the kind of arithmetical truths required by the anti-mechanist in this context, since such
mundane propositions are provable in PA.
13The proof appears originally in (Turing 1939). Significantly improved statements and proofs
can be found at (Feferman 1988, §7) and (Franze´n 2004, ch.14)
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and with a reflection principle as weak as consistency, we cannot model the modest
Go¨delian mind by means of a theory constructed from an autonomous transfinite
reflection progression based on PA.
The reason for this is that the construction relies on the non-autonomous charac-
ter of the required progression, and so the modest Go¨delian must think the idealised
mind has some special ability to recognize certain arithmetical truths. As Turing
puts it, by means of these progressions ‘it is possible to prove Fermat’s last theorem
(if it is true), yet the truth of the theorem would really be assumed by taking a
certain [number] as an ordinal [notation]’ (1939, §9). Therefore the arguments made
in this chapter apply not only to full-blown Go¨delian anti-mechanism, but also to
more modest anti-mechanist positions.
For example, it might be suggested by a modest anti-mechanist that some arith-
metical propositions are absolutely undecidable, and hence that no Feferman arith-
metic can be the correct arithmetical model of the mind. However, the modest
anti-mechanist might think we have a limited ability to overcome incompleteness.
They might argue that the idealised human can, in principle, recognize true universal
generalisations over the numbers. This would certainly be a weaker hypothesis than
the full-blown anti-mechanism with which this chapter is concerned. And perhaps
such a view might be appealing to some, in light of the fact that Penrose restricts
his Go¨delian argument to the Π01 sentences (Penrose 1994, p.96).
However, a mind which could recognize, by intuition or otherwise, the truth of
every true Π01 sentence could only be modelled by a theory that was at least Π
0
1-
complete. Turing’s theorem above then shows that a mind with such abilities cannot
be modelled by a theory constructed from an autonomous progression based on PA
using any reflection principle as strong as consistency. A reflection principle at least
this strong will be required, since the putative non-mechanical mind has the ability
to recognize true Π01 sentences, and a consistency statement for a theory is itself
Π01. This means that the arguments presented in the previous sections will apply to
this more modest position (since a Π01-complete theory will also not be recursively
axiomatized, thanks to Go¨del’s theorems).
Of course, there may be anti-mechanist positions even more modest, on which
Turing’s theorem has no bearing. But the point of this section is to illustrate that
any Go¨delian anti-mechanism that is strong enough to be tempting will be such that
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the arguments of this chapter will apply to it. Such a position will inevitably pre-
suppose knowledge of certain complex arithmetical truths on behalf of the idealised
mathematician, despite alleging to explain the idealised mathematician’s knowledge
of those very truths.
Conclusion
I’d like to end with a few comments on what I take to have been established in this
chapter, as well as a few comments on the limitations thereof. According to the
Go¨delian, there are, in principle, no absolutely unprovable number-theoretic truths.
Accordingly, the mind cannot be modelled, in principle, by a Turing machine.
I’ve argued that the Go¨delian is nonetheless obliged to provide something like
a model of the arithmetical abilities of the idealised mathematician, and that the
Feferman arithmetics are best equipped to function as such a model. These theories
are constructed via transfinite iterated soundness reflection on PA. However, the
mathematical properties of theories so constructed presuppose that the idealised
mathematician has inexplicable access to certain arithmetical truths, despite alleg-
ing to explain why those truths are provable in-principle.
Moreover, the arguments presented in this chapter apply to substantially weaker
forms of anti-mechanism than full-blown Go¨delianism. Hence, Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness theorems do not support any remotely strong form of anti-mechanism.
I’ve made no attempt to engage with anti-mechanism more broadly construed.
But if the mind cannot be modelled by a Turing machine, I at least hope to have
shown that anti-mechanism motivated by the incompleteness theorems cannot be
the correct account of why this is so.
The arguments I’ve presented also provide some support for the view that there
are absolutely undecidable arithmetical propositions, at least indirectly. If every
arithmetical truth is provable to the idealised mathematician, then they must be
able to deploy some operation that cannot be performed by a Turing machine. I
take myself to have shown that the most plausible account of such an operation we
might perform, involving the transfinite iteration of a reflection principle, is unten-
able. The first attempt to reduce the incompleteness of arithmetic can therefore
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be regarded only as a modest success: we do not have the ability to unrestrictedly
apply reflection principles to the axioms of arithmetic in order to eliminate incom-
pleteness. In the next chapter, the considerations raised here will be developed




Absolutely Undecidable Arithmetical Propositions
Introduction
In this chapter, I’ll argue that there are absolutely undecidable propositions about
the natural numbers that can be expressed in the language of arithmetic. In the pre-
vious chapter, we saw that Go¨delian anti-mechanism was an unacceptable response
to the disjunctive argument. In this chapter, we’ll examine more closely Go¨del’s
rationalistic optimism, according to which no well-defined mathematical problem is
unsolvable in an ‘absolute’ sense. This straightforwardly implies Go¨del’s well-known
view that no true propositions of arithmetic are absolutely undecidable. We’ll take
a proposition φ to be absolutely undecidable if and only if it is undecided by every
formal theory recognizable by us as sound; i.e. if T 6` φ and T 6` ¬φ for any recog-
nizably sound T.1
Firstly, I’ll examine two of Go¨del’s central arguments against the existence of
absolutely undecidable propositions, and show that both of them, while persuasive
to some degree, ultimately fail. The first, and most persuasive (addressed in §1–§3),
seeks to establish that arithmetical propositions which are deductively independent
of the axioms of PA are nevertheless just as evidently true. The argument trades
on the intuitive idea that we can ‘see’ the truth of certain Go¨del sentences, but fails
for reasons related to the coding of information about transfinite recursive ordinals
into the language of arithmetic.
The second argument (addressed in §4) is made firmly in the context of ratio-
nalistic optimism, and seeks to establish that some kind of scandalous inconsistency
is introduced to human reason by supposing that there are absolutely undecidable
1Note that this includes theories where φ is an axiom, hence this definition does not beg the
question against anyone who thinks that some axioms can only be recognized by us as valid using
informal modes of verification. For if φ were such a proposition, and we verified it informally,
we would then recognize the theory {s|φ ` s} as sound, and hence φ would not be absolutely
undecidable according to the definition given.
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propositions. I disambiguate two readings of this argument; on one its premises are
simply implausible, and on the other the argument fails for familiar reasons.
I’ll go on to give an argument for the existence of absolutely undecidable arith-
metical propositions. I have no deductive argument that such propositions exist,
but the evidence as it is overwhelmingly stands in favour of their existence. In §6, I
define the recursive ordinal selection ability, and show that our evaluation of Go¨del’s
disjunctive argument hinges precisely on whether we have this ability under suitable
idealisation. I consider two different accounts of what this ability might amount to:
the Go¨delian account, and a weaker alternative. I then argue that there is no good
reason to believe that we possess the relevant ability in either sense. Hence belief
that we have the selection ability is based purely on faith. On the other hand, a
compelling case can be made against our possession of the recursive ordinal selection
ability, from which the existence of absolutely undecidable arithmetical propositions
follows.
Finally, we’ll examine the upshot of this for another alleged philosophical impli-
cation of Go¨del’s theorem, namely Dummett’s argument that the concept natural
number is vague because the notion of an intuitively acceptable arithmetical proof is
indefinitely extensible. In §9–§10, I argue that Feferman’s theorem refutes the Dum-
mettian position. In §11 I offer several responses on Dummett’s behalf. None of
them is adequate, and I show that even in the context of Dummett’s constructivism,
the vagueness of the concept natural number cannot be sustained.
2.1 The Evidence Argument
Go¨del’s first (and best known) argument for the absolute decidability of all arith-
metical propositions appears in handwritten notes from the 1930s (Go¨del 193?)
discovered in Go¨del’s Nachlass (Davis 1995, p.156). The argument there is terrif-
ically condensed, so I’ll try to spell it out with a little more clarity. Go¨del (quite
rightly) supposes that if an arithmetical proposition is absolutely undecidable, it
will be of one of the kinds that the incompleteness theorems tell us is troublesome.
In particular Go¨del identifies a special class of polynomial expressions that give
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rise to unsolvable Diophantine Problems.2 The Diophantine problem corresponding
to such a polynomial is to determine whether the equation has solutions in the in-
tegers for arbitrary integer values of the parameters. Each recursively axiomatized
theory which can express all Diophantine problems of this kind is incomplete with
respect to them (Go¨del 193?, p.165).3
Go¨del goes on to argue that the fact that PA (and its extensions) are incom-
plete with respect to Diophantine problems gives us no reason whatsoever to suppose
that there are propositions of this kind which are undecidable in an absolute sense.
Without loss of argumentative force, we’ll re-cast Go¨del’s argument in terms of con-
sistency sentences, for the sake of clarity.
The ‘evidence argument’, as I call it, proceeds as follows. Suppose you have some
particular theory which is known to be sound, such as PA, the standard first-order
formalization of arithmetic. It follows trivially that the theory is consistent. Hence,
if we then recognise some sentence, such as ConPA, as an expression of this fact,
our reasons for believing that PA + ConPA is sound are just as good as those for
believing that PA itself is sound.4 While not all sentences which entail the con-
sistency of PA will be recognizable as such, a canonical consistency sentence like
ConPA =df ¬∃m PrfPA(m, p0 = 1q) certainly is. Hence we know that PA +ConPA
is sound. Since that theory gives us a trivial proof of ConPA, that sentence isn’t
absolutely undecidable. As Go¨del puts it, the kinds of undecidable sentences gener-
2Polynomials are equations constructed only using variables, integer coefficients, addition, mul-
tiplication, and exponentiation (to powers in the naturals). Where F is such a polynomial in m+n
variables, Go¨del’s equations are of the following form: F (a1, ..., am, x1, ..., xn) = 0, with the ais
considered as parameters and the xjs considered as unknowns. A schematic example of such an
equation is a1x
n1
1 + . . .+ aix
ni
i = 0.
3As a corollary of the Matiyasevich-Davis-Robinson-Putnam theorem, we can do away with
parameters and reduce the Diophantine problem to whether a certain Diophantine polynomial has
any solutions. That theorem implies that for each sufficiently expressive recursively axiomatized
arithmetical theory T, there is a true (and constructible) Diophantine sentence DT undecided by
the theory, in the sense that T 6` DT and T 6` ¬DT. The Diophantine sentence says that a certain
Diophantine equation has no solutions.
4One reason to be suspicious here is the idea that our epistemic warrant decreases with each
inferential step in a deduction, as the possibility of making errors increases with the length of
an argument. I take it that such concerns should not apply in the present context, because we
are concerned with absolute undecidability. Since we are in general idealising away from finite
lifetime and supply of paper, we can suppose that the mathematician can check and re-check any
argumentative move arbitrarily many times, so that warrant is ideally preserved through each
deductive step, whether formal or otherwise.
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ated by the incompleteness theorems are ‘exactly as evident’ as the theorems of the
old system (in this case, PA) (Go¨del 193?, p.164). In principle, the same argument
can be run for the new theory, and so on. It follows that canonical consistency sen-
tences, and the undecidable propositions generated by the incompleteness theorems
more generally, are not absolutely undecidable propositions.5
Something like this argument must be correct.6 The inference from soundness
to consistency is trivial, so as long as we accept the premise that we know that PA
is sound, it follows that we do have a proof in some sound theory of many of the
undecidable propositions generated by the incompleteness theorems. The question,
then, is do we have a proof in some-or-another system of all such propositions?7
2.2 Intensionality
For the purposes of this chapter, we’ll take Go¨del’s argument to be that the con-
sistency sentences of knowably sound theories are absolutely decidable because the
result of adding a consistency sentence to any such theory will be exactly as evident
as the axioms with which we started.8
5There are other interesting candidates for an absolutely undecidable proposition, like CH,
and Go¨del has plenty to say about such cases. However, we will here confine our attention to the
arithmetical case.
6Indeed, in other places Go¨del takes some version of the argument, though perhaps not the
full version, to be essentially truistic. See, for example (Go¨del 1946, p.151).
7The argument could similarly be run using Go¨del sentences. In this, the procedure for con-
structing the Go¨del sentence makes it obvious that it is true. The same goes for Go¨del’s original
Diophantine formulation, especially when strengthened by the MDRP theorem, since the construc-
tion of the Diophantine sentence of a sound theory is successful only if the corresponding equation
really does have no solution in the integers.
8We could also have framed Go¨del’s argument in terms of a different requirement, namely that
the theory in question is what Leach-Krouse (2016, p.226) calls ‘proof-constituting’. A theory
is proof-constituting if a sentence being a theorem of the theory constitutes its having a proof.
It’s perhaps worth noting that the concepts of proof-constituting and soundness are importantly
distinct. There may be sound theories which we might be tempted to deny are proof-constituting
(as, for example, with the Feferman arithmetics discussed in the previous chapter). Similarly,
there may be unsound theories which we nonetheless take to be proof-constituting. For example,
we might think that ZFC + V = L is unsound, yet produces genuine proofs relating to the
constructible part of the set-theoretic hierarchy. However, since PA is undoubtedly both sound
and proof constituting, we needn’t concern ourselves with such minutiae for the purposes of this
chapter.
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It’s crucial to note that the evidence argument, as given by Go¨del, relies on an
intensional relation between two theories, namely that the axioms of one are ex-
actly as evident as those of another. This is the key to seeing why Go¨del’s argument
cannot be sustained in full generality. In describing this relation as ‘intensional’, all
I mean is the following: if P is recognizable as a consistency sentence for T, then
the axioms of T + P are exactly as evident as those of T. However, if P is not
recognizably a consistency sentence, then there is no reason to suppose that T + P
inherits the evidential merit of T.9 This means that we can assess Go¨del’s argument
in terms of whether undecidable sentences, like consistency sentences, are always
recognizable for what they are.
The claim that the relation the axioms of φ are exactly as evident as the axioms
of ψ is intensional is an extremely weak one. Suppose that (a) T is a sound theory,
(b) the consistency of T is sufficient for the truth of P , and (c) there is no proof
or other rationally compelling reason to believe (b). Plainly, it does not follow that
the axioms of T + P are exactly as evident as the axioms of T. This is all I mean
by the claim that the relation in question is intensional.
It might be objected that this forces us to adopt an internalist interpretation of
the relevant epistemic notions which is unwarranted. I don’t want to comment at
all on the more general epistemological debate here, but I do think in this particular
dialectic a somewhat internalist interpretation of the relevant epistemic concepts is
required. The reason is that in this debate, as in our previous examination of anti-
mechanism, I’m quite happy to grant the Go¨delian any degree of idealisation that
they please. So clause (c), that there is no proof or other rationally compelling rea-
son to believe that the consistency of T is sufficient for the truth of P , is supposed
to mean that the entire community of mathematicians, idealised to have as much
time, paper, and brain-power as you like, has no rationally compelling argument for
the fact in question. Furthermore, given the presumptive mathematical necessity
involved, these situations are of the kind where the consistency of T is sufficient for
P, but there is no possible proof for creatures like us that this holds.
9In some cases there might be independent compelling reasons to believe P ; but Go¨del’s ar-
gument is supposed to be fully general, and so relies on the tacit assumption that the axioms of
the extended theory are always exactly as evident as those of the old theory for exactly the same
reasons.
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Crucially, this does not beg the question against the Go¨delian, since thinking
that the relation the axioms of φ are exactly as evident as the axioms of ψ is inten-
sional in this sense does not involve asserting that any situation in which (a), (b),
and (c) jointly hold does, or even could, obtain.
Given the idealisation we’re allowing Go¨del here, any assertion that the evidence
relation must be extensional is essentially a change of subject, because to demand
that the epistemic notions in play are interpreted extensionally is to stop thinking
about what creatures like us could achieve, and to start thinking about what some
mathematically divine mind could do. This might perhaps be a worthwhile pursuit,
but it isn’t the concern with which we started. Even Go¨del himself writes that in
the context of his disjunctive argument ‘the epithet “absolutely” means that they
would be undecidable, not just within some particular axiomatic system, but by any
mathematical proof that the human mind can conceive’ (1951, p.310).
The intensionality of the relevant notions is much clearer when we consider that
the general idea of a consistency sentence is an informal one. By ‘a consistency
sentence for T’ all I mean is a sentence in the language of T which expresses that
T itself is consistent. The idea of such a sentence is of course closely tied to formal
ideas in the arithmetization of syntax, but it is no less informal for that. In many
textbooks on the issue, the idea of a consistency sentence is made canonical. For
example we may stipulate that ConT =df ¬∃m PrfT(m, p0 = 1q), for any T. But
that definitional schema is not a functor into which the axioms of T can simply
be inserted, because the relation PrfT is different for different sets of axioms, and
hence must be defined afresh for different sets of axioms. This is not altered by the
stipulation of a canonical shape for consistency sentences to take.
Crucially, the need to define a new proof relation occurs whenever the axioms
of T are changed, even if this makes no difference whatsoever to the theory consid-
ered as a set of sentences. Hence there might be two theories, T and S, which are
extensionally equivalent in the sense of sharing a deductive closure, but which differ
wildly in their ‘presentation’, in that very different sentences are used to axiomatize
the theories (this issue was also discussed in the previous chapter). In such a case,
the relation PrfT and PrfS might appear so different that the consistency sentences
ConT and ConS are not obviously equivalent, even if they are both ‘canonical’ in
the required sense. So even if we restrict our attention to consistency sentences
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of a canonical form, the exactly-as-evident relation is still intensional. If T is ex-
tensionally equivalent to PA, but radically different in presentation, the axioms of
PA+ConT cannot be assumed to be exactly as evident as those of PA. ConPA and
ConT may be equivalent, but unless we have a compelling reason to believe that
fact, we are not entitled to infer ConT from the observation that PA is sound.
So, given that the relation is exactly as evident as is intensional, Go¨del’s argu-
ment will only work if we can always recognize, for any theory T, that T + ConT
is indeed an extension of T by the addition of a canonical consistency sentence for
T. As we shall see, this is an assumption to which Go¨del is certainly not entitled.10
What makes Go¨del’s position on consistency extensions so persuasive is that
there are abundant examples where it is clearly correct. In the first instance, PA
is sound. If we know this (and I think we do), then we have just as much cause to
believe in the soundness of PA + ConPA, PA +GPA (PA plus its canonical Go¨del
sentence), and so on. I’ll argue, however, that this appearance is deceptive, and
ultimately breaks down.
The chain of theories that stand to one another in the relation the axioms of φ are
exactly as evident as those of ψ is very long; indeed it is infinitely long. Let T0 = PA,
and Tn+1 = Tn + ConTn . For any n we can, given time and paper, verify that the
axioms of Tn+1 are exactly as evident as the axioms of Tn. We can, in principle,
verify that the axiomatizations and constructed consistency sentences are correct,
and then the same argument that convinced us that PA + ConPA must be sound
because PA is should also convince us that Tn+1 is sound. Since Tn+1 ` ConTn , we
10One might object that this misrepresents Go¨del’s views on the nature of absolute provability.
He ultimately came to think that a proposition is provable tout court if it follows from set theory
plus some true large cardinal assumptions (Go¨del 1946, p.151). Hence, the restriction in this chap-
ter to arithmetic and the neglecting of set theory perhaps fails to do justice to Go¨del’s thought
on the matter. The reasons for restricting ourselves to arithmetic here are as follows: firstly, it is
unclear to what extent the various extensions of ZFC by large cardinal axioms should be, or even
are, regarded as knowably sound. It is by no means clear, for example, that the Riemann Hypoth-
esis could be settled by a proof in some extension of ZFC by large cardinal assumptions. Hence
philosophically, the significance of the discussion is unclear if framed set-theoretically. Secondly,
it is widely acknowledged that the large cardinals as Go¨del conceived of them can’t successfully
frame a notion of absolute provability that works in the desired way, since by the Levy–Solovay
theorem, even under powerful large cardinal hypotheses the size of the continuum is still sensitive
to forcing (Koellner 2010, p.202). Hence we’re better off here restricting our attention to undecid-
able propositions that are arithmetical (unlike CH) and for which Go¨del offers a more persuasive
argument.
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have, for any n an argument that ConTn isn’t absolutely undecidable.
2.3 Ordinal Notations
Go¨del’s argument succeeds for at least arbitrary finite extensions of a knowably
sound theory by the iterated addition of consistency statements. But the theory
Tω, which extends every Tn in our sequence above by ConTn , is recursively enu-
merable. Hence ConTω , is true and independent of the theory. The crucial question
is now whether Go¨del’s argument is successful in the case of transfinite iterated
addition of canonical consistency sentences.
Given the argument above that the axioms of PA are just as evident as those of
Tn, for any n, and the fact that Tω simply extends the Tns by canonical consistency
statements, let’s grant that the axioms of Tω are just as evident as those of PA.
Now Tω is incomplete, but according to Go¨del’s argument, our reasons for believing
PA is sound are exactly as evident as our reasons for believing in the soundness of
Tω, and hence are exactly as evident as our reasons for believing in the soundness
of Tω + ConTω .
At this point, the situation has changed drastically. When we’ve iterated the ad-
dition of consistency sentences only finitely many times, we can directly write down
what the theory is. For example, T2 = PA+ConPA+ConPA+ConPA . Evidently the
process is laborious, but there’s no obstacle to checking ‘in principle’ whether such a
theory is an extension by the iterated addition of consistency sentences of PA, and
hence whether Go¨del’s argument applies to it. However, we cannot use such brute
force methods in representing a theory in our chain after the addition of infinitely
many consistency sentences. We also can’t simply write down ‘Tω’ and formulate
its consistency sentence accordingly, since all our theories are couched in the lan-
guage of arithmetic, and this does not include symbols for transfinite ordinals. If we
want to assert that Tω is consistent by using a canonical consistency sentence, we
need to fix a presentation of that theory in order to define a proof predicate for it.
Hence we need to use a notation system for representing recursive ordinals in the
natural numbers, such as Kleene’s O or an equivalent, just as we did for reflection
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progressions in the previous chapter.11
This is a big problem for Go¨del’s argument, because there is no recursive pro-
cedure for deciding whether a number represents an ordinal, nor is there such a
procedure for determining whether two notations represent the same ordinal. So
unlike in the finite case, there is no reason to suppose that, where β is transfinite,
we can effectively recognize that the βth theory in a sequence is actually an exten-
sion of PA by transfinitely iterated consistency reflection. In consequence, there is
no reason suppose that the axioms of such a theory really are exactly as evident as
those of PA.
To spell this out in a little more detail: recall that
ConTα =df ¬∃m PrfTα(m, p0 = 1q)
So the formulation of the consistency sentence is itself dependent on the predicate
PrfTα , which is sensitive to exactly how the theory Tα is axiomatized. Given that
we are working in the language of arithmetic, we cannot define the βth theory in our
reflection sequence as the βth extension of PA by iterated consistency reflection if
β is transfinite. But we need a means to express that some of our theories are the
result of transfinite iterated addition of consistency sentences to PA, hence the need
for a coding system which allows for the representation of recursive ordinals. Even
supposing that the transfinite iterated addition of consistency sentences doesn’t spoil
our ability to perspicuously formulate the proof predicate here, it remains that Tα+1
is only as evident as Tα if we can recognize that ConTα is true.
Given the intended generality of Go¨del’s argument, our recognition of the truth
of ConTα can’t hinge on any special features that sentence may have. Rather, our
recognition of its truth must consist solely in our recognition that it is a consistency
sentence for an extension of PA by the iterated addition of consistency sentences.
This is so only if Tα is a member of our reflection sequence; i.e if the ordinal index
is denoted in the arithmetical presentation of the theory by a notation in O of a
recursive ordinal.
11Though we don’t know the exact date of the relevant manuscript, Go¨del’s argument may
well have been produced years before Kleene’s work on ordinal notations, so I’m not making the
anachronistic argument that Go¨del was wrong to ignore these issues. Rather, I am claiming merely
that they can help us see why the Go¨del’s arguments break down.
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Given that there is no recursive procedure for recognizing whether a number
‘denotes’ an ordinal in this fashion, we have no reason to suppose that we can
always recognize the truth of a sentence expressing the consistency of a theory in
the transfinite stages of our sequence, as Go¨del’s argument requires. In fact, this
seems to be a good reason to suppose that our ability to recognize the truth of the
relevant sentences might give out at some point.
So Go¨del’s evidence argument looses its persuasive power once we’ve iterated the
addition of consistency sentences into the transfinite. Furthermore we must iterate
that procedure transfinitely, since a finite version of the evidence argument fails to
show that the consistency sentence for Tω isn’t absolutely undecidable.
2.4 The Irrationality Argument
Go¨del communicated to Hao Wang a somewhat crypic second argument against the
existence of absolutely undecidable arithmetical propositions. With respect to the
hypothesis that there exist such propositions, Go¨del claims that ‘if it were true it
would mean that human reason is utterly irrational in asking questions it cannot
answer while asserting emphatically that only reason can answer them. Human
reason would then be very imperfect and, in some sense, even inconsistent’ (Wang
1974, pp.324–5).12 Let’s call this the ‘irrationality argument’.
I hope we can all agree that Go¨del’s meaning here is difficult to discern. He
might be claiming that the mere existence of an absolutely undecidable proposition
is sufficient for some kind of inconsistency in human reasoning. Against this ar-
gument, the comments made above have nothing to offer. I think there are good
historical reasons to think that Go¨del did have such an argument in mind. Though
his position on undecidability fluctuated over time, he eventually settled on a po-
sition called ‘rationalistic optimism’ (Wang 1974, p.324-326). Narrowly speaking,
this is the view that any well-posed mathematical proposition can be proved or can
be refuted. More broadly, it is the view that ‘for clear questions posed by reason,
12The quotation here is not a direct quotation from Go¨del, but from Wang’s paraphrase of
Go¨del’s argument. The source can certainly be considered a reliable report of Go¨del’s view, but
we should not make too much of the precise phrasing of this argument.
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reason can find clear answers’ (Go¨del 1961/?, p.318). With such a strong conception
of the powers of human reasoning, it is quite possible that Go¨del’s intended mean-
ing is simply that the existence of an absolutely undecidable proposition would be
scandalous.
At least with respect to arithmetical propositions, some form of optimism seems
to have been Go¨del’s view throughout the majority of his career; even in the 1930s,
when Go¨del did entertain the existence of absolutely undecidable propositions, these
were set-theoretic, and generally related to the continuum hypothesis.13 He wasn’t,
even at this time, convinced that the incompleteness theorems suggest the existence
of absolutely undecidable number-theoretic propositions. Tieszen (2011, p.202) ar-
gues that Go¨del eventually came to take the absolute decidability of mathematical
propositions (including those of set theory) to be a ‘postulate of reason’, and several
of his writings certainly support that reading. For example, his closing remarks of
the Russell paper implore us not to abandon the ideas behind Leibniz’s programme
for a Characterstica Universalis (Go¨del 1944, pp.140–141). In a later paper (1961/?,
p.385), he cites a broad agreement with the Kantian conception of mathematics.
Tieszen traces these remarks to assertions by Kant of the explicit solvability of all
problems in mathematics:
[T]here are sciences whose nature entails that every question occurring in
them must absolutely be answerable from what one knows, because the
answer must arise from the same source as the question; and there it is
in no way allowed to plead unavoidable ignorance, but rather a solution
can be demanded (Kant 1787, A476/B504).
Additional remarks at (A480/B508) make it clear that Kant considers mathematics
at large to be such a science. In the light of this historical evidence, we can make
a probable judgement that Go¨del’s remarks to Wang are intended to be read in
a rather strong sense. I don’t have much to say here about such an argument,
but I think it would be of little appeal to philosophers who don’t entirely share
Go¨del’s rationalistic leanings. After all, it relies on a clearly non-standard notion
of inconsistency or irrationality; we don’t ordinarily take the inability to answer a
13Indeed, he claims that the absolute undecidability of CH is ‘very likely’ and ‘highly plausible’
in (193?) itself (p.175).
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clearly posed question as a symptom of either aﬄiction. However, I think a modest
interpretation of this argument is of some broader interest.
The modest claim is that there is some kind of irrationality involved in thinking
that we might be presented with some axioms for a theory which are known to be
sound, and think that we can’t determine the truth of the canonical consistency
sentence for those axioms by means of mathematical reasoning. This is much more
interesting a reading of Go¨del’s remarks, since it appeals to the popular idea that
we can, for instance, ‘see’ that the Go¨del sentence of PA is true. Indeed, read this
way the irrationality argument is a corollary of the evidence argument.
Moreover, the argument fails for the same reasons that the evidence argument
failed. According to the picture I’ve sketched, though there might be an absolutely
undecidable true proposition, there cannot be a recognizable example of such a
proposition that would give rise to the irrational scenario sketched above.14 Suppose
that we were presented with a consistency sentence that was alleged to be absolutely
undecidable. This proposition would specify some axioms for a theory, Tn, which is
some extension of PA by iterated consistency, and exhibit some consistency sentence
constructed by a specified canonical method from those axioms. If we can tell what
we’re looking at, then such a proposition could not be an example of something
absolutely undecidable: if we can recognize that Tn extends PA in the right way,
which involves recognizing that n denotes an ordinal, then we can recognize its
soundness, and hence the soundness of Tn+ConTn . And this theory trivially decides
ConTn in the affirmative. In other words, if we can recognize that the sentence is
the sort of thing that might be absolutely undecidable, we can thereby recognize its
truth. On the other hand, if we can’t recognize that Tn extends PA in the right
way, then we can’t in general recognize that the theory is sound, and hence couldn’t
recognize that ConTn is indeed true given that it’s constructed from the axioms of
Tn. In such circumstances, there is no reason to think that we have any other means
of determining the truth of the sentence. So the sentences that are candidates for
truth and absolute undecidability, can’t be recognised for what they are.
Either way, this kind of absolute undecidability does not mean that we can be in
the ‘irrational’ position of simultaneously having a theory known to be sound and
14Again, attention is restricted to the arithmetical case; perhaps we can recognize that CH is
absolutely undecidable, for instance.
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not having a means of proving its consistency: if we can’t prove that the theory is
consistent it’s because we can’t recognize that it is sound. This will be because we
can’t recognize that it extends PA in the right way; and in general there seems to
be nothing ‘inconsistent’ or ‘irrational’ in supposing that we can’t always recognise
whether a natural number codes an ordinal or not. This is especially so given the
lack of a recursive procedure for doing this.
2.5 Go¨del’s Disjunction Revisited
So much for Go¨del’s arguments against absolute undecidability. Both have persua-
sive features, but neither can be made to work in full generality. Having defused
them, it’s worth pausing to consider the state of the dialectic with respect to the
disjunctive argument. Go¨del himself never offered a Lucas-Penrose type argument
for anti-mechanism, but rather took it to be a consequence via disjunctive syllogism
from the truth of rationalistic optimism (Shapiro 2016, p.191). Similarly, in the
previous chapter, I never offered a positive argument for absolute undecidability,
just another disjunctive syllogism from the disastrous epistemological picture that
Go¨delian anti-mechanism left us with. The arguments of Go¨del’s just examined
in the previous few sections were similarly indirect; they aimed to ward off argu-
ments for absolute undecidability, and could only give peripheral support for Go¨del’s
rationalistic position. Hence, in rejecting those arguments, I have offered only a pre-
liminary case for the existence of absolutely undecidable arithmetical propositions.
My aim in the next few sections is to develop these considerations into a more pos-
itive argument for the existence of them.
In the previous chapter, we reached the conclusion that Go¨delian anti-mechanism
succeeds if and only if we have the ability to construct very specific sequences of
notations for transfinite recursive ordinals. It now appears that Go¨del’s argument
for the decidability of every arithmetical proposition also hinges on an ability to
recognise such notations unrestrictedly, at least ‘in principle’ (which is to say, under
conditions of extreme idealisation).
This observation lets us greatly sharpen Go¨del’s disjunctive conclusion. The cru-
cial issue becomes whether we can, with respect to O (or to some equivalent notation
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system) and under idealised conditions, select or enumerate notations for recursive
ordinals in such a way that the arithmetical theories in a Feferman reflection pro-
gression indexed by these numbers are collectively complete with respect to true
sentences of arithmetic.15 Call the ability to do this the ‘recursive ordinal selection
ability’. Determining whether we possess this ability promises to be substantially
more tractable than the issues with which we were originally faced.
There is a lack of clarity in the thesis that the human mind is a machine, and
an equal lack of clarity in the claim that the mind isn’t a machine. Due to this
lack of clarity, the conclusion reached in the previous chapter was merely that anti-
mechanism wasn’t supported by the incompleteness theorems; certainly no definite
conclusion on the general hypothesis of mechanism was reached. By contrast, the
claim that we have the recursive ordinal selection ability is much more specific (al-
though still open to multiple interpretations, as we shall see below). Furthermore,
since our idealised mathematical abilities extend our actual mathematical abilities,
we can focus the debate on whether or not our present abilities to construct ordinal
notations should be taken to generalise in the required way when we remove the
constraints of paper and time. This strikes me as a far less daunting task than
determining the general nature of the human mind!
The revised disjunction can now be formulated as follows:
(a) We have the recursive ordinal selection ability, and mathematical
proof cannot be represented mechanically; or
(b) We lack the recursive ordinal selection ability, and there are abso-
lutely undecidable propositions
The advantage of this new disjunction is that it allows us to see precisely on what
the previously unclear debates hinges. Despite that, it is true that something is lost
in this formulation. Namely, it completely glosses over the wider debate outside
of the arithmetical context. After all, Go¨del for a time thought that there were
absolutely undecidable propositions that weren’t arithmetical in character. But we
15The relevant conditions of idealisation remain unchanged from the previous chapter: the
idealised mathematician is assumed to have access to arbitrarily large, but finite, amounts of
material, time, and energy in verifying the index of any theory in a progression in order to construct
a sequence of the required kind.
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shall return to the issue of set-theoretic propositions in later chapters.
For now, it’s important to note that rationalistic optimism and the recursive
ordinal selection ability are related by implication: if the former is true, then no
arithmetical proposition is absolutely undecidable, in principle. And if there are
no absolutely undecidable arithmetical propositions, then it follows that we have
the recursive ordinal selection ability: Franze´n (2004, p.191) has proved that there
is a unary primitive recursive function f from sentences in LQ to natural numbers
such that φ is true iff f(φ) ∈ O. Hence if all arithmetical sentences are decidable
by some means, we could simply read off the correct selection of ordinal notations
via the use of this function. So, with respect to the arithmetical restriction of the
disjunctive argument, we can resolve the debate entirely if we can show that human
beings don’t have the recursive ordinal selection ability.
I don’t have an argument that Go¨del’s optimism is incoherent; in fact I don’t
think it’s incoherent in the slightest. Rather, I’ll argue that the evidence as it stands
shows that we have no good reason to believe that we have the recursive ordinal
selection ability, even in principle. For those of us who can’t take the existence
of such an ability on faith, the existence of an absolutely undecidable arithmetical
proposition is made enormously probable by the evidence to be presented. And if
there is such a proposition, it follows by modus tollens that rationalistic optimism
is false.
2.6 Recursive Ordinal Selection
In light of the mathematical results alluded to in this chapter, the only route for
the Go¨delian to take in asserting the absolute decidability of every arithmetical
proposition is to argue that we have the recursive ordinal selection ability. This is
to argue that, under idealised conditions and with respect to a fixed coding system
such as O or something equivalent, we can select notations for recursive ordinals
such that the union of the theories in a Feferman reflection progression indexed
by these notations is arithmetically complete. Having this ability is equivalent to
having the ability to non-recursively enumerate the truths of arithmetic by the use
of a reflection principle. There are two main senses in which we might have such an
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ability, both of which will be discussed (and rejected) below.
Strong Recursive Ordinal Selection
Firstly, we might have the ability to select the correct ordinal notations in a strong
sense. In this sense, our ability to select ordinal notations is a consequence of
rationalistic optimism, and so this is the distinctively Go¨delian route to take.16 Re-
call that rationalistic optimism credits us with the ability to prove or refute any
well-defined mathematical proposition. We can pick some branch, ∆, of a recur-
sive progression of PA using Feferman reflection such that
⋃
n∈∆:|n|<ωω2+1 PAn is
arithmetically complete, since such branches exist by Feferman’s theorem. For any
number then, the question ‘n ∈ ∆?’ is meaningful. Assuming rationalistic optimism
then, we should be able to enumerate the members of ∆ by enumerating the answers
to ‘n ∈ ∆?’ for each n, and removing the numbers for which the answer is ‘no’.
Assuming rationalistic optimism then, we have the recursive ordinal selection ability
almost trivially.
There are two central problems with this Go¨delian view. We saw in the previ-
ous chapter that taking our arithmetical capabilities, even heavily idealised, to be
modelled by a Feferman arithmetic involves crediting the idealised mathematician
with knowledge of certain arithmetical truths which are required to correctly con-
struct the arithmetically complete theory. But being able to deploy this theory was
supposed to explain why the idealised mathematician had knowledge of those truths
in the first place. So to whatever extent you have sympathy with the arguments of
chapter 1, you should be hostile to the Go¨delian view here, since in essence ratio-
nalistic optimism entails Go¨delian anti-mechanism.
Moreover, this isn’t all that’s wrong with Go¨del’s view. Once we’ve seen that
thinking about the recursive ordinal selection ability is just another way of thinking
about the hypothesis that no arithmetical propositions are absolutely undecidable, it
becomes apparent that the whole structure of this Go¨delian position is problematic.
This is because the ‘explanation’ of our ability to decide any arithmetical propo-
sition proceeds in terms of a prima facie more contentious principle, namely that
16Not that this is the only route for denying the existence of absolutely undecidable propositions.
We’ll see another below. But this is the distinctively Go¨delian argument which makes use of the
truth of rationalistic optimism as a working hypothesis.
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we have the recursive ordinal selection ability. That principle is, as I’ve argued, a
consequence of rationalistic optimism. But that is of no argumentative support for
the Go¨delian, since rationalistic optimism really is just optimism: despite Go¨del’s
insistence that its failure would constitute some kind of scandal to human reason,
it is hard to see how anything other than faith could compel us to believe its truth.
To illustrate the problem, consider this extremely unconvincing argument that all
arithmetical propositions are, in principle, decidable: all set-theoretic propositions
are decidable, in principle; therefore, all arithmetical propositions are decidable,
in principle. The problem with the argument is that its premise is much stronger
than its conclusion, so it’s almost trivial that the conclusion follows. Indeed, the
only missing information is that all arithmetical propositions are expressible in a
set-theoretic context.
Go¨del’s own argument may well be less egregious. However, it is more similar
than we ought to be comfortable with. Given the failure of the evidence and ir-
rationality arguments, all the Go¨delian is left with is something like ‘We have the
recursive ordinal selection ability. Therefore all arithmetical propositions are in-
principle decidable’. Feferman’s theorem gives us the required suppressed premise
that the recursive ordinal selection ability entails the decidability of all arithmetical
propositions.
Franze´n’s function gives us reason to believe that the recursive ordinal selection
ability is equivalent, in some sense, to the ability to prove any arithmetical truth,
so this argument doesn’t obviously deploy a stronger set-theoretic ability in order
to explain a weaker arithmetical ability. But why does the rationalist think that
we have the recursive ordinal selection ability in the first place? If we have it as
a result of some more general ability to solve set-theoretic problems, then we’ve
postulated a much more contentious ability in order to explain our arithmetical ca-
pacities, as in the egregious example. But the alternative is to postulate, without
broader reference to set theory, that we simply have the unexplained ability to pick
out the correct numbers from a notation system. But that is no explanation for our
ability to prove any arithmetical truth, since it is simply another way of asserting
it. So once it becomes clear that the selection ability is the key assumption in the
Go¨delian position, the argument looks to have a deeply unconvincing structure that
is practically question-begging.
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In summary, Go¨del’s position, though coherent, really has little to recommend
it. We’ve been given no serious philosophical or mathematical reason to think that
it’s true. The recursive ordinal selection ability, as conceived of by the optimist, is
a conceptual possibility and nothing more.
Weak Recursive Ordinal Selection
In this section, I want to discuss a weaker sense in which we might have the recursive
ordinal selection ability, one that does not depend on the assumption of rationalistic
optimism. The recursive ordinal selection ability requires that we can, in principle,
select natural numbers such that the theories in a Feferman reflection progression
based on PA indexed by those numbers are collectively arithmetically complete.
The rationalistic optimist posits that, under a suitable idealisation, we can select or
enumerate the indices of a branch in O such that the union of those theories in such
a progression is arithmetically complete. The weaker position to be considered here
makes no such claim, but nevertheless denies the existence of absolutely undecidable
arithmetical propositions.
The advocate of the weak position does not, unlike the Go¨delian, assert that
given time and paper, the idealised mind can execute a non-recursive procedure.
Furthermore, the weak position denies that there is some absolutely undecidable
arithmetical proposition which expresses the consistency of our idealised arithmeti-
cal output.17 The view therefore appears to lie somewhere between mechanism and
rationalistic optimism.18
According to this intermediate position, we cannot execute a non-recursive pro-
cedure, even under the standard idealisation away from time, paper, and so on.
Hence there are some arithmetical propositions which we cannot prove. Amongst
such propositions will be consistency sentences of some theories in a Feferman reflec-
tion progression on PA. If such a sentence, ConTn , cannot be proved, it is because
we cannot recognize that n ∈ O. After all, if we could recognize that fact, then
we would know that Tn was an extension of PA by iterated Feferman reflection,
17The existence of such a proposition follows from the most straightforward expression of mech-
anism as the thesis that the idealised mathematical abilities of the human mind have an output
coextensive with some Turing machine.
18Thanks to Tim Button for pressing me on the importance of this position.
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and hence that it was sound. So we would also recognize that T2n is sound, and
T2n ` ConTn . According to the weak position, it seems almost accidental that our
ability to recognize ordinal notations gives out before n, rather than after n but
before some m such that n <O m. The reason for this is that, although O is not
recursively enumerable, predecessors within O are recursively enumerable. In other
words, for any b ∈ O, the set {a | a <O b} is recursive. According to the weak
position, this fact gives us good reason to think that under suitable idealisation, we
could prove the undecidable sentence ConTn .
The weak position holds that our mathematical abilities have the output of
some recursive procedure. Hence, idealising to the extent that we can execute a
non-recursive procedure is too far; the idealised beings in such a scenario are no
longer representative of what is humanly provable, and hence are no longer rele-
vant to debate about absolute undecidability. Nevertheless, since any notation in
O has recursively enumerable predecessors, we can, for any m >O n, idealise to the
extent that it is recognizable by us under that idealisation that m ∈ O. Hence,
under idealisation, we can recognize that 2n ∈ O, and hence that ConTn is true. So
there are no absolutely undecidable arithmetical propositions, since any proposition
which is a plausible candidate for absolute undecidability is provable by us under
some acceptable idealisation of our abilities. The indices of the theories required by
such idealisations constitute a selection of notations satisfying the hypothesis that
we possess the recursive ordinal selection ability.
The weak position essentially reverses the order of the quantifiers in the rational-
istic optimist’s thesis: the latter claims that, under some idealisation, we can prove
every arithmetical truth, while that former claims that every arithmetical truth is
provable by us under some-or-another idealisation. If this is correct, then we have
the recursive ordinal selection ability not because we can, under idealisation select
each of the required notations, but because each of the required notations can, under
some idealisation, be selected by us.
Despite the intuitive appeal of such a position, it actually rests on optimism just
as much as the original Go¨delian position did. To see why, we need to re-examine
the idea that any limitation on our ability to recognize ordinal notations would be
‘accidental’, insofar as any such notation could be recognized by us under a natural
idealization on our current abilities. This claim rested crucially on the recursive enu-
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merability of predecessors in O, but overlooks the important fact that the ordering
<O is only partial. Suppose we accept the weak position’s claim that our current
arithmetical abilities have an output coextensive with some recursively enumerable
set, the closure of the theory Tn. The intermediate position claims for any m such
that n <O m, under some idealisation our abilities correspond to Tm. The claim
has some intuitive appeal, but it does not entail that any notation is recognizable
as such by us under some idealisation or another. Since <O is only partial, all we
can suppose is that any notation which lies on a path that includes n is recognizable
by us under some idealisation.
Even if all of that is true, it does not entail that we have the recursive ordinal
selection ability, thanks to the Feferman–Spector theorem, which we encountered in
the previous chapter:
Feferman–Spector Theorem: There are paths Z through O that
constitute a notation for every ordinal < ωCK1 , such that
⋃
n∈Z Tn is
incomplete with respect to the Π1 sentences (Feferman and Spector 1962,
p.384). Moreover, there are ℵ0 such paths (1962, p.389).
Why is this so bad for the weak position? Suppose we accept that our current abil-
ities correspond to Tn and that any notation which lies on a path that includes n is
recognizable by us under some idealisation. This means that for any ordinal less that
ωCK1 , we can recognize some notation for it. What the Feferman–Spector theorem
tells us is that being able to give a notation for every recursive ordinal by enumer-
ating a path through O is not on its own sufficient to generate an arithmetically
complete theory by iterated Feferman reflection on PA. This is because there are
paths through O such that the theories in a Feferman reflection progression which
are indexed to that path are collectively incomplete.
Hence the key premises of the intermediate position could all be true, and yet
we might lack the recursive ordinal selection ability. The thought was that any
arithmetical proposition was provable by some natural idealization of our actual
arithmetical abilities, because any ordinal notation could be recognized by us under
some natural idealization. However, the fact that the relevant order on O is only
partial means that it is only the notations on some paths that are recognizable by
such means, and the Feferman–Spector theorem shows that being able to follow a
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path through O does not entail having the ability to construct an arithmetically
complete theory by taking the union of theories in a progression indexed to nota-
tions in that path.
Only certain paths through O are such that the union of theories in a Fefer-
man reflection progression on PA indexed to that path are arithmetically complete.
Hence, the weak position is only correct if, by some cosmic chance, the theory rep-
resenting our current mathematical abilities happens to lie on one of these special
paths. And there is simply no reason to suspect that this is the case.
So the weak position, much like its strong counterpart, is a bare conceptual pos-
sibility; there is no reason to think that either is true. For all its extra sophistication,
the weak position rests on sheer optimism about our present arithmetical abilities,
much as the Go¨delian position requires enormous optimism about our idealised abil-
ities.
2.7 Which Propositions are Absolutely Undecidable?
We’ve seen that two parties to the absolute undecidability debate, namely strong
Go¨delianism and a weaker position, are conceptual possibilities, but beyond this
little can be said in their favour. Adopting them requires a certain kind of faith
in our arithmetical capacities that is simply unwarranted by the evidence. Another
option is to think that our arithmetical abilities are representable by the union of
theories in an initial segment (or segments) of some branches of a reflection pro-
gression based on PA. We are capable of expanding our arithmetical abilities by
going further in our iterative procedure of adding relevant instances of Feferman’s
reflection principle, so we can’t assume that our abilities are representable in a fixed
formal system.19
As the evidence currently stands, it would simply be a miracle if we have the
recursive ordinal selection ability, even if we only have it ‘in-principle’. If we are
unwilling to countenance such a miracle, it follows that some arithmetical propo-
19It is however, consistent with this position that our abilities be so representable. A thorough
discussion of this would take us too far afield, since it seems to me that Go¨del’s theorems can
neither verify nor refute this kind of mechanism.
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sitions are absolutely undecidable, namely those instances of Feferman reflection
corresponding to theories indexed by numbers which we cannot recognize as denot-
ing recursive ordinals, i.e. theories that we cannot recognize as sound by reflecting
on the soundness of PA.
The question naturally follows: which arithmetical propositions are absolutely
unprovable? Quite reasonably, one might want to see an example of such a sentence,
and perhaps if appropriate a proof of its independence from a system that might
represent our arithmetical capacities. The aim of this section is to give a principled
excuse for my lack of an example, and gesture at some philosophical significance the
necessary lack of an example might have. The reason is intimately related to the
failure of Go¨del’s irrationality argument, as you might expect.
As argued above, Go¨del’s evidence argument is sound at least as far as finite
iterations of reflection principles are concerned. The problem which comes to the
fore in extending this argument is that there is no general method for recognizing
ordinal notations within a given system (e.g. Kleene’s O), and we are obliged to
use such a system since, since the theorems of PAω can be enumerated by a Turing
machine. Since we cannot iteratively add instances of Feferman reflection to PA in
such a way that the union of the constructed theories is arithmetically complete, it
follows that the axioms of some theory in our progression are not exactly as evident
as the axioms of PA. But this fact means that neither I, nor anyone else, can exhibit
an absolutely unprovable arithmetical truth of this kind.
As was argued in the discussion of Go¨del’s irrationality argument, on the picture
I’m proposing, there could be no recognizable example of an absolutely undecidable
arithmetical proposition, for the reason that if a true instance of Feferman reflec-
tion is absolutely undecidable then we cannot recognize it as asserting a soundness
property of a theory which extends PA by iterated reflection, and which is therefore
sound. If we could so recognize it, we would have sufficient justification for the
soundness of a theory which trivially decides it. But if we cannot recognize it, then
there is no reason to think that it is true, and so no reason to think that it expresses
a true but unprovable arithmetical proposition. Either way, such a proposition could
not be the kind of example one might reasonably ask for.
As I’ve explained it, the reason that there are absolutely undecidable true propo-
sitions of arithmetic is, to speak somewhat metaphorically, because we lose our grip
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on whether a set of sentences is an axiomatization of an extension of PA by iter-
ated reflection when we cannot verify that such a theory is indexed by a suitable
notation or not. Any putative instance of an absolutely undecidable arithmetical
proposition will present a theory and a reflection principle for it. If we can recognize
that the theory is of the required kind, then reasoning just rehearsed will show that
the proposition is decidable in some stronger theory the axioms of which are exactly
as evident as those of PA. So I can’t give a counterexample to Go¨del’s rationalis-
tic faith about arithmetical propositions, because if a proposition is a recognizable
counterexample, then it is not a counterexample after all. But if my arguments are
sound, then the evidence overwhelmingly supports the existence of some unrecog-
nizable example of a true but absolutely undecidable arithmetical proposition.
That concludes the argument for the existence of absolutely undecidable arith-
metical propositions. But some light can be shed on the implications of this view by
considering another major philosophical issue related to Go¨del’s theorems: indefinite
extensibility.
2.8 Indefinite Extensibility
The arguments of the previous chapter have focused principally on epistemic is-
sues related to recursive axiomatization and the recursive ordinals. I’ve argued that
both have a principle role in addressing Go¨del’s disjunctive argument, because a
sensible epistemology of arithmetic is sufficient to defuse Go¨delian anti-mechanism
and establish the existence of absolutely undecidable arithmetical propositions. It
would therefore be remiss not to apply these considerations to the other central
philosophical issue in the vicinity of Go¨del’s theorem, namely Dummett’s argument
for arithmetical indefinite extensibility.20
The central text on indefinite extensibility in relation to the natural numbers is
(Dummett 1963). In that paper, the concern is to defend the working idea that the
meaning of an expression is its use against the claim that Go¨del’s theorem shows
that we have an inner perception of the intended interpretation of PA that cannot
20Indeed we can expect the preceding arguments to be relevant, for as Wright argues (1994,
p.175) indefinite extensibility and anti-mechanism are intimately related positions in the debate.
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be fully articulated in a formal theory. Although we’ll return to the issue of intuition
of mathematical objects in the next chapter, I think Dummett is essentially correct
that the rival position fails because the notion of a model is not something that we
can grasp independently of model theory (Dummett 1963, p.191). In other words,
models are not the sort of thing that are independent of their description. I’ll not
quibble with Dummett on this issue, nor am I concerned to attack the program-
matic identification of meaning with use. Rather, it is with the specific use to which
indefinite extensibility is put in the paper that I shall take issue.
In particular, Dummett uses considerations related to indefinite extensibility to
argue that the concept natural number is, in some sense, vague. This scandalous
conclusion has its basis in three claims: firstly, that the concept natural number
determines not only its extension, but also the grounds for asserting something to
be true of the natural numbers. Secondly, Dummett takes it that the notion of a
ground for asserting something to be true of all natural numbers is indefinitely ex-
tensible. Finally, he takes indefinite extensibility to be a species of vagueness. Hence
the conclusion that the concept natural number is vague.21 I’ll argue that Dummett
is mistaken, even in his own terms, to think of the grounds for asserting something
to be true of all natural numbers as indefinitely extensible. In other words, I’ll take
Dummett’s first and third claims for granted, and show that the second is false.
Hence, Dummett is mistaken, even in his own terms, to conclude that the concept
natural number is vague.
In (Dummett 1963), we are told that a concept is indefinitely extensible if ‘for
any definite characterisation of it, there is a natural extension of this characterisa-
tion, which yields a more inclusive concept’ (1963, p.195). Dummett’s archetype of
an indefinitely extensible concept is the concept ordinal, which is supposed to be
indefinitely extensible for the following reason: let O be the extension of some defi-
nite characterization of the concept ordinal. These order-types of well-orderings are
21There is a distinction to be drawn between the indefinite extensibility of the concept natural
number and the indefinite extensibility of the concept ground for asserting something about all
natural numbers. In (1963), as well as the follow-up paper (1994), Dummett does not assert that
the concept natural number is indefinitely extensible itself (i.e. with respect to its extension), nor
does he think that there might be ‘borderline cases’ or other indeterminacy in the application of
the concept (1994, p.336). However, as Oliver emphasises (1998, p.28), certain later time-slices
of Dummett do argue for the indefinite extensibility of the concept natural number. I shan’t be
concerned with such arguments here.
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themselves naturally well-ordered, and this well-order must itself have some order
type, Ω. It follows by some basic set theory that the order type of the sequence of
all ordinals less than α is α itself. By the well-ordering of ordinals, it is follows that
Ω ≮ Ω, and hence that Ω 6∈ O. We can then form some more extensive characteri-
zation of the ordinals with the extension O ∪ {Ω}.
This method of generating new ordinals is ‘natural’ in that it works in complete
generality; we can, according to Dummett, apply it to any well-defined totality of
ordinals. I won’t take a stand here on the validity of Dummett’s argument. All
that’s important for my purposes is that Dummett takes to be indefinitely extensi-
ble those concepts that are like the concept ordinal in this respect.
Dummett argues that the concept of ground for asserting something about all
natural numbers is also indefinitely extensible in the sense described (1994, p.336).
The reason is that the natural numbers are intimately related to their characteri-
zation as a totality over which induction is unrestrictedly valid. Induction is taken
by Dummett to be a means of asserting statements about all natural numbers with
respect to any ‘well-defined’ property. Indefinite extensibility appears because the
notion of ‘well-defined arithmetical property’ is itself indefinitely extensible (1963,
p.196).
Dummett’s argument for the latter principle is as follows: PA cannot prove
ConPA. However, if PA is sound, i.e. if all its axioms are true, then it is consistent.
Hence, whatever justification we had for believing PA to be sound is just as good
a basis for believing that PA + ConPA is sound. In this stronger system, we now
define the property of being ‘true-in-PA’, and this new property can feature in the
induction scheme (1963, p.195). This means we have a new ground for asserting
something about all natural numbers. Since our stronger system is itself a sound
extension of PA, it is again incomplete, and the process of forming new well-defined
properties of numbers can be continued indefinitely. Because all such properties
can be used for induction, any well-defined totality of grounds for asserting some-
thing about all natural numbers can, by the uniform means of adding consistency
sentences to the defining theory, be extended to form a more inclusive totality of
such grounds. All that is required is the insight that PA is itself sound. Hence the
concept of ground for asserting something about all natural numbers is indefinitely
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extensible, just as was the concept ordinal.22
As I mentioned above, Dummett takes this to constitute vagueness in the con-
cept natural number. I don’t know how to argue with this terminological decision,
but I do think Dummett’s argument misfires. The key to seeing why is to examine
what is meant by ‘indefinitely’.
2.9 Infinite Extensibility
In his discussion of the issue, Moore argues that with respect to any concept, not
just those that Dummett marks off as indefinitely extensible, we have no hope of de-
limiting in advance what its possible usage and applications might be (1998, p.119).
With this is mind, I don’t want to be read as making any grand claims about in-
duction over the natural numbers in general. However, I do think that Dummett’s
claim that the notion of a well-defined property is indefinitely extensible thanks to
Go¨del’s theorem is straightforwardly false.
Taking the ordinals as our paradigm case of indefinite extensibility, it seems clear
what ‘indefinite’ amounts to: the most general means we have of formulating prin-
ciples relating to the length of a sequence are set-theoretic. Hence the sequence of
ordinals, if it can be thought of as even having a length, is longer than any ordinal.
This is demonstrated by the general method exhibited of forming an ordinal greater
than any member of any putative set of all ordinals. A consequence is that we have
no means of taking the ordinals as a ‘definite totality’ — there will always be an-
other ordinal lurking outside any totality we might circumscribe.
The mention of a standard method of extending the initial concept is required for
indefinite extensibility; as Dummett puts it ‘this extension will be made according to
some general principle for generating such extensions, and, typically, the extended
characterisation will be formulated by reference to the previous, unextended, char-
acterisation’ (1963, pp.195–196). With respect to this process of extension, the
contrast between the ordinals and the notion of an arithmetical proof is stark. Play-
22Dummett’s original argument uses the iterated addition of the Go¨del sentence of a theory.
The matter is simplified without any substantive change in the argument by considering reflection
on consistency.
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ing the role of the standard ordinal construction in the arithmetical case is of course
the application of a reflection principle.
In particular, Dummett argues that our base theory is PA, and that re-
flection upon this theory proceeds by the iterated addition of canonical consis-
tency sentences. This leads to a sequence of theories, such that T0 = PA and
Tn+1 = Tn + ConTn . Each time we apply the consistency reflection principle, our
theory becomes more powerful than before. Dummett cautions that ‘there is no
ground for recourse to the conception of a mythical limit to the process of exten-
sion’ (1963, p.198), and concludes that the ground for asserting something true of
all numbers is indefinitely extensible.
The problem, however, is that the limit isn’t a myth! According to Dummett,
the application of consistency reflection is justified because the axioms of PA are
known to be sound. For the same reason, we can apply Feferman’s reflection princi-
ple.23 That principle is plainly valid with respect to a sound arithmetical theory, no
matter what the formula φ is: the antecedent of the principle is that, for all objects
x, the predicate which codes provability from the axioms of Tα holds of the number
coding the proposition that φ(x). If Tα is sound, then PrTα(Ψ) implies that Ψ.
Assuming the antecedent then, we then have it that for all objects x, φ(x), which is
the consequent of Feferman reflection, as required.
Even Dummett’s constructivist leanings do not alter the state of play here. By
the hypothesis that ∀x PrTα(φ(x˙)), we have a means of proving, when presented
with any n, that φ(n) (assuming that Tα is sound). On a standard Brower-Heyting-
Kolmogorov understanding of universal quantification, we therefore have a proof
that ∀x φ(x). That little argument is itself a construction transforming a proof
of ∀x PrTα(φ(x˙)) into a proof of ∀x φ(x), and hence on the BHK interpreta-
tion of the conditional, we have a proof (though of course not in Tα itself) that
∀x PrTα(φ(x˙)) → ∀x φ(x). And that argument for the conditional claim works
for any formula φ, constituting a proof of the Feferman reflection schema for Tα.
The whole argument just given relied only the assumption that Tα was sound, and
23Recall that Feferman reflection states that if, for all numbers, a theory proves the relevant
instance of a formula, then that formula is true of all numbers. Formally: ∀x PrTα(φ(x˙))→ ∀x φ(x)
where PrTα is a provability predicate for Tα coded in the standard Go¨delian fashion; and where
φ(x˙) denotes the number coding the result of substituting the numeral denoting x for the first
variable appearing in φ.
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hence even the intuitionist should accept that Feferman reflection holds for any
sound arithmetical theory. This is critical to my argument against Dummett, since
it allows for the deployment of Feferman’s completeness theorem.
In consequence, and contrary to Dummett’s claim, there is a limit to the process
of extending our grounds for asserting truths about the natural numbers: having
taking the union of theories in a Feferman reflection progression on PA indexed by
notations for ordinals < ωω
ω
, there are no more truths in the language of arithmetic
to be proved ‘further up’, not even instances of the induction schema. After such
a series of applications of the reflection principle, we are left with an arithmetically
complete theory. Although reaching this limit requires infinitely many applications
of the reflection principle, the ordinal is tiny, even by the standards of countable
ordinals.
We might, therefore, want to say that the notion of arithmetical proof is in-
finitely extensible, but it isn’t indefinitely extensible, if that is to imply anything
like a structure analogous to the sequence of ordinals.
2.10 Dummett on Feferman’s Theorem
The original paper by Dummett appears only a year after the proof of Feferman’s
theorem, so it’s no surprise that the former paper shows a lack of awareness of the
result. In a later paper (1994) Dummett specifically discusses Feferman’s theorem,
albeit briefly. There, he claims that for purposes of considering indefinite extensi-
bility, we should only be interested in autonomous progressions.
Recall that in each branch of an autonomous progression, one can only advance
to a stage Tn if at some previous stage there is a proof that the coding has been
successful, i.e. that n, a natural number, really does code |n|, an ordinal, in the sys-
tem we’ve set up. Such proofs are not in general available in progressions as we’ve
discussed them. Every autonomous progression on PA is incomplete and does not
have members indexed to every recursive ordinal.24
24These ordinals are also known as ‘constructive ordinals’ or ‘computable ordinals’. Nothing
substantive hinges on the choice of name: these ordinals are exactly those which have a notation
in O, and this is determined independently of the relationship between recursiveness and com-
putability. However, since an intuitionist like Dummett is likely to consider the name ‘computable
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Dummett glosses the autonomy condition on progressions as ‘the formal equiv-
alent of the requirement that we can recognize the axioms of the theory to be true’
(1994, p.337). Dummett quite rightly observes that no branch of any such pro-
gression can represent all the recursive ordinals, and though the point is not made
explicit, I assume that this is the reason he does not take his argument for indef-
inite extensibility to be under threat: since no autonomous progression exhausts
the recursive ordinals, we can presumably keep extending each one in a way that
vindicates Dummett’s argument.
Dummett’s gloss on the concept of an autonomous progression is somewhat non-
standard. A more neutral gloss would be that an autonomous progression is such
that we can recognize it at all points to be indexed by a recursive ordinal. In the case
under consideration, if we can recognize the theory as belonging to the progression,
it is trivial that is sound. But that is only because PA is sound as well. The au-
tonomous iteration of reflection principles is more commonly used to capture what
we are committed to when we accept a theory, rather than what we can recognize
as true on the basis of a theory (Feferman 1998, §4), so this characterization may
seem unusual. I suspect, however, that this is harmless, since by using Franze´n’s
function (discussed previously), if we can recognize that the theory is sound at each
stage, then we can recognize that it is indexed by an ordinal notation and vice-versa.
Despite that, there are two problems with Dummett’s argument here.
First, the autonomy of a progression only guarantees that at each stage we can
recognise the current stage as indexed by a notation for an ordinal by means available
within the theory itself so far. But in determining what an acceptable ground for
asserting truths about all natural numbers is, we have to go beyond what is available
in the formal system so far. Dummett’s own argument crucially relies on recogniz-
ing that PA is sound, and hence consistent, which of course requires resources that
go beyond those available in PA. Indeed, at every stage of the progression, we are
required to use more resources than we have available in the formal theory, since no
stage of the progression proves its own canonical consistency sentence.
Even if we restrict our attention to autonomous progressions, we must still use
ordinal’ as potentially misleading, it’s worth bearing in mind that the argument can be run entirely
in the more neutral terminology of ‘constructive ordinals’. Thanks to an anonymous referee from
Philosophia Mathematica for highlighting the need for clarification here.
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resources external to the theory to satisfy Dummett. Suppose that we have some Tn
such that for some m <O n (where <O is the ordering on notations induced by our
coding system), Tm ` Ω(n), where Ω(n) iff n ∈ O (i.e. iff n codes an ordinal). This
does not tell us that Tn is sound, as Dummett requires. Rather it tells us that Tn
extends Tm by the iterated addition of consistency sentences, which only amounts
to the soundness of Tn if Tm is itself sound, which of course cannot be proved in
Tm itself.
No argument to my knowledge has been offered as to why deploying information
from outside the theory at any given stage is legitimate if that information is about
the soundness of members of the progression, but illegitimate if the information is
about the indices of members of the progression. This looks especially suspicious in
light of the observation that recognizing the soundness of a member of the progres-
sion at transfinite stages requires recognizing that it is indexed by a notation for a
recursive ordinal.
Second, even if we had some story about why we should only care about au-
tonomous progressions in the course of determining whether the concept natural
number is indefinitely extensible, Dummett would still be wrong.25 The reason
is that, although the indices of the members of an autonomous progression don’t
represent all recursive ordinals, these progressions still have a well-defined ordinal
length, since all autonomous progressions break off at a recursive ordinal (Feferman
1998). Hence all such progressions are of length < ωCK1 , the first non-recursive ordi-
nal. Because of this, the analogy between the concept under consideration and the
sequence of ordinals breaks down completely, since there is no corresponding bound
on the length of sequences of ordinals.
In short, Dummett’s defence of indefinite extensibility in this case rests on an au-
tonomy restriction which cannot justifiably be imposed in this context, and wouldn’t
entail the indefinite extensibility of the relevant concept even if it could be. The
structure of grounds for asserting something of all natural numbers is simply not
like the structure of the ordinals in the relevant sense.
25This is not to suggest that we shouldn’t care about autonomous progressions. Autonomous
progressions were developed by Feferman, Kreisel, and others in order to think about the com-
mitments we incur from accepting a given theory, an endeavour which is surely worthwhile. All I
mean to suggest is that we don’t have a story about why we should care exclusively about such
progressions in the debate about indefinite extensibility.
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2.11 Responses on Dummett’s Behalf
A very simple way of stating the problem with Dummett’s argument is as follows:
for a concept to be indefinitely extensible is for any definite totality of things falling
under it to yield, by uniform means, a more inclusive totality of such things, typ-
ically by reference to the previous unextended characterization of the totality.26
Feferman’s theorem shows us that, in the case of extending our grounds for assert-
ing something of all numbers there is a limit to how far the process can go.27
Dummett’s own response is unsatisfactory, but there are two responses avail-
able on his behalf. A means for Dummett to defuse my second argument in the
previous section is to re-interpret the relevant mathematics so that it doesn’t have
the philosophical implications which cause trouble for his indefinite extensibility
argument. Wright (1985, pp.133–134) argues that the proof of Cantor’s Diagonal
argument, which is standardly taken to show that there is no enumeration of the
sets of natural numbers, can be instead be interpreted as a proof that there is no
recursive enumeration of the recursively enumerable sequences of numerals. This is
a strategy that a Dummettian might be sympathetic to in order to avoid a commit-
ment to uncountable cardinalities. A similar strategy might well be used to avoid
a commitment to non-recursive ordinals — interpret any proof of their existence as
a limitative theorem on what is recursively enumerable.28 In this case the analogy
with the ordinals might survive. If Dummett can avoid a commitment to ωCK1 and
larger ordinals, there is no reason to regard the limit on the length of progressions
as a genuine ordinal value. Thus, if the Dummettian can avoid thinking that ωCK1
really is an ordinal, then the argument that the concept natural number is indefi-
26In Dummett’s later arguments, the ‘typical’ condition is more strongly insisted upon (Dum-
mett 1991, p.318). In our particular case, given that the new system of grounds for asserting
something of all natural numbers is the result of defining a truth predicate for the old system of
grounds, I take it that Dummett’s more stringent account doesn’t change the state of play.
27I’ve argued in this chapter that we in fact can’t apply Feferman reflection in such a way as to
reach an arithmetically complete theory. But of course Dummett is not committed to this view.
In deploying Feferman’s theorem here, I am trying to show that Dummett is wrong in his own
terms; I’m not trying to show that we actually can reflect on the soundness of PA in such a way
as to prove every arithmetical truth.
28Thanks to Tim Button for making the connection between Wright’s work and Dummett’s
here, and for offering the argument on Dummett’s behalf.
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nitely extensible might be salvaged.29
I think this is sufficient to defuse the second argument of the previous section;
I doubt I could convince a sceptic that ωCK1 is an ordinal any more than I could
convince a finitist that ℵ0 is a cardinal. But that isn’t a dialectical position that I
find especially worrying. It’s worth noting that ωCK1 is a very small ordinal; indeed
it is countable, falling well short even of ω1. So this proposal would severely reduce
the strength of set theory in a way that few mathematicians or philosophers could
accept.
The ability of the Dummettian to defuse my second argument reveals the crucial
role played by Feferman’s theorem in this context. Since the goal is to show that
Dummett is wrong by his own lights, no argument against indefinite extensibility
requiring ordinal numbers not acceptable to a constructivist of the appropriate kind
will do, and the second argument offered did rely on considering ωCK1 as an ordinal.
By contrast, the ordinal bound provided by Feferman’s theorem is intuitionistically
acceptable, and hence the argument presented here has a virtue that a simple car-
dinality argument would lack.30 We might be inclined, for instance, to argue that
there are ℵ0 true arithmetical sentences, but ℵ1 countable ordinals, and hence that
the notion of arithmetical proof couldn’t possibly be extendible to the same extent
as the ordinals. But such an argument needn’t persuade a Dummettian in light of
Wright’s technique for re-interpreting theorems proving the existence of uncountable
cardinals.31
By contrast, the bound given by Feferman’s theorem is so small that even if we
equate the sequence of ordinals with the sequence of recursive ordinals, the concept
natural number is still not indefinitely extensible. Showing that it is would require
an argument that in extending our grounds for asserting something of all numbers
29As an anonymous referee pointed out to me, Church’s thesis ‘is not particularly plausible from
the intuitionistic standpoint’ (Dummett 2000, p.186). Hence, there may be non-recursive ordinals
(i.e. ordinals ≥ ωCK1 ) which are in some sense computable for the intuitionist. It is perhaps unlikely
therefore, that Dummett would be willing to pursue the strategy outlined in order to defuse the
argument. If so, then things are looking all the worse for Dummett.
30There is a further question about whether the proof of Feferman’s theorem is intuitionistically
acceptable, which is complicated by the open-endedness of the intuitionistic concept of proof.
Notably, Dummett does not raise the issue in his discussion of Feferman’s reflection techniques.
31Even in rejecting Church’s thesis, a Dummettian might well be hesitant to regard uncountable
ordinals as effectively constructible.
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we are restricted to using autonomous progressions of PA. But we’ve already seen
that no stable position can supply this argument, due to Dummett’s need for infor-
mation at each stage of the progression relating to the soundness of extensions of
PA by the iterated addition of consistency sentences.
A second option for Dummett is to claim that a concept can only be described as
indefinitely extensible ‘in its own terms’. The concept ordinal is indefinitely extensi-
ble (according to Dummett) because any defined totality can be extended by means
admissible in the general theory of ordinals. Similarly, one might think the concept
of a natural number is indefinitely extensible ‘in its own terms’; the argument I’ve
put forward against this makes ineliminable use of the concept recursive ordinal, a
concept which does not properly belong to arithmetic. Hence, Dummett’s argument
might escape unscathed.32
This argument strikes me as deeply suspicious for two reasons. Firstly, Dum-
mett’s own position relies on coding, in the language of arithmetic, concepts that
are difficult to see as ‘properly’ arithmetical. In particular, several concepts from
logic and the theory of syntax are coded into arithmetic in order to prove Go¨del’s
theorem, and appear again in the formulation and application of consistency reflec-
tion which is required for Dummett’s own argument to succeed.33 It is simply ad
hoc to insist that syntactic and logical concepts are legitimately arithmetizable here,
but that information about the recursive ordinals is not so.
Moreover, the resulting account of the concept ground for asserting something
of all natural numbers would be deeply unsatisfying. If the use of ordinal nota-
tions is excluded from theories which provide a ground for accepting truths about
the natural numbers, then even very well-behaved theories like PAω are not to be
considered as giving us proper justification for their arithmetical consequences. If
this theory did give us acceptable grounds for asserting something of all natural
32Put otherwise, Dummett’s advocate might say that the argument for the indefinite extensibil-
ity of the concept ordinal is sufficiently pure, but the argument for the non-indefinite extensibility
of the concept natural number is insufficiently so. This idea bears some resemblance to an idea
presented by Shapiro and Wright, who consider concepts which are indefinitely extensible relative
to some further concept. For example, the concept real number might be said to be indefinitely
extensible relative to the concept countable, since any countable set of reals can be extended via a
diagonal construction (Shapiro and Wright 2006, pp.266–267).
33For a fuller account of why these concepts go beyond what can be regarded as arithmetical in
the relevant sense, see (Isaacson 1987).
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numbers, then we ought to be able to reflect on its soundness; but we can’t reflect
on its soundness without the use of a notation denoting ω. This is a problem be-
cause PAω merely extends, by an evidently valid reflection principle, the axioms of
theories which, according to the view under consideration, do provide acceptable
arithmetical proofs. Moreover, it can still be recursively axiomatized, just like the
theories it is constructed from. So it is again ad hoc to exclude certain theories
as illegitimate when no illegitimate property of those theories can even be gestured
toward.
In conclusion, the concept grounds for asserting something about all natural num-
bers is not indefinitely extensible. More significantly, the concept natural number is
free from whatever kind of vagueness might infect the concept ordinal.
Conclusion
In light of results in recursion theory, it seems untenable to claim that the con-
cept of a ground for asserting something about numbers is indefinitely extensible.
Consequently, any reason for taking the concept natural number to be vague, or
open-ended, is undercut. The arguments I’ve made about indefinite extensibility
are intimately related to the discussion of Go¨del’s evidence argument earlier in the
chapter. Namely, the concept of an intuitively acceptable arithmetical proof is ex-
tensible to exactly the extent that the axioms of extensions of PA by the iterated
addition of Feferman reflection are as evident as the axioms of the base theory, PA.
Given that no example of a true but absolutely undecidable arithmetical propo-
sition can be exhibited, we are left with a peculiar species of quietism about the
limits of arithmetical knowledge. The arguments of this and the previous chapter
show that a rejection of Go¨delian anti-mechanism and rationalistic optimism is re-
quired. Two important corollaries follow: the existence of absolutely undecidable
arithmetical propositions, and the collapse of Dummett’s analogy between ordinals
and arithmetical proof.
This combination of views has perfectly coherent articulations, some of which are
mechanistic. Benacerraf, in his discussions of the Lucas-Penrose argument (1967),
notes the possibility of a position (later endorsed by Smith (2013, pp.281–283)) that
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might best be called ‘mechanistic quietism’. According to this position, it is con-
sistent with the arguments given in favour of anti-mechanism that our arithmetical
capabilities can be perfectly mimicked by a Turing machine, but that we don’t have
the ability to recognize the machine when presented with it. As mentioned above
(fn.19), I’m happy to remain silent on whether this kind of mechanism is true.
Perhaps the union of theories which we can reach by iterated reflection is itself re-
cursively axiomatized, and hence associated with some Turing machine which could
be taken as the definitive model of our idealised arithmetical capacities; though of
course definitively specifying which machine was such would be forever beyond our
abilities. But then again, perhaps the union of theories we can reach by iterated
reflection is not recursively axiomatizable. Benacerraf provides little reason to think
otherwise (Smith goes slightly further and claims that the ability to spot which ma-
chine enumerates my idealised output would be ‘godlike’ (2013, pp.281–282)).
Regardless of the status of mechanism, in embracing the notion that the union
of theories in an initial segment (or segments) of some branches of a Feferman re-
flection progression on PA models our idealised arithmetical capacities, we’ve seen
that a similar form of quietism is forced upon us: we can’t precisely delimit our
ability to recognise notations for recursive ordinals, so we can’t give an example of
an absolutely undecidable proposition. Moreover, it’s not merely an epistemic issue;
rather the very idea of exhibiting such a proposition doesn’t make sense. Even if we
don’t embrace the mechanistic element of Benacerraf and Smith’s view, we should
at least acquiesce in its quietism.
There is a decent positive story to tell about why our output could be repre-
sented by the union of theories in an initial segment (or segments) of some branches
of a transfinite reflection progression on PA, based on our knowledge that PA is
sound together with the observation that PAω is recursively axiomatizable. The
additional point that the union of theories which we can recognize to be sound isn’t
arithmetically complete has been developed over the previous two chapters. With
respect to arithmetical knowledge then, perhaps the significance of Go¨del’s theorem









In addition to the disjunctive argument examined in the previous chapters, Go¨del’s
Gibbs lecture contains a barrage of arguments that the incompleteness theorems
support some kind of platonism. In light of the arguments in Go¨del’s drafts of
Is Mathematics Syntax of Language?, a widely held view is that Go¨del’s theorems
refute conventionalism, at least as it was understood in the 1950s. Another fairly
common view is that the second incompleteness theorem is fatal for Hilbert’s for-
malistic programme with respect to infinitary mathematics.
While I’m happy to agree that these anti-platonist views are made less credible
by the incompleteness theorems, it is not so clear that the theorems can form the
basis of an argument for a specific variety of platonism. The main reason is a se-
vere lack of clarity in the nature of the position that they are supposed to be an
argument for. Go¨del claimed to have been a mathematical realist since 1925 (Wang
1987, pp.17–18), and was certainly a platonist at the time of his death in 1978. Five
decades is a long time to hold a view, and Go¨del’s position was certainly not static.
For example, mathematical intuition, a concept that has come to be intimately as-
sociated with Go¨del, plays no role in his support for platonism in the major articles
(1944), (1947), and (1951). But later, and especially in (1964), it takes on a leading
role. It’s further worth emphasising that much of the material we have attesting to
Go¨del’s platonism is from reported conversation, rough notes for talks and lectures,
and draft manuscripts. The result is that there is no one unique view that can be
called ‘Go¨del’s platonism’; there are only forms of platonism that are Go¨delian in
varying degrees.
In light of these considerations, it is difficult to know how to make progress in
assessing Go¨del’s claims that the incompleteness theorems support platonism. That
issue will be a focus of the next chapter; here I’ll take up the more straightfor-
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wardly interpretive task of getting clear on what Go¨delian platonism involves, and
in particular whether it deserves the allegations of mysticism that have been levelled
against it. The methodology adopted here will be something between rational re-
construction and critical exegesis. Since there is no unique realist view attributable
to the historical Go¨del, I’ll outline (§1–§2) a promising version of platonism that can
be extracted from his various writings on the subject. I’ll call this view conceptual
platonism. Along the way, I’ll also sketch what I take to be a Go¨delian account of
mathematical intuition, though we shall see that Go¨del’s use of this (already chal-
lenging) concept is both ambiguous and somewhat stretched. Nonetheless, there is
some evidence that this reading gets Go¨del right; in the next chapter we’ll see that
it vindicates his rather puzzling claim that our knowledge of small large cardinals
(at least up to Mahlo cardinals) is founded on mathematical intuition.
In §3 I’ll argue that Go¨del’s view, understood along these lines, involves no ‘mys-
ticism’ and should be perfectly intelligible to an analytic philosopher of mathematics
today. I’ll end, in §4, with a discussion of an element of Go¨del’s platonism that is ab-
sent from the reconstruction presented here. I’ll argue that Go¨del’s claims that some
perception-like relation obtains between us and sets are largely independent from
his more general view of intuition, and do not form a central pillar of his platonist
perspective. This is particularly relevant to the material of the final chapter, which
discusses Go¨del’s analogy between set theory and natural science, and his view on
the non-intuitive (a.k.a. ‘extrinsic’) justification of larger large cardinal axioms.
3.1 Two Kinds of Platonism
With the possible exception of Dummett’s work, it is often far from clear what real-
ism with respect to a particular subject matter amounts to. The case of platonism
in the philosophy of mathematics is no different, and in this context especially, re-
alism is often taken to be characterised only by a series of platitudes, such as that
mathematical objects ‘really exist’, that they are ‘mind-independent’, that they are
‘acausal’, ‘abstract’ etc. If taken as metaphors these platitudes are certainly sugges-
tive; if taken literally then one might think they hardly amount to the articulation
of a specific philosophical thesis.
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Go¨del himself is no stranger to these kinds of metaphors. In the Gibbs lecture
he characterizes ‘[p]latonism or “realism” as to the mathematical objects’ as the
view ‘that mathematical objects and facts (or at least something in them) exist
objectively and independently of our mental acts and decisions’ (1951, p.311). The
statement is of course less than transparent, and further points of articulation (such
as that platonism amounts to the view that mathematical objects are not located
in the mind or the natural world (1951, p.312, fn.17)), are hardly more informative.
It is such remarks that lead critics like Chihara (1990, p.12), to label Go¨del’s
platonism ‘a kind of theology’. I think that the above remarks, as well some other
popular examples, are intended by Go¨del to be a kind of ‘textbook’ reminder of
what platonism usually amounts to, rather than a specific thesis to be defended.
Nonetheless it isn’t clear just what kind of position Go¨del is defending. The goal
of this section is to try and articulate a distinctive kind of platonism that has its
roots in Go¨del’s writings and that, I hope, is less vulnerable to charges of being
metaphorical or theological. Although I’ll argue that we must ultimately reject at
least certain elements of Go¨del’s platonism (so construed), I think the result is both
a reasonable reconstruction of his writing and the sort of position that might be
found in mainstream analytic philosophy (though no doubt expressed in different
terminology).
As the previous paragraphs indicate, platonism is typically a position formu-
lated with respect to mathematical objects. It is these objects that are said to exist
timelessly, mind-independently, and so on. A striking feature of Go¨del’s view is
that his platonism is not primarily a kind of realism about mathematical objects
like sets, but is rather a realism about (the content of) mathematical concepts, such
as the concept set. At several places in his writings, Go¨del makes it clear that
he is a platonist about mathematical objects, in the more traditional sense, but it
is clear from his remarks elsewhere that platonism about concepts is explanatorily
prior in his view. Indeed at times he simply equates mathematical platonism with
realism about mathematical concepts (1951, p.314), while at others he takes it that
platonism about concepts implies platonism about objects:
[I]f the meanings of the primitive terms of set theory as explained...
are accepted as sound, it follows that the set-theoretical concepts and
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theorems describe some well-determined reality (Go¨del 1964, p.260)
This remark makes it clear that Go¨del’s view is not a ‘kind of theology’, or at least
that the central commitments are consistent with a more secular view of set theory.
Indeed I think that in these remarks is the seed of a much more subtle philosophical
position. Go¨del’s view is that a grasp of the concept set is the proper source of pla-
tonism about sets. And according to him, our grasp of the concept set is explained
primarily in terms of our apprehending the truth of increasingly strong axiomatic
theories of sets (1964, pp.260-261). Hence, what this platonism requires is an ac-
count of how we apprehend the truth of the axioms of set theory, and we should
hope to be able to provide such an account without recourse to mystical means.
Viewed this way, Go¨del’s platonism is relatively minimalistic. In the context of
arithmetic, Potter argues that ‘Go¨del thinks that once we have grasped the concept
“natural number” there is nothing further involved in the claim that natural numbers
exist, because he thought the concept “natural number” itself has a real content,
namely the existence of the natural numbers themselves’ (Potter 2001, p.343). Un-
derstanding Go¨del’s view this way makes clear an analogy between his platonism
and Quine’s; for a conceptual platonist it is quite proper to say that the existence of
sets demands nothing more than the truth of sentences which existentially quantify
over sets, perhaps the axioms and theorems of ZFC.1
Far from being theology then, conceptual platonism is the view that sets exist
if and only if they are quantified over in sound axiomatic theories of the primitive
term/concept set. No prayer or mystical insight is required to ascertain their exis-
tence, merely deduction from the axioms of set theory, and reflection on the concept
set. According to the picture so sketched, the pressing philosophical question is then
not how we have ‘access’ to causally inert abstract objects called ‘sets’, but rather
how it is that we apprehend the truth of the axioms of set theory. In my view this
1There is some question as to whether first- or second-order ZFC should be meant here.
Though a first-order formulation of the theory is standard today, there are good reasons to read
Go¨del as having second-order axioms in mind here. Firstly, Go¨del’s conception of set theory owes
much to Zermelo’s, whose system is most naturally taken to be second-order. Further, Go¨del
claims that set theory involves the primitive term property of sets (1947, p.181 fn17), which might
suggest a second-order axiomatization with properties as the values of the second-order variables.
Martin (2005, p.214) reads Go¨del as meaning a second-order axiomatization; though he doesn’t
provide an argument, it’s safe to assume he has something like these reasons in mind.
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question promises to be much more tractable.
In pursing the justification of set-theoretic axioms, Go¨del takes two relatively
distinct routes. The former, which will be our concern for the bulk of the next chap-
ter, focuses on what is known in the literature today as the intrinsic justification
of axioms. The other route pursued is the justification of axioms by ‘extrinsic’ or
quasi-scientific methods. Some of these are related to something akin to a ‘percep-
tion’ of sets, to be discussed in §4 of this chapter. The other considerations relate to
less direct extrinsic justification based on an analogy Go¨del draws between mathe-
matics and natural science, discussion of which will be taken up in chapter 5. For
now, I will flesh out the conceptual platonism at the heart of Go¨del’s view about
intrinsically justified axioms, in particular the role that mathematical intuition plays
in this account.
3.2 Mathematical Intuition
Perhaps even more so than for his platonism, Go¨del is infamous for his belief in
the existence of a faculty of mathematical intuition. As with platonism, it is not
entirely clear what Go¨del takes mathematical intuition to be, and certainly there is
no well-developed theory of intuition in his writings. But there are (at least) two
concepts at work that come under the heading of ‘intuition’, and disambiguating
them is crucial to framing a plausible interpretation of Go¨delian platonism.
As Go¨del is a platonist about both sets and the concept set, there are correspond-
ingly two notions of intuition, roughly corresponding to intuition of and intuition
that. Roughly speaking, intuition of is directed toward mathematical objects, and
intuition that is directed toward mathematical truths. Direct knowledge of math-
ematical objects is given by the former faculty; according to Go¨del this objectual
intuition is like ‘a kind of perception’ (1964, p.268) (though we’ll see below that,
in context, this remark is perhaps less substantial than it appears). Indeed, little
beyond the analogy with perception is offered as to how such intuition is supposed to
work. On the other hand, intuition that yields knowledge of mathematical axioms,
and might be thought therefore to give indirect knowledge of mathematical objects
via the medium of mathematical concepts.
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The most compelling interpretation of Go¨del is to think that intuition of is sup-
posed to be roughly Kantian; in other words a singular representation to a thinking
subject founded in perception or imagination. One reason for mistrust of the notion
of intuition in Go¨del’s thought is that, so interpreted, it is utterly mysterious how
such a faculty could do the work that Go¨del ascribes to it. According to Kant,
intuition founds arithmetic and geometry. The role it plays in Hilbert’s philoso-
phy is even more restricted, being used to account only for a ‘finitary’ fragment
of arithmetic. The most prominent modern account of intuition is due to Parsons,
and on his account objectual intuition does not even extend to natural numbers
(2008, p.186), or to small finite sets (2008, p.214). By contrast, Go¨del claims that
mathematical intuition can deliver much stronger verdicts, such as the existence of
Mahlo cardinals (1964, pp.260-261 and fn. 20).2
I think a lot of the confusion disappears if we take care to distinguish the role
of intuition that in Go¨del’s philosophy. Go¨del does not claim that we have intuition
of large cardinals such as Mahlo cardinals; indeed it is hard to see how this could
be possible if we understand intuition along broadly Kantian (and hence spatio-
temporal) lines. Rather, Go¨del claims we have an intuition that an axiom stating
the existence of such a large cardinal is true (1964, pp.260–261). This is just as
well, given that it is much easier to digest the idea that we have an intuition that
an axiom stating the existence of Mahlo cardinals is true, than it is to give credit
to the idea that we could have some quasi-perception of such a cardinal. Even the
more palatable thought needs an argument of course; in the next chapter I’ll outline
such an argument on behalf of conceptual platonism.
Although distinguishing these two varieties of intuition is required to give a
plausible interpretation of Go¨del’s platonism, it isn’t always clear whether it is
propositional or objectual intuition at work in his writings, in light of his platon-
ism about concepts. For example Go¨del speaks of ‘an intuition which is sufficiently
clear to produce the axioms of set theory’ (1964, p.268). This intuition is perhaps
supposed to be an intuition that such-and-such axioms are true. On the other hand,
Go¨del claims that the validity of axioms is a consequence of how things are with
2A cardinal κ is (strongly) inaccessible iff it is uncountable, regular, and such that 2λ < κ, for
all λ < κ (Jech 2003, p.58). A cardinal κ is (strongly) Mahlo iff the set of strongly inaccessible
cardinals < κ is stationary in κ (Kanamori 2009, p.21).
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the relevant mathematical concepts, (1944, p.139 and 1951, p.321).3 So perhaps the
‘sufficiently clear’ intuition referred to by Go¨del is meant to be an an intuition of
the set-theoteric concepts the facts about which entail the truth of the axioms.
Whichever interpretation was intended, it’s clear enough that for Go¨del, propo-
sitional intuition is delivered by the grasp we have of a concept. In sufficiently clear
cases, this will deliver knowledge of the truth of axioms, some of which may contain
quantification over objects such as sets. Although the term ‘intuition’ may sound
unhappy to the modern ear, I think there’s no mysticism involved in Go¨del’s com-
mitments here. And as in the case of his platonism, Go¨del’s view here can indeed
be interpreted as involving fairly minimal commitments. Thanks largely to the sec-
ond incompleteness theorem, Go¨del argues that mathematics cannot be the result
of syntactical or semantic convention and stipulation; in other words he thinks that
mathematics is importantly non-trivial, a view that few would take issue with today.
Potter (2001, p.340) argues that from this view, Go¨del’s terminological conven-
tions with respect to thought make the existence of something fulfilling the role of
mathematical intuition immediate. Go¨del thinks that ‘by our thinking, we cannot
create any qualitatively new elements, but only reproduce and combine those that
are given’ (1964, p.268). If thinking is, by definition, essentially combinatorial, and
mathematics is not reducible to combinatorics of syntax, then it follows that math-
ematical thought involves something ‘extra’, and this, whatever it may be, is called
‘intuition’.
Parson’s comes to a similar conclusion about the role of intuition in Go¨del’s
thought, namely that ‘the deliverances of mathematical intuition are just those
mathematical propositions and inferences that we take to be evident on reflection
and do not derive from others, or justify on a posteriori grounds, or explain away
by a conventionalist strategy’ (1995, p.59).
I think this minimalistic interpretation of Go¨delian propositional intuition is es-
sentially correct, and bears no resemblance to any kind of mystical insight. When
considered as a source of evidence for the truth of mathematical propositions, in-
tuition can be an imperfect tool. In particular, the credence intuition lends to a
particular proposition need not be particularly strong, and in some cases can be
3In Go¨del’s terminology, the axioms are ‘analytic’. See chapter 4 for details.
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outright misleading. Go¨del claims, for instance, that insufficiently clear intuition is
responsible for the set-theoretic paradoxes (1951, p.321). He is of course confident
that many such imperfect intuitions can be corrected over time; in a similar passage
(1964, pp.267-268) he claims that the paradoxes ‘are hardly any more troublesome
for mathematics than deceptions of the senses are for physics’. But for Go¨del, intu-
ition is neither immediate nor does having an intuition that P entail that P is true.
Parsons makes a related point in emphasising that there is a noticeable gap between
acknowledging the existence of intuition and giving any credence to it (Parsons 1995,
p.70).
Though there is no reason to buy into Go¨del’s terminological convention of calling
only combinatorial thoughts ‘thoughts’, accepting that mathematics is non-trivial is
almost sufficient for the existence of intuition in Go¨del’s sense. Given the explicit
juxtaposition Go¨del makes between intuitive sources of justification in set theory
and those that we would today call ‘extrinsic’ or ‘quasi-scientific’ (1964, p.269), the
only means of getting by without Go¨delian intuition would be to claim that the
soundness of all accepted mathematical axioms, together with any means of reduc-
ing incompleteness (such as the addition to a theory of its Go¨del sentence) can be
established exclusively by methods analogous to those employed in the sciences.
This is not the place to engage fully with this kind of radical empiricism about
mathematics, but it’s perhaps worth raising a point or two against it. Firstly, a
primary use of intuition is the justification of consistency statements for sound for-
mal theories. Even if extrinsic methods do have an important role to play in the
epistemology of mathematics, it is implausible to claim that such methods are the
only source of verification for the canonical consistency statement of PA, for in-
stance, since the truth of that statement follows straightforwardly from the sound-
ness of the theory. A second use for intuition is the verification of set-theoretic
axioms, and again in this case it is implausible to claim that all commonly accepted
axioms can be justified by exclusively extrinsic methods. Even if you think that
quasi-scientific considerations justify set theory as a whole (e.g. the apparent indis-
pensability of mathematical reasoning in the natural sciences), such considerations
radically under-determine which set theory we should accept as sound. For example,
even the standard set theory, ZFC, provides more sets than could be required for
any known purposes of natural science. These considerations are not conclusive, but
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they do serve at least to show quite how radical this kind of scientism really is.
If we reject this radical empiricism, then Potter and Parsons are correct to take
propositional intuition in Go¨del’s thought as involving fairly minimal commitments:
mathematical intuition is simply that which enables us to have objective, non-trivial,
non-empirical mathematical knowledge. In the context of Go¨del’s platonism, in par-
ticular, mathematical intuition is simply the grasp of a mathematical concept. For
intuition to yield knowledge of objects, the concept grasped must have the right
kind of ‘objective’ content.4 As Parsons highlights (1995, p.70), this doesn’t entail
anything as strong as Go¨del’s platonism. One could for example accept that we have
intuition that the axioms of PA are true, owing to a grasp of the concept number,
but deny that we have a similar grasp of the concept set, perhaps on grounds related
to the paradoxes. But for those of us who don’t find the concept set to be inher-
ently flawed on such grounds, Go¨del’s account of intuition is simply that a grasp of
that concept can yield mathematical knowledge without recourse to quasi-scientific
methods.
Although the notion of intuition may appear to be somewhat arcane to an-
alytic philosophers today, the idea that reflection on the concept set can yield
set-theoretical knowledge independent of quasi-scientific considerations is relatively
mainstream.5 There are of course pressing philosophical issues in the immediate
vicinity, such as how concepts are ‘grasped’, and what it is for an axiom (or any-
thing else) to be true ‘in virtue’ of the nature of a concept. But these are issues that
are pressing for a variety of philosophical positions, and the need for them even to
be asked makes it clear, I think, that Go¨del’s view amounts to far more than the
positing of some ‘mysterious faculty’, whatever his terminological decisions may at
times suggest.
At the start of this chapter, I expressed scepticism of the idea that there was one
unique theory that could be said to be Go¨del’s philosophy of mathematics. What is
certain, however, is that he was committed to a platonistic account of mathematical
4Cases where a concept is not of the right kind might fail to yield mathematical knowledge
in any non-trivial sense. An example of a flawed concept of this sort might be the concept of a
Fregean extension.
5The works of Boolos (1971 and 1989) and Paseau (2007) are prominent philosophical examples
of the idea. You’re likely to also find a ‘conceptual’ argument for at least some of the axioms in
any set theory textbook.
78 Chapter 3. Conceptual Platonism
objects grounded in intuition. I’ve attempted to sketch a Go¨delian theory which de-
bunks the claims of mysticism surrounding Go¨del’s position, which are in part due
to terminological choices made by Go¨del. I’ll call this position conceptual platonism.
Its core commitments are:
1. Platonism About Concepts: Certain mathematical concepts, including but
not limited to the concept set, have objective content.
2. Axioms: The content of these concepts is partially expressed in the sentences
which axiomatize the concept. Such axiomatic systems can be inconsistent or
incomplete; hence our grasp of the concepts involved can be insufficiently clear
or not completely articulated.
3. Platonism About Objects: Certain mathematical objects exist, namely
those that are quantified over by true sentences of theories which axiomatize
a concept with objective content.
4. Propositional Intuition: Certain parts of our mathematical knowledge, in-
cluding the result of reflection on concepts, is neither empirical, nor tautolog-
ical, nor the conclusion of a deductive proof.
The theory as it stands is clearly short of a full articulation, and there are many
philosophical problems lurking in the near vicinity. Most pressingly, it isn’t clear
what it means for a concept to have ‘objective content’, though Go¨del’s remarks
suggest that this amounts to something like the axiomatization of the concept being
a non-arbitrary matter (1964, p.261) where the resulting axioms ‘force themselves
upon us as being true’ (1964, p.268). The position as I’ve reconstructed it is one
that I think is ultimately unacceptable, for reasons related to the objectivity of the
concepts, to be discussed below. My only claims for now are that it is a sensible
reconstruction of Go¨del’s view, and that it is mysticism-free. The account sketched
above omits entirely the discussion of intuition of mathematical objects (i.e. ‘some-
thing like perception’ of them), and the extrinsic, quasi-scientific justification of
axioms. My view is that these elements of Go¨del’s thought are cleanly separable
from the four elements above in a way that those four are not separable from each
other. Later in this chapter, I’ll argue that rejecting any substantial analogy be-
tween intuition and perception is necessary, but does little damage to the integrity
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of Go¨del’s overall account of intrinsic justification. Quasi-scientific methods in set
theory, being a major element of Go¨del’s thought (and undoubtedly the most well-
received by later philosophers) will be the sole subject of chapter 5. It remains,
however, to explore one final charge of theology against Go¨del.
3.3 Go¨del, Anselm, and Hilbert
I’ve argued that Go¨del’s platonism, far from being ‘a kind of theology’, combines
elements of views in philosophy that are more-or-less mainstream: our knowledge of
mathematics is sometimes non-deductive, non-empirical, and non-trivial; we should
believe that sets exist because they are quantified over by axioms that we accept;
the content of the concept set is partially expressed in the axioms of set theory,
which can justified by philosophical reflection on what the concept set commits us
to.
For all that, I think that Go¨del’s conceptual platonism has at its heart a seri-
ous philosophical issue, and to see why I’ll examine another charge of mysticism
or theology that can be levelled at Go¨del’s position. Once again, I think that the
charge is misplaced, but nevertheless the commitments of Go¨del’s view here render
it untenable, at least pending further analysis.
In the 11th century, Anselm of Canterbury wrote in the Proslogium ‘So truly,
therefore, do you exist, O Lord, my God, that you can not be conceived not to
exist’ (Anselm of Canterbury 1077/8, §3). This is the conclusion of his ontological
argument ; the very concept God guarantees the existence of an object falling under
it. The thought is that the concept God subsumes all perfections, and a being which
did exist would be more perfect than one which did not. Hence, God exists.
The final charge of theology that I’ll discuss in relation to Go¨del’s work is this:
conceptual platonism is essentially a mathematical version of the ontological argu-
ment. Merely by reflecting on the concept set, we can determine that the axiom of
infinity (for instance), expresses some of its content. The axiom of infinity asserts
the existence of an infinite set, and therefore, such a set exists. Go¨del, just like
Anselm, has deduced the existence of objects out of mere concepts, a move that a
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critic might allege is mysticism par excellence.6
Of all such charges made against Go¨del, this I think has the most force. A cor-
nerstone of conceptual platonism is the idea that we gain knowledge of the soundness
of axioms via conceptual reflection, and that from this, the existence of sets follows.
This is seen most clearly when Go¨del contrasts his interpretation of set theory with
those of the constructivists and intuitionists, arguing that his is suitable for ‘some-
one who considers mathematical objects to exist independently of our constructions
and of our having an intuition of them individually, and who requires only that the
general mathematical concepts must be sufficiently clear for us to be able to recog-
nize their soundness and the truth of the axioms concerning them’ (1964 p.258, my
emphasis.).
Once again, however, Go¨del’s view has much in common with a mainstream
view in the philosophy of mathematics, indeed one with a distinguished pedigree.
Namely, his platonism incorporates elements strikingly similar to Hilbert’s concep-
tion of an axiomatic theory, as discussed in his correspondence with Frege.
Hilbert’s view of axiomatic theories is neatly expressed in his claim that ‘[i]f the
arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict one another, then they are true, and the
things defined by the axioms exist’ (1899, p.42). Go¨del’s view of axiomatic systems
is certainly not identical to Hilbert’s and care must be taken in ensuring that the
views are not conflated. Nonetheless, I think Go¨del’s inference from reflection on
the concept set to the existence of sets is closer to the inference made by Hilbert
than it is to the one made by Anselm, and the view of the former is certainly less ‘a
kind of theology’ than the view of the latter! That said, it is no accident I think that
Go¨del thought that some version of the ontological argument could be made to work
(Go¨del 1970). Furthermore, the connection between Hilbert’s view of mathematical
theories and the ontological argument for the existence of God was highlighted by
Frege (1900, p.47) merely eight days after Hilbert outlined his views on the subject.
The crucial points of difference between Hilbert and Go¨del are that Hilbert takes
the primitive terms appearing in his axioms to be meaningless in isolation, whereas
Go¨del explicitly speaks of the meaning of the primitive terms of set theory (1964,
p.260). Similarly, Hilbert takes the axioms of a theory to be partially interpreted
6Thanks to Tim Button for playing the critic here.
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syntax, but Go¨del thinks they express part of the content of the concept that they
axiomatize. Nonetheless, the similarity is clear; both take some axiom systems to
have some property which is sufficient for the existence of some things. In the case
of Hilbert, it is the syntactic consistency of the axioms which suffices for the exis-
tence of a mathematical ‘system’ (Hilbert 1899, p.40). For Go¨del, what is required
for the existence of objects appears to be more elusive, namely that the concept
axiomatized is ‘sound’, or has objective content.
Unfortunately, Go¨del is less informative than is required about what this con-
dition on axioms amounts to. Clearly though, he does think of the axioms of set
theory and of the concept set in this way. His remarks suggest that the objectiv-
ity of the content of the concept set is responsible for the non-arbitrariness of its
axiomatization (1964, p.261), and later he claims that the resulting axioms ‘force
themselves upon us as being true’ (1964, p.268). So Go¨del’s criteria are certainly
more restrictive than Hilbert’s, since we may suppose that a necessary condition on
a decent axiomatization of a concept with objective content is that it be consistent.
Of course, it is to some extent a matter of taste whether or not an analogy holds
good. I find myself impressed by the similarity of Go¨del’s view with Hilbert’s, in
that both maintain that certain axiomatic systems have a property sufficient for the
existence of some things. Perhaps others will be less so. For exegetical purposes, all
that is really important is the acknowledgement that Go¨del’s argumentative move,
from concepts to objects, does not by itself justly invite the charge of mysticism.
Amongst several central figures in the history of early analytic philosophy and math-
ematical logic, we find views that are similar in asserting that reflection on some
aspect of mathematics is all that is required to ascertain the existence of something
non-conceptual. Quite apart from Go¨del or Hilbert, it was maintained by Frege that
numbers exist simply as a matter of logic (1884), and by Dedekind that an infinite
system exists as a consequence of the existence of any thought whatsoever (1888,
pp.217-218). My point is not, of course, that we should adopt conceptual platon-
ism merely because it sits in such illustrious company. Rather, the point is that we
should not charge Go¨del’s view with mysticism simply because it takes the existence
of objects to be verifiable by reflection on the relevant theories and concepts. As
previously seen in this chapter, the attempt to portray Go¨del as lacking a serious
philosophical position to offer is found wanting.
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There does, however, remain the question of the viability of this aspect of con-
ceptual platonism. In assessing this, it’s helpful to draw on a distinction sketched by
Martin (2005, pp.209-210) between two differing interpretations of Go¨del’s remarks
on the concept set. The first is to interpret Go¨del’s remarks in the ‘straightfor-
ward’ sense, according to which the concept set is what sorts sets from non-sets. In
Fregean terminology, this is the first-level concept under which all and only sets fall.
The second interpretation offered by Martin is to read Go¨del as talking about the
concept set in a structural sense.7 In Fregean terminology, this is the second-level
concept under which all and only first-level concepts of set fall. The concept set in
this sense characterizes the structural properties that a first-level concept must have
if it is to genuinely qualify as a set-concept, rather than some other kind of concept.
Martin’s central criticism of Go¨del is that reflection on the concept set can only
give us information about the hierarchy in the structural sense. We might think, for
instance, that reflection on the iterative conception of set could deliver the verdict
that the axiom of pairs is true of it. At each level, we have all possible sets given
what has come before. So if a and b both appear in Vα, the iterative conception
dictates that the set {a, b} appears at Vα+1. Hence the axiom of pairs is satisfied.
The axioms therefore may indeed force themselves upon us as being true at the
second level, in that we may think no first-level concept could be a set-concept if it
didn’t satisfy the axiom of pairs.
What Martin rejects, however, is the idea that reflection upon the concept set
can yield similar knowledge of the hierarchy in the straightforward sense. We can’t,
merely by reflecting on the axioms, sort sets from non-sets, and in particular we
cannot determine by this kind of reasoning whether there are any sets at all. This
echoes Frege’s criticism of Hilbert in the geometric context, where the former com-
plained that the axioms of the latter could not determine whether a pocketwatch is
a point (Frege 1900, p.45).
The complaint is particularly vivid when we consider explicitly existential ax-
ioms, such as the axiom of infinity. Given that the iterative conception dictates
that the sequence of stages goes on as far as possible, we might be able to convince
ourselves that any set-structure must have a stage indexed by ω. We already have
7Martin calls this ‘the concept set in my sense’. The terminology has been altered to avoid
confusion.
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the means to form the stages indexed by finite ordinals, so the result of the closure
of the operation of forming such stages must also be a set. Even if convincing,
however, such reflection can’t show that there is such an infinite set, only that any
set-structure must contain such a set.
Go¨del’s position, however, is that reflection on the concept set allows us to de-
termine that axioms are true of the concept set in the straightforward sense. The
meaning of the primitive terms of set theory do not just determine that any set-
structure must contain an infinite set, though according to Go¨del they do determine
this. Much more than this, they determine that there is such a structure satisfying
the axiom of infinity.
There is a sense in which Go¨del’s position is difficult to assess here, as com-
pared to Hilbert’s. The latter is quite specific that consistency is the property an
axiomatic theory may have which is sufficient for the existence of the things collec-
tively implicitly defined by the theory. For Go¨del, however, it is the ‘soundness’ or
‘objective content’ of the concept axiomatized which is sufficient for the existence of
some objects satisfying the axioms. Indeed, the success or failure of Go¨del’s project
hinges on whether this notion can be made sufficiently precise.
According to Go¨del, the ‘criterion of truth in set theory’ is the existence of a
sufficiently forceful axiomatization of the concept set and a non-arbitrary series of
extensions of that axiomatization (1964, pp.268–269). Since our intuition of the con-
cept set is sufficiently clear to produce the axioms of ZFC, which ‘force themselves
upon us as being true’, and since these axioms can be extended non-arbitrarily by
further principles which serve to ‘unfold the content of the concept’ by means of fur-
ther appeals to intuition, the criterion of truth is satisfied. So according to Go¨del,
there is no ‘gap’ between the truth of the axioms in the structural sense and the
straightforward sense, just as for Hilbert there is no gap between the consistency of
a theory and the existence of a system which is defined by it. It is the objectivity
of the concept set which bridges the divide between structural and straightforward
truths about sets, and it is in terms of this objectivity that the conceptual platonist
must answer Martin’s argument.
What is wrong with this line of thought? There two key points on which to put
pressure. The first echoes Martin’s (and Frege’s) complaint that the axioms alone
do not suffice to sort the sets from anything else. Even if the objectivity of the
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concept set and ‘structural’ reflection on the axiom of infinity determines that ℵ0
exists, for instance, there is a further question: is it my pocket-watch or not? I have
some sympathy with this complaint; although the axiom of extensionality supplies
identity conditions for sets in terms of other sets, it does not tell us whether ℵ0
is a pocket-watch. But is this enough to show that the existence of ℵ0 can’t be
established by reflection on the axioms?
Clearly, Martin’s criticism is derivative of Frege’s famous Caesar problem (1884,
p.68e). Frege complains that some definitions previously given cannot decide
whether Julius Caesar is a number. And certainly this simple form of the prob-
lem cannot be solved by appeal to the axioms of ZFC; for all they tell us, ℵ0 might
be any object whatsoever (other than another set). But the real force of the issue
for Frege is that the indeterminacy of these identity conditions under discussion had
the consequence that, while he had successfully defined the senses of expressions
like ‘the number 0 belongs to [the concept φ]’, he had not succeeded in defining the
expression ‘0’ (Frege 1884, p.68e). If he had, it would follow by mere logic that 0 6=
Caesar.
The reason that the Caesar problem is so pressing for Frege is intimately bound
up with the logicist project. Frege required that all arithmetical truths must follow
from logic and definitions alone, hence the need for an explicit definition of number
that ruled out troublesome identity statements like ‘0 = Caesar’, the negation of
which does not follow from an inductive definition of ‘the number n belongs to [the
concept φ]’. But it’s not clear that Go¨del’s project faces anything like this problem.
It is true that, even by Go¨del’s own lights, ‘ℵ0 6= Caesar’ does not follow from
the axioms of set theory. But for Go¨del, the axioms of set theory needn’t be taken
(and indeed can’t be taken) to express the full content of the concept set. Hence
it is perfectly acceptable for Go¨del to assert that reflection on the concept reveals
that no set can be identical to a physical object. Whatever we may think of the
notion that reflection on a concept can deliver verdicts on quite technical infinitary
statements in set theory, it is less contentious to assert that if you understand the
concept set, you understand that sets are not to be found in physical reality. When I
say that ‘ℵ0’ denotes a set, part of what I mean is that it doesn’t denote a thing you
could bump into! So the force of Martin’s complaint is not apparent to me outside
of the Fregean context.
3.3. Go¨del, Anselm, and Hilbert 85
The other reason to reject the Go¨delian argument is that it is simply too un-
clear whether or not the axioms of ZFC characterize a concept with the required
objective content. One of the hallmarks of a concept with objective content is that
its axiomatization fails to settle all of the relevant mathematical questions, necessi-
tating the need for further appeals to intuition (1964, p.269). This principle sorts
the wheat from the chaff, to some extent, since no concept with objective content
can be properly axiomatized by an inconsistent theory, since such theories are not
extendible by these non-arbitrary means. But the other signifier of objectivity for
Go¨del is that the ‘axioms force themselves upon us as being true’. This is a deeply
unhelpful means of sorting the theories which axiomatize a concept with objective
content from those theories which do not. In the case of the concept set specifically,
the ongoing controversy about the justification of ZFC, as well as its extension by
large cardinal principles, ought to be a primary cause for concern. Without some
clear means of distinguishing concepts with objective content from those which lack
it, it is impossible to sustain the claim that if a concept has such content, then it
follows that some objects satisfy it. If we do not know in what the having of such
content consists, we can hardly claim such philosophically potent consequences for
it.
This is ultimately why we should reject conceptual platonism as an account of
mathematical objects: a crucial part of Go¨del’s theory is left insufficiently developed,
namely the specification of what the objectivity of a concept’s content amounts to.
This rejection comes only to agnosticism, however. I do not currently see how an
adequate account of the objectivity of a concept’s content can be developed, but I
have no argument that no such account can be found. Whether or not the account
can be properly supplemented, I think that any charge of mysticism is misplaced.
The view that mathematical entities of certain kinds are in some sense ontologically
‘cheap’ or ‘thin’ has great historical pedigree in the philosophy of mathematics, and
is a mainstream position for analytic philosophers today.8 I don’t see how Go¨del’s
version of this idea can be made viable, but that a philosophical theory has an ex-
planatory gap can hardly qualify it as mysticism. Go¨del does have an argument
as to why the existence of sets follows from the concept set, which goes beyond
8Most recently, a version of this idea has been put forward by Linnebo (2018).
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the mere observation that the concept is axiomatized by a theory containing an
existential quantifier. The argument is unsuccessful, but that is a rather mundane
philosophical problem.
3.4 Mathematical Perception
I’ve outlined a version of platonism and mathematical intuition reconstructed from
Go¨del’s remarks, and defended it against charges of mysticism. Even if we can’t
quite accept the theory in its present state, we’ve reached a position where we can
discuss Go¨del’s argument that the incompleteness theorems support platonism, and
assess the question of whether intuition gives us a means to substantially reduce
the incompleteness of set theory. Before moving on to those questions in the next
chapter, I’d like to discuss one aspect of Go¨del’s thought that I’ve almost completely
neglected in reconstructing his platonism: the hypothesised ability to perceive sets.
Though I have little of substance to add to the literature that already exists on
the subject, I’ll try to explain why I’ve not given the issue any attention until now,
and why I think we shouldn’t take any hypothesis of mathematical perception to
constitute a substantial element of Go¨del’s platonism.
The comments made by Go¨del in regards to the perception of mathematical
objects are less committal than one might suspect given the subsequent attention
they have received. As we shall see, he often speaks of perception of mathematical
objects and concepts analogically or metaphorically, and his remarks frequently tell
against any interpretation of him as postulating a literal ability to see sets or con-
cepts. Nonetheless, Maddy (1990) develops a full Go¨delian platonism on the basis
of taking perception seriously.9 This might tempt us to think along the following
lines: conceptual platonism had to be rejected because it posited the existence of
sets as a consequence of facts about the concept set, but the argument could not
be sustained due to a crippling lack of clarity. But why reject Go¨del’s view at this
point, rather than find an alternative justification for thinking that some objects do
satisfy the concept set? At this point, the hypothetical critic might point out that
9Maddy’s reading of Go¨del is very selective, as she herself is the first to admit (1990, p.78).
The view as offered is Go¨delian, not Go¨del’s.
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Go¨del does offer just such an alternative justification, namely the idea that we can
perceive mathematical objects.
While I admit that the omission of a discussion of perception is an interpreta-
tive risk in developing an account of Go¨delian platonism, I think it is a defensible
one.10 There are two chief reasons why, which shall be discussed in turn: firstly,
the aspects of Go¨del’s thought that I have chosen to emphasise at the expense of
perception are genuinely more prominent working parts of Go¨del’s philosophy of
set theory; secondly, I don’t see how perception, or anything much like it, could
take over the role that Go¨del’s platonism about concepts plays in establishing his
platonsim about sets, as the imagined critic suggests.
The first important thing to note is that Go¨del’s remarks about mathematical
perception do not strongly commit him to the view that we can actually perceive
sets, nor to the view that such perception justifies a belief in a structure satisfying
the axioms of set theory. Indeed, he is consistently quite clear that talk of mathe-
matical perception is not to be taken literally. In the Gibbs lecture he claims that
our ‘perception’ of mathematical objects is nothing to do with the spatio-temporal
‘world of real things’ (1951, p.320) and that the objects of mathematics are com-
pletely different from the objects of the senses (1951, p.312, fn.18). He does speak
of ‘an objective reality...which we can only perceive or describe’ (1951, p.320), but
this is explicitly in relation to concepts, so the remark does little to support the
interpretation of Go¨del as thinking that platonism about sets can be established
independently of our knowledge of the concept set. He also describes the afore-
mentioned objective reality as ‘non-sensual’ (1951, p.323), and claims that from the
objectivity of mathematics ‘it follows at once that its objects must be totally differ-
ent from sensual objects’ (1951, p.312, fn.18).
Little more support is found for the view in either version of ‘What is Cantor’s
continuum problem?’ (1947 and 1964). Go¨del does state that we ‘have something
like a perception also of the objects of set theory’ (1964, p.268), but he claims in
10Martin (2005, p.220) asserts that Go¨del would ‘no doubt reject’ an account of intuition which
equates intuition with the understanding of a concept. This appears to be for reasons that relate
to the perception of mathematical objects. But note that the reading I have urged of Go¨del is
not that intuition and understanding a concept are to be equated, but that there are two distinct
notions of intuition, one of which is roughly the understanding of concepts, the other of which is
roughly Kantian.
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the same breath that those objects are remote from sense experience, and that our
‘something like a perception’ is grounded in the self-evidence of the axioms of set
theory. Indeed, this particular kind of perception is explicitly stated to be mathe-
matical intuition, and in the next paragraph, he says that what is given in intuition
is ‘not, or not primarily, the sensations’. Hence even where Go¨del explicitly dis-
cusses perception, he falls far short of committing himself to a robust view that
sets can literally be perceived. In light of that, I think we should interpret Go¨del’s
remarks about ‘a kind of perception’ as referring to intuition of, i.e. singular objec-
tual intuition of the kind posited by Kant and Hilbert. Moreover, there is no hint
that he takes this to be the sort of thing that could convince us that there are sets
independently of our knowledge of the concept set. For this reason, I’ve not taken
perception or ‘something like a perception’ of mathematical objects to be a central
part of Go¨del’s view in reconstructing his platonism here.
Setting aside matters of interpretation, I think there are good philosophical rea-
sons to think that Go¨delian platonism cannot be salvaged by giving to perception
of sets the founding role in establishing the existence of sets that I have ascribed to
our knowledge of the concept set.11 There are of course, all sorts of difficulties in
positing a perception of even small finite sets. To use Maddy’s favoured example,
suppose there is a carton of three eggs before you. Do you see a set of three eggs?
Three singletons each with an egg as the member? The set of three such singletons?
The set whose members are the first egg and the pair of the second and third eggs?
Such problems of individuation are severe enough that Parsons (2008, pp.212-214)
denies even intuition of finite sets, let alone literal perception of them.
Secondly, as Maddy points out (1990, p.59), where we perceive a set of physical
objects, the same spatio-temporal region will be home to any set with just those
physical objects and no others in its transitive closure. This means that either our
perceptual capacities are such that whenever we see an object, we see a set of rank
α for any ordinal α, or our capacity to see sets is limited by the ordinal rank of a set,
which is not prima facie a sensory property at all. The former possibility ascribes
an astonishing richness to our visual capabilities, while the latter is manifestly ad
11On Go¨del’s behalf, of course. I should stress again that I take the inference from some property,
either of the concept set or of its axiomatization, to the existence of sets to be illegitimate, absent
a sufficiently developed account of how this could work.
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hoc. Neither possibility bodes well for the defender of set-perception.
Quite aside from these difficulties, however, it is unclear that perception of sets
could possibly do the philosophical work that conceptual platonism ascribes to the
objectivity of the content of a concept. In other words, it is difficult to make out
how perception of sets could determine that any particular set theory was satisfied
by some objects. Any account of set-perception that is weak enough to be plausible
will radically underdetermine which set theory is true, and hence won’t assure us
that the particular axiomatization of set theory delivered by our reflection on the
concept set is satisfied by some objects. Conversely, any account of set-perception
strong enough to ensure us that a powerful set theory such as ZFC is satisfied will
be so strong as to be implausible. For example, can we really claim to see, in a
purely visual sense, that the axiom of choice holds unrestrictedly, as opposed to a
restriction of choice up to some large ordinal rank like Vω1? I think not.
In summary, the omission of the notion of mathematical perception as a core
tenet of Go¨del’s platonism is interpretatively sound, and philosophically well-
motivated; even if the problems with the notion could be overcome, the perception
of sets is in no position to fulfil the role in Go¨del’s platonism that was occupied by
his quasi-Hilbertian views about the objects of axiomatic theories. It is the content
of the concept set, and the self-evidence and non-arbitrariness of its axiomatization
which, according to Go¨del, guarantees the existence of objects which fall under the
concept and satisfy the axioms, together with a non-arbitrary series of extensions
of them. So while Go¨del does think that we have ‘something like’ a perception of
mathematical objects, this plays no significant role in his arguments for platonism.
Conclusion
The central goals of this chapter were to get clear about what Go¨del’s platonism
amounts to, and to defend it against charges of mysticism. Although I’m scepti-
cal of claims by any one position to represent Go¨del’s views uniquely, I outlined a
position called conceptual platonism reconstructed from salient remarks by Go¨del
in several major works. According to this position, what matters for establishing
platonism about mathematical objects is not an account of how we ‘interact’ with
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acausal objects or similar, but rather an account of how we apprehend the truth of
axioms which express the content of the concepts under which those objects fall. In
particular, sets are known to exist because they are quantified over in the axioms of
set theory, the self-evidence and non-arbitrariness of which suffice to establish the
objectivity of the interative concept set. I urged that the fatal flaw in this position
is the lack of a developed account as to how we can distinguish, even in principle,
those theories which axiomatize a concept with objective content from those which
do not.
Although I don’t think we can accept the view in light of that serious omission, I
do think it’s a sophisticated position which cannot be fairly accused of mysticism or
theology. Indeed, the view shares crucial points of contact with mainstream views
in the philosophy of mathematics, namely Quine’s view that mathematical ontol-
ogy should be assessed via accepted axioms, and Hilbert’s conception of axiomatic
theories. Of course, Go¨delian platonism departs from both of these in important
respects, but nonetheless it stands as a serious philosophical position, and not a
series of mystical insights.
There is no substantive role in this account to be played by perception of math-
ematical objects, or anything analogous. I’ve argued that the omission is not inter-
pretatively serious, since Go¨del’s remarks on perception have largely been taken out
of context and over-stated in the literature. Moreover, it is not a philosophically
promising avenue with respect to the verification of set-theoretic axioms. So even if
Go¨del gave the idea more credit than I have done, it is cleanly separable from the
other elements of his thought, and deserves no central role in a rational reconstruc-
tion of his platonism.
In the next chapter, I’ll put these interpretative efforts to work in answering
two central questions about Go¨del’s platonism: firstly, does it justify the axioma-
tization of set theory in a manner that substantially reduces its incompleteness as
compared to standard ZFC? And secondly, is the view lent substantial support by
the incompleteness theorems?
Chapter 4
Intuition and Reflection Principles
Introduction
I’ve reconstructed a form of platonism from Go¨del’s remarks, conceptual platonism.
The view is characterized by four central principles, given in §3.2. In this chap-
ter, we’ll see how conceptual platonism deploys Go¨delian intuition in an attempt to
establish the truth of certain set-theoretic reflection principles, related to, but im-
portantly distinct from, the arithmetical reflection principles discussed in chapters
1 and 2.
In chapters 1 and 2, we saw that the use of arithmetical reflection principles
could not completely eliminate the kind of incompleteness generated by Go¨del’s
theorems. In a similar vein, I’ll argue in this chapter that reflection principles can-
not eliminate the distinctly set-theoretic elements of incompleteness. In §1, I’ll give
an interpretation of Go¨del’s philosophy of set theory in terms of conceptual platon-
ism. Set-theoretic reflection principles are a crucial element in Go¨del’s platonism,
and they do result in some reduction of the incompleteness of set theory by sys-
tematically increasing the strength of the axiomatic system, as detailed in §2. I’ll
outline Koellner’s limitative results on what can be achieved by such reflection, and
in §3 I’ll go on to question whether even the little they do establish ought to be
accepted. Ultimately, I’ll conclude that certain reflection principles might be sup-
ported by conceptual platonism, but that incorporating them into the view requires
philosophical modifications which render it less appealing as a philosophy of set
theory.
In §4, I’ll move on to discuss the extent to which this view of the hierarchy can
be said to be supported by Go¨del’s theorems. I’ll examine the arguments put for-
ward in the Gibbs lecture, and conclude that some weak level of support is offered
to Go¨del’s platonism by the incompleteness results.
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4.1 Intuition in Set Theory
In this section we’ll see how conceptual platonism tackles the case of set theory, and
in particular what it is has to offer the programme of justifying set-theoretic axioms.
A well-known classic addressing the question of which axioms follow from the
concept set is (Boolos 1989). There Boolos identifies three distinct ‘thoughts’ be-
hind the concept set from which the axioms of ZFC follow. The first is analyticity,
from which the axiom of extensionality follows: since it is the criterion of identity for
sets, if what you’re talking about doesn’t satisfy extensionality, then they are triv-
ially non-sets.1 The second thought is the iterative conception, according to which
sets are formed in successive stages such that at each stage every combinatorially
possible set is formed, given what was ‘present’ at the previous stage. According
to Boolos, this validates all the remaining axioms with the exception of choice and
(the instances of) replacement. These, he claims, follow from the third thought,
limitation of size: any things form a set unless there are ‘too many’ of them.
The usual articulation of limitation of size is in terms of a second-order axiom
stating that any class is a set iff there is no bijection between the class and V , the
universe of sets. The idea is certainly independent of the iterative conception; as
Parsons emphasises, this way of thinking about the principle (known as von Neu-
mann Limitation of Size) makes it a sorting principle for dividing sets and proper
classes in a given second-order ‘universe’, rather than a principle for constructing
sets ‘from below’ (2008, p.133).2 This is similarly true of weaker principles like Can-
tor Limitation of Size, an axiom stating that a class is a set iff there is no bijection
between it and On, the class of ordinals.3 Replacement and choice are acceptable
according to either principle, since they do not imply the existence of collections
which can be put into one–one correspondence with On or V . So according to the
limitation of size thought, the relevant sets exist, and the axioms are true.
1This argument is offered by Boolos only tentatively, due to Quinean anxiety about the notion
of analyticity.
2Parsons also points out that this version of the axiom of limitation of size has the rather
unintuitive consequence that V is well-ordered: by Burali-Forti’s theorem, the ordinals do not
form a set. By limitation of size, there is class-function from On to V that is bijective. The map
therefore induces a well-ordering on V (this principle is also known as the axiom of global choice).
3The principle is weaker because it is silent on question of whether there is a bijection between
the class of ordinals and the universe. Consequently it does not imply global choice.
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Go¨del similarly considers what axioms follow from the concept set, though he
takes less care than Boolos does to distinguish the various thoughts behind the
concept. With respect to analyticity, Go¨del’s view is that all the axioms ‘might
fittingly be called analytic’ (1951, p.321). The thesis is not as radical as it might at
first seem, since Go¨del operates with a dual notion of analyticity. He distinguishes
between what we might call ‘narrowly’ analytic propositions, and ‘broadly’ analytic
propositions (1951, p.321). The former are characterized by Go¨del as ‘true owing
to our definitions’, or as ‘tautologies’, and as such are recognizably analytic in the
traditional sense. Go¨del is quite explicit that the axioms of mathematics as a whole
are demonstrably not analytic in this sense (1944, p.139), since there is no decision
procedure for arithmetic. On the other hand, a proposition can be be broadly ana-
lytic, in the sense that it is true ‘owing to the the meaning of the concepts occurring
in it’ (1944, p.139), or the ‘nature’ of the relevant concepts (1951, p.321).
This is quite removed from the traditional conception of analyticity, since Go¨del
goes so far as to claim that a proposition analytic in this sense might be undecid-
able. Although Go¨del doesn’t go into enormous detail on the distinction between
kinds of analyticity, the basic idea seem to be that narrowly analytic propositions
are reducible to explicit tautologies by purely syntactic methods, whereas broadly
analytic propositions can only be seen to be true by semantic reflection on the prim-
itive terms which appear therein.4 But it is in this sense that Go¨del claims that the
axioms of mathematics might be called analytic; hence the thesis is closer to being
a restatement of his conceptual platonism, rather than a radically new account of
analyticity. In any case, Go¨del gives us no hint that analyticity, conceived of in this
manner, distinguishes the axiom of extensionality from other mathematical axioms.
The iterative concept of set does, however, play an important role in Go¨del’s
analysis. According to him, the primitive concepts involved in set theory are that of
a set as an ‘arbitrary multitude’ (1964, p.262), and the concept property of set (1964,
p.260 fn.18).5 Go¨del’s concept of sets as arbitrary multitudes seems to be what we
4Though unusual, Go¨del’s view here is not completely without precedent. Ramsey argues that
certain set-theoretic propositions might be both unprovable and tautological (Ramsey 1925, p.224).
Of course, Ramsey is operating with a very particular notion of a tautology here.
5The notion of arbitrary multitude here is meant as opposed to that of a definable multitude.
A truly arbitrary concept of multitude would perhaps include non-well-founded sets, but Go¨del
doesn’t discuss this issue here.
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would today think of as the iterative conception, namely that of sets obtained from
the urelements by iterated application of the ‘set of’ operation (1964, p.259). At
stages of the process where the set-forming operator is the powerset operation, this
is ‘by definition’ the full powerset (1951, p.306 fn.5).
The limitation of size does not play a direct role in Go¨del’s analysis of the con-
cept set, but a similar role is played by a different maximality principle, namely
that the hierarchy of sets is inexhaustible. The idea plausibly has its origin in Can-
tor’s distinction between the transfinite and the ‘absolutely’ infinite, but the mature
statement of this principle is given by Go¨del in terms of the concept set, rather than
the hierarchy itself (as one might expect given his conceptual platonism). Moreover,
it is stated in terms of the axiomatization of this concept, rather than its extension
(also to be expected, if one accepts my arguments so far about Go¨del’s view). Com-
ments suggesting that Go¨del took the axiomatization of set theory, as well as the
hierarchy itself, to be inexhaustible appear at least as early as (1933, p.47). But the
mature statement is:
[T]he axioms of set theory by no means form a system closed in itself,
but, quite the contrary, the very concept of set on which they are based
suggests their extension by new axioms which assert the existence of still
further iterations of the operation “set of”. (1964, p.260)
In other words, the concept set is not exhausted by our ability to axiomatize it.6 In
my view this is the core tenet of Go¨del’s platonism as applied to set theory, and is
a nice way of cashing in the metaphor that ‘concepts form a reality of their own,
which we cannot create or change’ (1951, p.320). The concept set in particular, is
not simply invented by us. If it were, then it would in some sense be ‘up to us’ what
axioms were valid with respect to it. But the non-arbitrariness of this open series
of extensions, and indeed the possibility of substantive debate about what follows
from the concept, shows that we do not enjoy the sort of freedom a creator would
have.
6Parsons (2008, p.133) identifies the inexhaustibility principle as a variety of the limitation
of size principle. For my part, I simply do not see how this is so, and no argument is offered
by Parsons for the claim. The difference between the two principles is especially stark when it is
observed that the most natural formalization of inexhaustibility is in terms of reflection principles.
See below for details.
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Given how I’ve so far characterized Go¨delian platonism about sets, it’s no sur-
prise that mathematical intuition has an important role to play in the epistemology
of the view. According to Go¨del, we have ‘an intuition which is sufficiently clear to
produce the axioms of set theory and an open series of extensions’ (1964, p.268),
and the new axioms serve to ‘unfold the content of the concept of set’ (1964, p.261).
The idea that successively stronger set-theoretic axioms ‘unfold’ the concept set is
an important one for the plausibility of Go¨del’s position. As defined here, intuitive
knowledge of the truth of an axiom is simply non-deductive, non-trivial, and not
‘extrinsic’. The view that even the basic axioms of set theory are intuitively justified
would be deeply implausible if intuition had to give immediate knowledge, or if the
various deliverances of intuition had to be independent of one another (as perception
of physical objects might plausibly be taken to be). Rather, intuitive knowledge of
the axioms of set theory is supposed to be acquired in successive stages, and hence
there is no requirement that the truths of various intuitable axioms be ‘obvious’ to
the untrained eye, or be independently apparent.
Just as platonism about concepts leads to platonism about objects, the notion
of the inexhaustibility of the axioms of set theory has an objectual counterpart in
the conception of the set-theoretic hierarchy that it gives us. The ‘absolute’ infinity
of the cumulative iterative hierarchy is such that it cannot be ‘characterized from
below’. There is a lot of metaphorical talk here, which is worth unpacking. A
‘bottom-up’ approach to set theory is broadly one in which the hierarchy of sets is
described in terms of its members or levels, and without explicit mention of V or
classes over V (as occurs, for instance, in the limitation of size axioms). In practical
terms, a bottom-up selection of axioms is motivated by considerations about what
sets are like and how they should behave, as opposed to considerations about how
the universe as a whole (or the models of the theory) should look.7 So, to say that
the hierarchy cannot be ‘characterized from below’ is to say that in set-theoretic
terms (and perhaps in a stronger sense), the height of the hierarchy is indescrib-
7All of this is merely heuristic, of course, and the ‘bottom-up’ approach to set theory cannot
be precisely defined. But for an example of the approach in action, see Tait’s work (2005 in
particular). As he emphasises, the approach is somewhat out of fashion, with most set-theoretic
work today being ‘top-down’, thanks to the focus on models of set theory.
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able.8 Making this more precise, we can say that no formula in the language of set
theory, φ, can uniquely characterize the height of the hierarchy.9 One consequence
is that if φ does characterize the hierarchy, it does not do so uniquely; rather it char-
acterizes an initial segment. Hence if φ is true, then it is true when reinterpreted to
be just about that initial segment, rather than the hierarchy as a whole.
Axioms which, in some form or another, state that the hierarchy is inexhaustible
in this sense, are called reflection principles. Such principles form a key part of
Go¨del’s epistemology of set theory, as they are the articulation of the inexhaustibil-
ity principle which he takes to be intrinsically justified by our grasp of the concept
set. In the next section, we’ll take a closer look at the precise shape reflection prin-
ciples take, and examine the argument that some of them are intrinsically justified
by the concept set.
4.2 Reflection Principles
In the context of set theory, a reflection principle is an axiom which, intuitively, says
that any attempt to characterize the hierarchy can only succeed in characterizing
a part of it. In other words, if φ is true of the hierarchy, then φ is also true of
an initial segment. The formula φ is ‘reflected downward’, and fails to characterize
the hierarchy uniquely.10 The idea of a reflection principle is therefore thoroughly
informal, and the strength of any formalized axiom will vary enormously depending
on language of which φ is a sentence, and the order of the parameters which occur in
φ. Though the precise form of such axioms varies, Incurvati (2016, p.165) provides
a very useful ‘template’ for reflection principles, which can be thought of as doubly-
schematic:
8Of course, ZFC has models whose height can be described in set-theoretic terms as a strongly
inaccessible cardinal. But for the advocate of inexhaustibility, this just shows that no such model
could contain the whole hierarchy.
9Or rather, we can’t correctly and uniquely characterize the height of the hierarchy. It’s
consistent with ZFC of course, to say that there is no inaccessible cardinal. But the advocate of
the inexhaustibility of the hierarchy must insist that this mischaracterizes the height of V .
10This notion is therefore distinct from the reflection principles previously examined, although
both kinds of principles are to be justified by the grasp we have of certain concepts. Indeed, it is
perfectly reasonable to think that our grasp of the concept set justifies the extension of ZFC by
reflection principles of both kinds.
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Reflection Principle Template: Let φ(A1, ..., Ak) be a formula in the
language of mth-order set theory with parameters A1, ..., Ak of order ≤ n.
The following is an axiom:
φ(A1, ..., Ak)→ ∃α φα(Aα1 , ..., Aαk )
where α is an ordinal and φα is the result of restricting the quantifiers of φ to Vα.
11
For the parameters, Aαi = Ai if Ai is a first-order (set) parameter, and A
α
i = Ai∩Vα
if Ai is a second-order (class) parameter. If Ai is a third- or higher-order parameter,
then Aαi = {Bα|B ∈ A}, where A is of order n+1 and B ranges over classes of order
n.12 Let RPmn be the axiom schema which results from restricting φ to the language
of mth-order set theory, and limiting the parameters to order ≤ n.
Perhaps the most commonly encountered instance of this template is RP12. This
principle, when added to extensionality, foundation, and the separation schema
yields a theory which is equivalent to ZF (Incurvati 2016, pp.165-166). It can
therefore be deployed in the justification of set-theoretic axioms which have less of
a clear connection to the iterative conception of set, in particular the replacement
schema. But the template covers far more than just this principle of course, so by
formalizing the basic idea behind the inexhaustibility of the hierarchy, we are led
to a progression of increasingly powerful reflection principles. In this section we’ll
review the central results in the area, and examine what exactly can be delivered by
reflection principles of this form. We can then take to examining which, if any, of
these principles can be considered deliverances of intuition of the concept set, and
in particular whether intuition can be said to justify the existence of certain small
large cardinals as a result.
If one were inclined to think the iterative conception of set had a notion of
inexhaustibility built into it, and that reflection principles were an appropriate for-
malized expression of this principle, it might be tempting to think that the iterative
11Vα is a level of the standard von Neumann universe. Where α = 0, Vα is the (possibly




12If one is concerned to rigorously keep track of the distinction between sets and classes, let
higher-order variables of order n range over sets in an isomorphic copy of Vβ+(n−1), rather than
classes of order n (Koellner 2009, p.208).
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conception thereby licensed truly unlimited reflection, i.e. that RPmn is valid for any
choice of m and n. Sadly, such a temptation leads to inconsistency. Indeed, it runs
into inconsistency remarkably quickly, as demonstrated by Tait (1998, p.481). Let
U be the third-order class of bounded second-order classes. If we allow third-order
parameters into our favoured reflection schema, we can reflect on φ(U), the state-
ment that every member of U is bounded. When interpreted over V , φ(U) is plainly
true, but for every β the restriction φβ(Uβ) is false. This is because Uβ is simply
the class of all (second-order) classes over Vβ, including Vβ itself, which is of course
unbounded in Vβ. Hence, RP
1
3 is inconsistent.
The crucial question, therefore, is how to extract significant deductive strength
from the informal notion of a reflection principle which avoids inconsistency. To
increase the deductive power of ZFC via reflection principles which fit the template
above, we must add a principle which reflects certain higher-order formulae, rather
than merely permitting higher-order parameters. In terms of our template, we must
increase m, and not just n. This is because Tait’s result shows that RP 13 is incon-
sistent, and Gloede has shown that RP 12 does not extend the deductive strength of
ZF (see above). Another option would be to give a more fine-grained template for
reflection principles in order to avoid inconsistency. The first option will be explored
first.
Bernays-Style Reflection Principles
In the second-order setting, the addition of Bernays’ reflection principle, RP 22 , af-
fords some manner of increase in deductive power thanks to the expressive resources
available in the language of second-order set theory (see Bernays 1961). Since ZF
is equivalent to ZF+RP 12 , every instance of RP
1
2 is provable in ZF. Clearly, every
instance is therefore also provable in ZF2, but moreover, a single provable sentence
can express that fact, by saying that for any A there is an α such that the structure
〈Vα,∈, Aα〉 is an elementary substructure of 〈V,∈, A〉 (Incurvati 2016, p.166).
This formula implies that there is an inaccessible cardinal, and using RP 22 , we can
reflect on that to infer the existence of a second inaccessible. Iterating this reason-
ing implies that there is a proper class of inaccessibles, and a very similar argument
can be used to show that there is a proper class of Mahlo cardinals. So adding
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the principle RP 22 to second-order set theory yields a genuine increase in deductive
power. Hence, if the intuitive idea of behind reflection principles does follow from
the iterative conception of set, a topic to which we shall return below, formalizing
things this way vindicates Go¨del’s claim (discussed in the previous chapter) that
mathematical intuition is sufficient for justifying certain large cardinal axioms, in
particular axioms which assert the existence of Mahlo cardinals, and perhaps other
small large cardinals.
Bernays’ reflection principle can be strengthened to yield somewhat stronger
large cardinal principles, by allowing reflection on higher-order formulae while re-
stricting the order of parameters to at most 2. These principles, RP n2 -reflection (for
n > 2), have received little attention in the literature, but can be shown to be con-
sistent relative to certain large cardinal assumptions. RP 22 yields the existence of
Π11-indescribable cardinals.
13 As RP 22 , is strengthened, the existence of indescribable
cardinals of increasingly high order is implied.14
Tait-Style Reflection Principles
Another strategy, in order to extract greater strength from the intuitive reflection
principle while avoiding inconsistency, is to consider a restriction on the kinds of
formulae amenable to reflection. Tait proposes to restrict the formulae on which we
can reflect to what he calls ‘positive formulae’ (1998, p.482). A formula is positive iff
it is constructed from conjunction, disjunction, and existential or universal quantifi-
cation from atomic formulae except formulae of the form X 6= Y and X, ..., Y 6∈ Z,
for any higher-order predicates. We can define the following classes of formulae:
Γmn -Formulae: Positive formulae of the form ∀X1∃Y1...∀Xn∃YnΨ,
where Ψ is at most first order, the Yi’s are of any finite order, and the
Xi’s are of order m.
This allows for a different reflection schema template to be defined:
13A cardinal k is Πnm-indescribable iff for every Π
n
m sentence φ, the following holds: ∀S ⊆
Vκ(〈Vκ;∈, S〉 |= φ → ∃α < κ(〈Vα;∈, S ∩ Vα〉 |= φ)) (Kanamori 2009, p.58). In other words, a
Πnm-indescribable reflects down every Πm sentence of n+ 1
th-order set theory.
14Thanks to Luca Incurvati for providing the information about these more general RPn2 prin-
ciples.
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Γmn -Reflection: ∀X(φ(X) → ∃β φβ(Xβ)), where φ is amongst the
Γmn -formulae.
From the simple reflection principle, we’ve come to a much more complicated hi-
erarchy of principles, which may be considered axiom candidates for extensions of
ZFC justified on the basis of the iterative conception of set, where that notion is
taken to include the thought that the hierarchy is ‘absolutely infinite’, or cannot be
reached from below.
The work of Tait (1998, 2005) and Koellner (2009) paint an almost complete
picture of the consistency strength of the Γmn -reflection principles. The key results
are both due to Koellner (2009), and will be rehearsed here for the purposes of dis-
cussion. The reader should consult that paper for full proofs. The central message
is in the form of a ‘dichotomy’, which says that reflection principles in this stratifi-
cation are either weak or inconsistent.
The sense of weakness here is a rather specialised one; by ‘weak’ Koellner means
that the principle has at most the consistency strength of an axiom asserting the
existence of the partition cardinal (a.k.a. ‘Erdo˝s cardinal’) κ(ω).15 I’d like to avoid
getting bogged down in technical details, but suffice it to say that, by today’s stan-
dards, κ(ω) is not a particularly large cardinal. Significantly for our purposes, an
axiom asserting its existence is of a higher consistency strength than the upper
bound on what can be obtained using Bernays’ reflection principle RP 22 , and more
generally, the Bernays-style principles RP n2 (Kanamori 2009, p.472. Full details are
at pp.59–71).
So Koellner’s dichotomy is that reflection principles are either weak, in that they
have the consistency strength at most of an axiom stating the existence of κ(ω), or
they are inconsistent. The dichotomy is not strictly a theorem, since the notion
of a reflection principle is informal, and is always capable of extension to cover
new formal principles (a fact which Koellner himself readily acknowledges (2009,
p.217)).16 That said, Koellner’s dichotomy is powerfully supported by the following
15Let [α]<ω be the union, for all n, of the n-element subsets of α. For any limit ordinal β, the
Erdo˝s cardinal κ(β) is the least cardinal λ with the following property: for every f : [λ]<ω → {0, 1},
f is constant on [H]<ω for some β-sized subset H of λ. See (Jech 2003, pp.109 and 302) for full
details.
16I don’t want to commit here to anything as strong as that no proof can ever be found where
informal notions are concerned. The point is simply that in this debate, the relevant informal
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two theorems (2009, p.210 and p.213):
Theorem 1: Suppose κ(ω) exists. Then for some δ < κ(ω), Vδ satisfies
Γ2n for all n < ω.
Theorem 2: Γ31 reflection is inconsistent.
17
In Koellner’s stratification of reflection principles, we have it that reflection (of
any complexity) on a second-order formula (in our positive language) is weak. By
contrast, the next strongest reflection principle in the stratification is inconsistent.
The challenge Koellner lays down is to find a different reflection principle which is
justified by the iterative conception of set, that is of higher consistency strength
than the existence of κ(ω), and is indeed consistent.
At one time, Go¨del appeared to think that all principles of set theory could be
derived from some form of reflection principle,18 but Koellner’s dichotomy strongly
suggests that the principles of set theory today cannot all be justified in this way.
In the next section, we’ll discuss the issue of whether even the RP n2 and the Γ
2
n
reflection principles are justified by the iterative conception; before that I’ll outline
the recent research on the subject of Koellner’s challenge and argue that it has not
been successfully met.
Koellner’s Challenge
Koellner (2009, pp.217-8) discusses very strong reflection principles, though they ap-
pear to be a long way from the sort of principles that can be said to follow from the
notion appears incapable of conclusive formal treatment. The reason is that what counts as a
reflection principle is highly sensitive to the linguistic resources we allow ourselves.
17The proof requires the use of a fourth-order parameter. So, temporarily reverting to our
default template for reflection principles, this shows that RP 34 is inconsistent, even with Tait’s
restriction to reflection on positive formulae.
18At least, he is cited as having thought so by Hao Wang (Wang 1996, p.283). In earlier
papers, such as (Go¨del 1933), Go¨del talks exclusively about establishing new axioms by means
which look a lot like reflection principles. What’s not clear to me, however, is the status of very
large cardinal axioms (of the kind discussed in the next chapter) in this. He may at some point
have thought that such axioms could be established by a reflection principle, and later changed
his mind (necessitating the use of extrinsic methods of justification). Or perhaps he never thought
such axioms could be justified by reflection at all, but changed his mind about whether there was
a non-reflective admissible justification of them. The evidence does not strike me as decisive.
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iterative conception of set. The same appears to be true of earlier strong reflection
principles, such as those discussed by Marshall (1989), though it would of course
be anachronistic to suggest that her reflection principles ought to be evaluated in
terms of whether they meet Koellner’s challenge.
Since 2009, however, several new reflection principles have been formulated with
Koellner’s challenge specifically in mind. The first such principle, given by McCallum
(2017), does not answer Koellner’s challenge, but appears to have strengthened it:
he formulates a reflection principle which subsumes those discussed by Tait and
Koellner which are not known to be inconsistent, and shows that this principle is
equivalent to the existence of a remarkable cardinal.19 The existence of such a car-
dinal is consistent relative to the existence of κ(ω) in ZFC (Schindler 2000, p.180),
and is of a higher consistency strength than principles which can be obtained from
the RP n2 principles. Hence, if correct, M
cCallum’s reflection principle strengthens
Koellner’s case by reducing the ‘barrier’ which candidates for intrinsically justified
reflection principles appear not to be able to break.20
Two principles have recently been formulated which purport to offer intrinsically
justified reflection principles which break the κ(ω) barrier. My view is that, while
both the principles have some intrinsic appeal, neither of them succeed in defeating
Koellner’s challenge.
The first such principle is proposed by Horsten and Welch (Horsten and Welch
2016a and Welch 2017). The principle asserts that the Global Reflection Property
19A cardinal κ is remarkable iff for all regular θ > κ there are pi,M, λ, σ,N, ρ such that:
1. pi : M → Hθ is an elementary embedding (where Hθ is the set of all sets hereditarily smaller
than θ.
2. M and N are countable and transitive.
3. pi(λ) = κ
4. σ : M → N is an elementary embedding with critical point λ.
5. ρ = M ∩On is a regular cardinal in N .
6. σ(λ) > ρ.
7. M ∈ N and N |= M = Hρ.
The significance of these cardinals is discussed in (Schindler 2000).
20The paper has not yet passed peer review, however, so I shall continue to speak as if the
barrier in question is κ(ω).
4.2. Reflection Principles 103
(GRP) holds of the hierarchy. Let V be the hierarchy as normal, and let C be the
collection of classes over V ,21 where class-talk is interpreted as quantification over
parts of V , in the mereological sense (ignoring the Lewisian concerns about ∅ and
the mapping from a set to its singleton). Horsten and Welch propose the following
new axiom:
Global Reflection Property: For some ordinal κ, there is a non-trivial
elementary embedding j : (Vκ,∈, Vκ+1) → (V,∈ C) with critical point
k which is elementary for first-order formulae with class parameters.
(Horsten and Welch 2016a, p.14)
The value of the principle is primarily located in its consistency strength; in par-
ticular it is far stronger than Koellner’s principles and implies the existence of a
proper class of Woodin cardinals.22 The source of this consistency strength is that
it says, not just that each reflected formula is reflected somewhere, but that they
are all reflected in some particular initial segment of V . Moreover, at Vκ, the classes
are indistinguishable from their respective intersections with Vκ+1. The principle
is not ‘bottom up’ like the reflection principles previously examined here, in that
it doesn’t just assert that our language fails to distinguish the universe from some
part, no matter what we say. It is ‘top down’, in the sense of postulating a very
strong resemblance between V and an initial segment thereof.
This principle strikes me as somewhat intuitive, at least with respect to a cer-
tain conception of set theory. The problem, at least as far as the present project
is concerned, is that the conception of set theory required to motivate the prin-
ciple goes far beyond what is given in the iterative conception of set. First, the
top-down nature of the principle requires us to consider the hierarchy as completed
infinite totality; this much is clear from the explicit mention of V in the formulation
of the principle, which is needed to give the range for the elementary embedding
j. Horsten and Welch are eager to embrace such Cantorianism, and go to some
21In neither paper cited is it made explicit what kind of collection this is.
22A cardinal κ is Woodin iff for all f : κ→ κ there is some α < κ such that {f(β) : β < α} ⊆ α
and an elementary embedding j from V into a transitive inner model M such that α is the critical
point of j and Vj(f(α)) ⊆M (Kanamori 2009, p.360).
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lengths to justify their position.23 The alternative is a Zermelian conception of the
set-theoretic realm as an unbounded sequence of models indexed to the ordinals.
We’ll return to these issues below, but for the present purposes, the details are not
so important. The central issue is that a Zermelian cannot even make sense of the
reflection principle put forward by Welch and Horsten, which is sufficient to show
that it is not implied by the iterative conception alone: if the GRP were implied by
the iterative conception of set, then a Zermelian interpretation would be ruled out
by it. Whatever one may think of Zermelo’s interpretation of set theory, it surely
consistent with the iterative conception, even if the latter does not imply the former.
A second difficulty is that the motivation for the principle relies critically on the
conception of proper classes as parts of V . This is because classes are postulated
as the relata of a resemblance relation, which rules out any nominalist or plural
interpretation of class-talk (Horsten and Welch 2016a, p.20). Moreover, conceiving
of classes as governed by the transitive ‘part of’ relation, rather than ∈, is crucial
for motivating the restriction favoured by Horsten and Welch that the embedding j
be elementary with respect to first-order formulae, but not to higher-order formu-
lae. Not only does this deliver certain technical results that Horsten and Welch find
desirable, it also ensures that the justification of GRP doesn’t over-generate and
justify stronger versions of GRP which may turn out to be inconsistent.
None of this would come as a surprise to Horsten and Welch, of course. Welch
explicitly claims that the principle does not follow from the iterative conception
alone (Welch 2017, p.11). But he asks us to ‘swallow the Cantorian pill’ and accept
that there is a real distinction between sets and classes in order to motivate the
principle (Welch 2017, p.7). Since it doesn’t follow from the iterative conception,
the GRP certainly does not defeat Koellner’s challenge in letter. Moreover, as I’ll
argue below, the reflection principles favoured by Go¨del are easier to motivate in a
Zermelian setting; so for our purposes at least, we can regard Koellner’s challenge
as unanswered. That said, those sympathetic to Cantorianism and a merelogical
concept of classes should regard the GRP as a very serious axiom candidate which
offers an intrinsic justification for extremely strong large cardinal principles.
23I’ll follow Horsten and Welch in their use of the expressions ‘Cantorian’ and ‘Cantorianism’,
though I make no commitment to any related historical claims about Cantor’s actual view of the
hierarchy.
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A second strong reflection principle has been proposed by Roberts (2017). The
principle is certainly an intuitive one, and is stated quite simply: φ→ ∃CφC . It says
that if φ is true of all entities of some kind, there is a set-sized collection of entities of
that kind, C, and φ is true restricted to C (2017, p.651). Despite its simplicity, the
principle is remarkably strong: its formalization in second-order set theory implies
the existence of a proper class of 1-extendible cardinals (2017, pp.659–660), and is
consistent if a 2-extendible cardinal exists (2017, pp.660–661).24
Much like Welch, Roberts seems not to have high hopes for the intrinsic justifi-
ability of his reflection principle in terms of the concept set. The inconsistency of
third-order reflection makes him sceptical of the intrinsic justifiability of any reflec-
tion principle, since the standard justification for reflection over-generates. Indeed,
Roberts is sceptical more broadly of the notion of intrinsic justification (Roberts
2017, p.657). However, he claims that if his principle isn’t intrinsically justified,
then Bernays’ principle probably won’t be justified either (Roberts 2017, p.657). He
claims that the greatest threat to the justifiability of his reflection principle is that
it implies the existence of classes. However, as Roberts quite rightly points out, this
is also true of Bernays’ principle.25
While this is correct as far as it goes, I do think that an important distinction
in justifiability can be drawn between Bernays’ principle and Roberts’. The key
reason that the latter cannot be said to follow from the iterative conception is that
it ineliminably relies for its formulation on the notion of a set-sized collection, while
Bernays’ and Tait’s principles do not. So, any intuitive or intrinsic motivation for
the axiom must, at least implicitly, appeal to a prior distinction between collections
which are set-sized, and collections which are class-sized. But the iterative concep-
tion, according to which sets are formed in stages, such that each stage contains
every possible collection of what was present at the previous stages (continuing into
the transfinite), makes no mention of size at all. Perhaps some variant of Roberts’
axiom could be justified in terms of the limitation of size, by stipulating that C is
24A cardinal κ is β-extendible iff for some λ there is an elementary embedding j : Vκ+β → Vλ
with critical point κ such that β < j(κ) (Kanamori 2009, p.311). The assumption of even a
1-extendible cardinal is very strong.
25It is not obvious from the formulation of RP 22 that it implies the existence of classes. That
it actually does so can be seen from the fact that the full schema in ZFC2 implies the axiom of
global choice (Kanamori 2009, p.59), an explicitly class-theoretic principle.
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set-sized iff there is no bijection between C and V , or similar. But the limitation of
size is not part of the iterative conception.
It strikes me that an axiom such as Roberts’, which relies on a notion of the
size of a collection, is critically different from one that does not, such as Bernays’.
Without a serious explanation of how the iterative conception alone, despite all ap-
pearances, really does carry with it a notion of size suitable to motivate Roberts’
axiom, we can safely consider Koellner’s challenge to be unmet.
Since the notion of a reflection principle is so deeply informal, it is difficult to
make any final judgement on what can or cannot be achieved by means of them.
Koellner’s Γ2n principles, and Bernays’ RP
n
2 principles are consistent, unlike their
strengthened counterparts, and offer some deductive extension of ZFC. Stronger
reflection principles of distinct kinds have been proposed, but cannot be said to
follow from the iterative conception of set. Since we are concerned with the iterative
conception here, for our present purposes at least, we can take reflection principles
to be those at most as strong as Koellner’s consistent principles, since these are the
strongest known reflection axioms which might at least have a justification available
in terms of the iterative conception. Whether or not they actually do have such a
justification will now be discussed.
4.3 The Limits of Reflection
We now have two candidates for reflection principles which might be said to follow
from the iterative concept of set. Both Bernays-style RP n2 axioms and Koellner’s
Γ2n axioms offer the possibility for the conceptual platonist to claim intuitive knowl-
edge of large cardinal principles. In particular, both kinds of principles support the
claim that small large cardinal axioms (i.e. those large cardinal axioms which have
a consistency strength below that of an axiom asserting the existence of κ(ω)) can
be verified by non-deductive, non-conventional, and non-extrinsic means. But this
is conditional on giving the reflection axioms a justification in terms of the iterative
conception of set. Can this be done in terms acceptable to the conceptual platon-
ist? Before answering this question, it’s worth saying something about the general
significance of Koellner’s limitative results for our broader study of incompleteness.
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Two Kinds of Incompleteness
The first thing to note is that for our purposes, Koellner’s theorems play an analo-
gous role to that played by Feferman’s theorem in the first two chapters. We saw that
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems quite naturally lead one to suppose that the formal
theory we started with (e.g. PA or ZFC) hadn’t adequately captured the concept
we wished to axiomatize. In the case of arithmetic, it seems that whatever justi-
fication we had for believing in a theory is also justification for strengthening that
theory by Feferman reflection. However, the processes of iteratively strengthening
our theory by such means does not suffice for the total elimination of incompleteness.
Unless we can tolerate the idea that an idealized mathematician has an inexplicable
knowledge of the arithmetical truths required to axiomatize a complete arithmetic
by iterated reflection, then we must give up on the idea that every arithmetical
proposition is decidable, even in an idealized sense.
In the case of set theory, something similar appears to hold. Whilst set theory
is of course subject to Go¨delian incompleteness, there is also a second kind of in-
completeness that aﬄicts it. The axioms do not merely fail to decide consistency
statements, Go¨del sentences and so on, but also fail to decide other set-theoretic
statements, most famously the continuum hypothesis. Closing off this kind of in-
completeness via set-theoretic reflection principles similarly does not seem to be an
option; rather than running into epistemological difficulties, the increased strength-
ening of reflection principles in the case of set theory leads to inconsistency (by
Tait’s theorem). Moreover, the consistent versions of the principle still leave many
propositions undecided (by Koellner’s results).
That there are two distinctive kinds of incompleteness at play in arithmetic and
set theory can be seen more clearly in a second-order setting. Second-order arith-
metic, while of course deductively incomplete, is fully categorical; it has exactly one
model up to isomorphism, as proved by Dedekind (1888). There is thus a sense
in which the incompleteness of arithmetic is merely deductive: we cannot prove all
arithmetical truths, but using second-order resources we can axiomatize arithmetical
concepts sufficiently precisely to settle all arithmetical questions.26 The uniqueness
26There is a further question as to whether the deductive incompleteness of first-order arithmetic
amounts to properly arithmetical incompleteness. According to Isaacson’s thesis (1987, p.89),
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(up to isomorphism) of the model of second-order arithmetic of course implies that
all of its models are elementary equivalent, and for a time this property was known
by the name ‘completeness’ (e.g. Wilder 1965).
By contrast, second-order set theory is deductively incomplete and incomplete in
this model-theoretic sense. That is, second-order set theory is only quasi-categorical,
meaning that even in the second-order setting, where statements like CH are set-
tled, there remains room for models to disagree about the height of the hierarchy
(Zermelo 1930).27 And this distinctively set-theoretic incompleteness cannot be sig-
nificantly reduced by reflection if Koellner’s dichotomy argument is successful, since
adding the most powerful consistent justifiable reflection principle to even a strong
second-order set theory like Morse-Kelley will only show that the height of the hi-
erarchy cannot be smaller than is required for the existence of κ(ω).
Go¨del’s theorems certainly give rise to a deductive kind of incompleteness: we
cannot axiomatize our mathematical concepts in a way that will enable us to de-
cide all questions about the consistency of the theory, for instance. By looking at
incompleteness in a second-order setting, we see that there must be incompleteness
of a second kind. We can axiomatize the concept number in a way that settles all
arithmetical questions, even if the answers to some of those questions remain be-
yond us. In the case of the concept set, this appears to be beyond our reach, since
a second-order axiomatization of the concept set will leave critical questions about
the hierarchy not merely unanswered, but also unsettled.28
Thus we have two kinds of incompleteness which can aﬄict any sufficiently strong
theory with an epistemically acceptable axiomatization. In chapter two, I argued
that the first kind of incompleteness was absolute in the sense that no acceptable ax-
iomatic theory sufficient for arithmetic can overcome it. In the set-theoretic case, no
the true arithmetical sentences left undecided by PA are all such that they code higher-order
information, and do not express truths which can be seen as such in light of only their arithmetical
content. The sentences which I have argued are absolutely undecidable are certainly of this kind.
27Correspondingly, this leaves certain height-sensitive statements potentially unsettled as well,
such as GCH.
28It seems reasonable to distinguish amongst what I have called ‘distinctively set-theoretic
incompleteness’ two different phenomena. It is significant that in the second-order setting, propo-
sitions like CH are settled, but propositions about the height of the hierarchy are not. We can set
this additional intricacy to one side, however, since all I want to argue is that there is a substantial
distinction between Go¨delian incompleteness and incompleteness which is genuinely set-theoretical.
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analogous case has yet been made; that will depend on the prospects of extrinsically
justified axioms closing off all incompleteness not generated via Go¨del’s theorem. It
does appear however, that only extrinsically justified axioms could finish the work
here, given the limitative results established by Koellner. While there is perhaps
some hope that a more fine-grained stratification of reflection principles could break
the κ(ω) barrier without succumbing to inconsistency, this is nothing more than a
slim hope. To my knowledge, no such stratification has been proposed, and more-
over there would need to be some case made that the principles so stratified were
intrinsically justified by the content of the concept set.
So this is the best case scenario for the conceptual platonist regarding the re-
duction of set-theoretic incompleteness: mathematical intuition can reduce incom-
pleteness by at most what can be effected by positing the existence of κ(ω). But I
should stress that this is the best case scenario, which only obtains if the concept
set really does justify the strongest consistent reflection principles. But does it?29
The Justification of Reflection Principles
In the arithmetical case, justification for the relevant reflection principles was easily
obtained; our evidence for the soundness of any theory was equally evidence for the
soundness of that theory extended by the relevant instances of Feferman’s reflection
principle, with the minimal requirement that we could recognize the extension for
what it was. The case of reflection principles in set theory is by no means so clear.
Merely accepting that the axioms of ZFC are sound does commit us to some re-
flection principles, since weak principles like RP 12 are derivable in ZFC itself. But
it isn’t clear that stronger principles follow straightforwardly from the concept set
or from the soundness of ZFC. Adding even the reflection principles very low-down
in our stratification yields the existence of stationary classes of Mahlo cardinals and
weakly compact cardinals,30 cardinals which, on the face of it, take us far beyond
the commitments incurred by accepting ZFC.
29We could, of course, follow Paseau (2007, p.33), in using a ‘liberalized’ conception of set which
includes a reflection principle by stipulation. But Go¨del’s view is that such principles already follow
from the concept set as we have it, so I’ll continue in the illiberal tradition.
30That is, strongly inaccessible cardinals with the binary tree property. See Tait (2005, p.145–6)
for details of these results.
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Although this may be bad news for the conceptual platonist philosophically
speaking, these results do at least provide some support for the interpretation of
Go¨del as deploying the notion of intuition in two distinct senses. If a decent argu-
ment can be made from the platonist’s persepective that certain reflection principles
can be known intuitively, and those reflection principles imply the existence of Mahlo
cardinals, then we can interpret Go¨del as making a cogent argument that propo-
sitional intuition delivers a verdict on their existence. On the other hand, if we
interpret Go¨del as operating simply with an objectual/Kantian notion of intuition,
then his claims about the existence of Mahlo cardinals are difficult to interpret as
anything but bizarre. However, showing that such a reflection principle has an in-
tuitive justification might be quite a big ‘if’ !
Our candidates for intrinsically justified strong reflection principles are the RP n2
principles and the Γ2n principles. An obstacle to giving an intuitive justification for
such stong priniciples is that it is far from clear that the iterative concept of set
gets us even as far as the axioms of ZFC. Serious challenges have been raised to
the idea that the standard axioms follow from the iterative conception, including
choice and extensionality (Boolos 1971 and 1989), powerset (Parsons 2008), and,
most often, replacement (all the above, as well as Potter 2004). Given that even the
basic RP 12 reflection schema directly implies replacement, one might think that the
case for an intuitive justification of any version of reflection is slim here. Indeed,
Potter argues that no intuitive justification on the basis of a platonist understanding
of the concept set is forthcoming (2004, p.224), and that it would be a ‘coup’ if such
an argument could be provided. This puts Potter and Go¨del directly at odds, with
the latter claiming that reflection principles (amongst other things) are ‘new axioms
which only unfold the concept of set’ (1964, p.261. See in particular fn.20 in the
1966 version).
So what exactly is Potter’s complaint about reflection principles? The central
problem is that even the most basic axiom schema of reflection is ‘irredeemably
syntactic’, unlike other schemata that appear in the ordinary course of set theory.
Potter thinks the motivation for adopting schemata such as separation is that we
believe the second-order versions of the axioms which the schemata go proxy for. No
reflection principle, however, has this character. The consistent reflection principles
keep bad company, in that higher-order generalisations of them are inconsistent,
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even if we restrict ourselves to the language of positive formulae. Hence, any re-
flection scheme that we might accept cannot be seen as a schematized version of
a higher-order principle which follows from the iterative conception (assuming that
the iterative conception is itself ‘consistent’ in some informal sense). So reflection
principles are inherently schematic.
The technical notion of reflection on a formula is of course syntactic, but even
the informal exposition of these principles is often formulated linguistically: nothing
we say can uniquely characterize the hierarchy, as opposed to an initial segment.
Formulated a bit more precisely by Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel, and Levy, ‘there is no prop-
erty expressible in the language of set theory which distinguishes the universe from
some “temporary universes”’ (1958, p.118).31
For Potter, that schematism is inherent in reflection principles gives us reason to
believe that no satisfactory justification of any version of it can be given in platonis-
tic terms. The thoroughly syntactic nature of reflection principles means, according
to Potter, that any justification for them on intuitive grounds will take on a dis-
tinctly constructivist spin, or else will lapse into theology (2004, p.224). I think that
both of these charges can be resisted by the platonist, and in doing so a positive
justification for stronger reflection principles can be offered (though as we shall see,
there are further problems to be dealt with). The charge of constructivism will be
addressed in the next subsection; for now I’ll sketch an approach which might allow
the conceptual platonist to embrace reflection principles and evade the charge of
theology and mystery.
Potter’s Theology Argument
In what sense does Potter consider the typical justification of reflection principles to
be theological? The idea is that just as the theologian might suppose that God is so
far beyond finite creatures that nothing we can say could adequately represent di-
vinity, so might the platonist suppose that the hierarchy is beyond characterization
in the language of set theory. An example Potter uses is the height of the universe;
presumably the platonist thinks V does have a height (2004, p.224), and reflection
31Similar informal expositions in terms of assertions, statements, formulae etc. can be found
in (Horsten and Welch 2016a, p.8), (Koellner 2009, p.208), (Tait 1998, p.473), and many other
locations.
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principles tells us that we can’t express this. The reason we can’t is allegedly some
kind of divine mystery.
The challenge for the platonist, then, is to offer a satisfactory picture of the
hierarchy according to which it has no particular ordinal height. If the case can be
made for thinking that the universe does not have an ordinal height, then there will
be no remaining divine mystery about why we cannot say how high the hierarchy
is. I think that for the platonist the right approach is to deny that the hierarchy
is some particular ‘definite totality’ (to borrow Dummett’s phrase), or well-defined
higher-order object. Such a conception of set theory renders platonism about sets
consistent with a denial of any particular height to the hierarchy, as we shall see
below.
Potter’s complaint strikes me as very persuasive in the context of a Cantorian
view of set theory, according to which the hierarchy is a completed infinite totality.
If we think of V as a particular (higher-order) object which comprises a model of
the axioms of set theory, then it seems perfectly sensible to enquire about the height
of this model, ask which ordinals it contains, and so on. After all, we can sensibly
make such enquiries of ordinary models of set theory. But the various reflection
principles tell us that we cannot express truths which serve to distinguish V from
its initial segments, and this fact demands an explanation. On this picture, V is a
model of set theory, so it must have some height or another. Hence it really does
begin to seem that if we mortals cannot talk about such things, this can be little
more than a divine mystery or a quirk of our language. Thankfully, Cantorianism
is not the only conception of set theory available to a platonist here.
An alternative to the Cantorian conception of V as a completed totality is of-
fered by Zermelo. According to Zermelo, the realm of set theory is not confined
to some particular model of the axioms; rather there is an unbounded sequence of
models of set theory indexed by ‘boundary numbers’ (strongly inaccessible cardinals,
in today’s terminology) (Zermelo 1930, p.1233). The set-theoretic realm cannot be
regarded as a completed infinite totality, according to Zermelo, because the sequence
of ordinals cannot be so regarded either.
This is because a key part of Zermelo’s conception of set theory is that the para-
doxes of na¨ive set theory are soluble only by the elimination of proper classes. The
idea is that a genuine solution of the paradoxes should not resort to higher-order
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entities which are either themselves paradox-ridden, or which solve the problem by
magic. Theories of the first kind would be those in which a ‘Russell class’ could
be formed, while theories of the latter kind would include those that distinguish
sets from classes only by the stipulation that classes cannot be members of classes.
While theories of the latter kind would be paradox-free in a pedantic sense, we
cannot accept that the paradoxes are solved in such a way without an antecedent
distinction between sets and classes that has some intuitive force.
The reason why Zermelo’s iterative set theory is seen as genuinely avoiding para-
dox is because the iterative conception has intuitive force aside from its apparent
consistency. Moreover, Zermelo’s conception of set theory is class-free, in the sense
that ‘what appears as an “ultrafinite non- or super-set” in one model is, in the
succeeding model, a perfectly good, valid set with both a cardinal number and an
ordinal type’ (Zermelo 1930, p.1233). Plainly, the universe itself never appears as a
set in any further models of set theory, so a platonist who adheres to Zermelo’s con-
ception of classes needn’t suppose that the universe of sets itself is a well-determined
model of the theory, which has either a cardinal number or an ordinal type.
For the platonist who refuses to think of V as a particular class which models
the axioms of set theory, the question ‘what is the height of the hierarchy?’, has only
the near-trivial answer that it is as high as it possibly could be.32 No particular or-
dinal can be offered as the height of the hierarchy, since by reflection any non-trivial
answer we offer will only succeed in characterizing the height of an initial segment of
the hierarchy.33 Hence, the hierarchy does not have some particular ineffable height,
and Potter’s charge of theology is defused.
Note that if we take this class-free conception seriously, we cannot even treat
‘V ’ as a genuine singular term. I’ll continue to use that expression, and related
expressions such as ‘the hierarchy’, with their normal singular grammar, since to
do otherwise would render the discussion needlessly difficult to parse. But strictly
speaking, these expressions should be understood in the Zermelian context as plural
terms (in the one case, a plural proper name, and in the other, a plural definite
32This idea of inexhaustibility is of course a familiar justification for reflection principles of
varying strength.
33Assuming the answer is given is in set-theoretic terms. But it’s unclear to me how that could
be avoided while still specifying some ordinal as the putative height of the hierarchy.
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description) denoting the models of set theory. As with other plural terms, such
as ‘the inhabitants of London’, we must take care not to be mislead by the pres-
ence of the definite article and interpret the term as singularly referring to a class;
particularly those of us who want to deny that the hierarchy so conceived has an
order type or constitutes a model of set theory. Indeed, according to the Zermelian
conception, the models of set theory do not constitute a class which is itself a model
of set theory any more that the inhabitants of London constitute a class which itself
inhabits London.34
The claim that the hierarchy does not form a totality with a definite height may
have implications beyond the scope of this discussion. Tait (1998, p.478) suggests
that thinking of the universe in this way should require that unrestricted quantifica-
tion over V be interpreted constructively, rather than classically. One might worry
here that there is a tension between platonism about sets and thinking of the uni-
verse in this way. However, recall (§1) that, for Go¨del at least, inexhaustibility is
a property of set theory just as much as it is a property of the hierarchy. So the
constructive reasoning here is supposed to correspond not to an anti-realist view of
sets, but rather to our inability to circumscribe once-and-for-all our means of form-
ing axiomatic extensions of set theory. Such a a view does not straightforwardly
commit one to a constructivist view of any sets since thinking of set theory as in-
definitely extensible in this way is consistent with the logic of every segment of the
hierarchy which models ZFC2 being classical. In other words, on Tait’s proposal
φβ ∨ ¬φβ is valid for each strong inacessible β and each formula φ, so this position
need not be radically revisionist about set theory.35
While I think it is perfectly compatible with Go¨delian conceptual platonism to
understand talk of the hierarchy as talk about an unbounded sequence of models of
set theory, which is ‘absolutely infinite’, or inexhaustible, there is a further question
as to whether this was Go¨del’s own view. With characteristic caution, he does not
squarely come down on either side of the debate. Horsten and Welch cite Go¨del
as a full-blown Cantorian, although the evidence they offer for this claim is rather
thin. They refer (2016a, p.13) to an unpublished remark of Go¨del’s cited by Wang
34See (Oliver and Smiley 2016) for more on plural terms, particularly §5.3.
35This suggestion accords well with Zermelo’s claim that in each model in the unbounded series
‘the whole classical theory [of sets] is expressed’ (1930, p.1223).
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(1996, p.260): ‘To say that the universe of all sets is an unfinished totality does
not mean objective indeterminedness, but merely a subjective inability to finish it’.
As it stands, this remark is consistent with the position I’m urging the Go¨delian
to adopt. Zermelo himself may have been a potentialist about the universe of sets,
as suggested by his claim that the hierarchy ‘reaches no true completion in its un-
restricted advance’ (1930, p.1223). But all that is required for present purposes is
that the hierarchy not be thought of as a unique higher-order object such as a class
which constitutes a model of the theory - whether indeterminate or otherwise. Tait,
somewhat more persuasively, cites remarks of Go¨del’s which imply, but do not state,
that V is a model of the axioms of set theory (1998, p.477). But since a Zermelian
view is consistent with Go¨delian platonism, even if Go¨del himself was inclined to
Cantorianism, we can simply regard Potter’s theological argument as showing that
he was wrong to be so inclined, given his acceptance of strong reflection principles.
The upshot is that reflection principles needn’t be understood as saying of some
well-determined higher-order object, the hierarchy, that it has some height, though
we cannot say to which ordinal this height corresponds. If we regard classes merely
as temporary universes, there is no mystery why we can’t specify the height of the
hierarchy - it is not the sort of thing to which a non-trivial ascription of height can
be made. Rather, reflection principles can be understood as saying of our language
that it can’t uniquely pin down the hierarchy. And this is no divine mystery, it is
simply a consequence of the fact that we take the closure of any principle used to
form all the sets so far to form still further sets.
Since it is inexhaustibility which motivates any form of reflection principle, we
have good reason to prefer the strongest consistent reflection principle - the un-
bounded sequence of models of set theory goes on as far as possible. The inex-
haustibility of the hierarchy, which is the traditional justification for various reflec-
tion principles, is the key to seeing why the charge of theology is misplaced, at least
in the context of a Zermelian conception of set theory.
Third-Order Platonism
What of the other part of Potter’s argument against reflection principles? Even if
we deny that V is some particular model of set theory, Potter’s claim that reflection
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principles are interminably syntactic still holds good. But should we follow Potter
in thinking that this syntactic character results in justifications of these principles
taking on a ‘constructivist spin’? I think not; platonists as well as constructivists
must speak about the hierarchy in a language, and there is no reason a priori to
suppose that the nature of the hierarchy as understood by a platonist might not
restrict our ability to speak about it in certain ways. Once we have abandoned the
idea that the hierarchy is a unique well-defined class (or similar higher-order object),
the way is open to a platonist to explain why various reflection principles are delib-
erately schematic, rather than schematized versions of a more general principles (as
with the separation schema, for instance).
The central motivation for reflection principles is the notion of the absolute in-
finity, or inexhaustibility, of the universe of set theory. Given the view that classes
are merely ‘temporary’, the notion of absolute infinity, or of inexhaustibility, cannot
possibly be explained by saying that the universe is ‘class-sized’ or anything along
similar lines. As Reinhardt puts it, ‘our idea of set comes from the cumulative hier-
archy, so if you are going to add a layer [of classes] at the top, it looks like you just
forgot to finish the hierarchy’ (Reinhardt 1974, p.196).
On this picture, classes are just sets higher up in the hierarchy, and so the uni-
verse isn’t a class. Since set theory is in the business of telling us about sets, amongst
which we will never find the hierarchy, we should indeed expect our language to be
impoverished with respect to speaking of it in completely general terms. That is, we
should expect any attempt to characterize it from below to result in failure. Given
that set theory is the theory of sets, and not the theory of things we might say
about sets, we should never expect reflection principles to be formulated as single
sentences. So the reflection principles are not just ‘inherently’ schematic, they are
deliberately schematic.
I think that line of thought is sufficient to establish that a platonist perspective
on the hierarchy can be used to justify schematic principles that are not schematized
versions of of higher-order principles. This element of Potter’s criticism can be safely
set to oneside. Nonetheless, reflection principles cannot be regarded as schematized
versions of higher-order principles because some of those higher-order principles are
inconsistent. So it remains to be explained how the platonist can justify as follow-
ing from the concept set a principle which, in its most general form, is inconsistent.
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Put otherwise, reflection principles keep bad company, and the platonist who would
endorse strong consistent reflection principles, such as Go¨del, owes us a justification
which does not extend to the inconsistent principles in the vicinity.
So where do we stand? I do not think that the platonist must resort to theology
or constructivism in order to justify reflection principles. Indeed, we’ve already seen
that the inexhaustibility of the hierarchy, considered in Zermelian terms, offers a
justification for strong consistent reflection principles. But reflection on a third-
order parameter is inconsistent, so this justification must be supplemented with an
account of why properties of properties of sets don’t reflect, unlike properties of
sets.36
This, I think, is the most serious obstacle in the way of any justification of strong
reflection principles. Somehow, the case must be made that our set theory, at least
as far as reflection principles are concerned, must be at most second-order. The
platonist has two options here; the first of these concerns the formalization of the
theory, and the second its interpretation.
The first option is for the platonist to put the theory before its subject matter,
and argue directly that the formalization of set theory as a whole should not include
third+-order quantification (that is to say, quantification of third-order and higher).
If a good argument for this can be made, then the restriction of the reflection prin-
ciple to exclude higher-order parameters can be made without an ad hoc manoeuvre
to rescue an otherwise reasonable principle from inconsistency. The best way to
motivate some restriction of this kind would be to focus on the correct theoretical
primitives required by a theory of sets. It is somewhat in philosophical vogue to
suggest that the terms of a theory in general, and the primitive terms in particular,
should have as their semantic values only those objects and concepts which are in
some sense suitably fundamental.
Without getting bogged down in the details of what this ‘fundamentality’ should
amount to in the case of set theory, it’s quite clear that the first-order quantifiers
should range over only sets (and, if suitably fundamental candidates can be found,
urelements as well). From this point, there would be a question about whether
second-order quantifiers ranging over properties of sets should be admitted to the
36This issue is not put forward explicitly in Potter’s argument. But I take it to be a natural
extension of the points he does explicitly make.
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theory as well. Go¨del certainly insisted (1947, p.181 fn.17) that property of sets
was a primitive term of set theory, and we could perhaps take this as a stipulation.
Alternatively we could look for historical justifications of such second-order quantifi-
cation in the work of Zermelo and other early set theorists working in the iterative
tradition.
From here, the strategy would finally require that considerations of fundamen-
tality ruled out any third+-order quantification. Perhaps the semantic values of such
variables are too far removed from the concern of set theory for the corresponding
vocabulary to qualify as legitimately fundamental. Or perhaps we could claim that
quantifying over properties of properties of sets is too ideologically profligate to fea-
ture in our best account of the foundations of mathematics.
This line of thought, however, is not one I think the platonist should follow. For
one thing, it isn’t obvious that a suitable account of what ‘fundamental vocabulary’
amounts to can be given.37 Secondly, even if such an account could be given, the
fundamentality of a theory couched in a second- or first-order language could surely
only count as one theoretical virtue amongst many that a formalization of set theory
might have. Such a theoretical virtue could in principle be overridden by other con-
siderations, but the platonist would require something much more substantial than
this. Indeed third+-order language must be completely excluded from the formaliza-
tion of set theory, on pain of inconsistency or rejection of the idea behind reflection
principles. If the justification of a principle like RP 22 is not to over-generate, it can-
not simply be that virtue saves us from inconsistency. Rather, there must be some
prior reason to think that properties of properties of sets don’t reflect.
The alternative to focusing directly on the language would be to focus instead on
the ontology of the theory. After all, there seems to be nothing stopping us adding
the language of higher type theory to a theory of sets if we want to. For the platon-
ist, the hierarchy is as it is independently of what we do or say. So what’s needed is
a philosophical story that distinguishes reflecting types from non-reflecting ones. A
first suggestion would be to refuse to interpret the third+-order part of any theory
realistically. If properties of properties of sets don’t actually exist, then it seems
reasonable to insist that they don’t reflect.
37For an account of why I don’t think suggestions like this will work in the more general case,
see Wrigley (2018).
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In a sense, this proposal may seem quite natural in the context of a class-free
interpretation of set theory; the values we assign to higher-order variables in formu-
lating reflection principles are defined only relative to the restriction of the hierarchy
to an initial segment. This is because we said that for a given ordinal β, first-order
variables range over sets in Vβ, whilst higher-order variables range over sets higher
up in the hierarchy. So it’s quite open to the Go¨delian platonist to insist that where
quantification over the hierarchy is absolutely general, there is no room to be made
for third+-order variables to have any values whatsoever.
A glaring issue with the proposal, however, is that a similar argument could be
run with the aim of eliminating the second-order quantification in set theory that
Go¨del and Zermelo commit themselves to. The natural interpretation of second-
order quantifiers in a class-free setting is as ranging over properties of sets. If we
cannot interpret third-order variables as ranging over properties of properties of sets,
for instance, then why should we be able to interpret the second-order variables as
ranging over properties of sets?
The platonist could, of course, simply bite this bullet and reject second-order
set theory, accepting that this is the price to pay for a strong reflection principle.
There are two deep issues with this proposal, however. Firstly, RP 11 is extremely
weak; with the axioms of extensionality, foundation, and separation, it can prove the
axiom of infinity, but fails to deliver even replacement. So giving up on second-order
set theory is a heavy price to pay for no gain whatsoever, if the axiom of infinity
has an independent motivation from the iterative conception as is usually supposed.
Secondly, we must resist this suggestion of first-orderism if we want a satisfactory
account of the different kinds of incompleteness discussed above. Given that (full)
second-order logic has no sound and complete deductive system, it is of somewhat
limited use for actually proving things about sets, and for that reason we might
prefer our mathematics proper to be first-order. But the metatheoretic properties
of second-order axiomatizations are crucial for an adequate philosophical account of
incompleteness. To the committed first-orderist, there is no sensible distinction to
be made between the inability of an axiomatic set theory to decide its own consis-
tency, and its inability to uniquely determine the height of the hierarchy. But these
forms of incompleteness are different and should be kept distinct, so the conceptual
platonist must find a means of legitimising second-order quantification and exorcis-
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ing anything third+-order.
Clearly the platonist is walking a tightrope here: in an ordinary case, the use
of third+-order reasoning is justified where the domain is not conceived of con-
structively. Such reasoning is simply uncommon due to the lack of training in, and
aptitude for, higher-order reasoning from which the vast majority of us suffer. There
is, for instance, no obstacle in principle to a carpenter considering the properties of
properties of wood in the construction of furniture, even if this would be unusual. So
why can’t the set theorist do similarly?38 The conceptual platonist who advocates a
strong reflection principle must think that reasoning about properties of properties
of sets is not merely difficult or inconvenient, but for some reason cannot possibly be
a legitimate source of knowledge about sets, while at the same time thinking that
second-order reasoning is perfectly above board, because the second-order domain
is suitably reflective.
I am sceptical that there is any satisfactory story to tell here. I cannot, however,
rule out the possibility, as any attempt would rely on drawing a very fine distinction
between properties of sets, and properties of properties of sets. As a Go¨delian might
put it, in order to rescue the strong reflection principles, we must think that the
concepts set and property of sets have objective content, while denying this of the
concept property of properties of sets. This is the only way I can imagine to explain
why first- and second- order parameters reflect, but third+-order parameters do not.
This is not an entirely happy proposal, since it is quite unclear why the concept
property of properties of sets should not have objective content.39 While it is per-
haps true that no axioms of third-order set theory force themselves upon as true,
this seems best explained by their unfamiliarity, rather than by some flaw in the
relevant concept. As we saw before, the force of the axioms need not be immediate
to us on Go¨del’s account.
This is certainly a problem, but it’s important to note that it isn’t a new prob-
38Thanks to Michael Potter for this particularly helpful example.
39Looking for help in Go¨del’s writings is of limited help here. In an early paper (1933, pp.49–50),
Go¨del does tell us a little about when concepts are ‘objectionable’. But the example here is the
concept property of integers, and its objectionable status is intimately linked with its impredica-
tivity. This is a view that Go¨del clearly changed his mind on, and the paper pre-dates his mature
platonism by some years. In general, finding details in Go¨del’s papers about when a concept lacks
objective content seems to be even more challenging than finding positive remarks on the subject.
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lem. Rather, it is simply a manifestation of the same problem that we encountered
in the previous exposition of conceptual platonism, namely that we have no reliable
and precise method for determining whether a concept has objective content. If
we had a means of so determining it, we could apply this method to the concept
property of properties of sets. If the concept has objective content, then we would
have to reject the idea behind the reflection principles as ultimately incoherent. If
not, we could accept RP n2 and Γ
2
n for all n < ω as implied by our concepts of set
and property of sets.
So, even if a suitable account of the objectivity of the content of a concept can
be found, something in conceptual platonism has got to give. That is either the
stronger consistent reflection principles, or third+-order platonism. This represents
a genuine compromise from a Go¨delian perspective: Go¨del explicitly says that such
higher-order concepts are legitimate in set theory, but that they are simply redun-
dant. He writes: ‘concepts of “property of property of set” etc. can be introduced.
The new axioms thus obtained, however, as to their consequences for propositions
referring to limited domains of sets (such as the continuum hypothesis) are con-
tained (as far as they are known today) in the axioms about sets.’ (Go¨del 1964,
p.260 fn.18). The very same paragraph of text contains another footnote (in the
revised 1966 version), in which Go¨del mentions that the existence of Mahlo cardi-
nals follows the concept set, and can be obtained using reflection principles. Of
course, we now know that using third-order set theory with a reflection principle
over third-order parameters, we can deduce all propositions about limited domains
of sets, thanks to the inconsistency of the theory. So a conceptual platonist cannot
both regard strong reflection principles as having an intuitive justification and be a
platonist about the concept property of properties of sets.
Let’s circle back to our central concern: Koellner’s results make it very likely that
only a modest reduction in set-theoretic incompleteness can be obtained from any
consistent reflection principles. Some of the obstacles to a compelling justification
of strong reflection principles can be overcome: in the context of a Zermelian inter-
pretation of set theory (which may be some distance from Go¨del’s own position),
the conceptual platonist can regard strong reflection principles as justified by the in-
exhaustibility of the hierarchy, without recourse to theology or constructivism. The
reflection principles are not a failed approximation of more justified principles, they
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are deliberately schematic, and follow from the iterative conception to the extent
that the inexhaustibility of the hierarchy does. The existence of such a justification
allows us to make sense of Go¨del’s claim that that mathematical intuition can deliver
the existence of small large cardinals, since the existence of such cardinals follows
from principles like RP 22 . The more pressing problem however, is that since the
time at which Go¨del was writing, it has been determined that the inexhaustibility
justification over-generates to inconsistent reflection principles. So even the modest
reduction of incompleteness offered by reflection principles is conditional on the pla-
tonist’s ability to draw a principled distinction between second-order parameters,
which are reflective, and third-order parameters, which are not.
I’ve argued that the only means by which a platonist could achieve this is by
showing that the concept property of sets has objective content, and that the con-
cept property of properties of sets lacks it. Even if this can be done, the platonist
cannot retain their full realism and the stronger reflection principles, which repre-
sents a significant philosophical compromise. Moreover, this serves to deepen the
central mystery which bedevils conceptual platonism: which concepts have objective
content, and why? Until a satisfactory answer to these questions is provided, we
must be sceptical of the idea that set-theoretic reflection principles are a legitimate
means of reducing set-theoretic incompleteness at all.
4.4 Platonism and Incompleteness
We now turn to the second central question of this chapter: do the incompleteness
theorems support platonism (construed as conceptual platonism), as Go¨del claims?
I’ll argue that they do, both for the reasons Go¨del offers in the Gibbs lecture,
and for reasons relating specifically to the form of platonism I’ve reconstructed
from Go¨del’s work. However, I will argue that in both cases the support offered is
unfortunately thin. The Gibbs lecture offers three distinct arguments for the claim
that the incompleteness theorems support platonism. Assessing these in turn, we see
that none are sufficient to establish platonism, although they do tell against some
of its less-convincing rivals. Note that Go¨del takes the incompleteness theorems
to support platonism whichever disjunct of the disjunctive argument holds (1951,
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p.314).
The Argument from Clarity
Go¨del’s first argument for platonism, contrasted with the view that mathematics
is a ‘free creation’ of the human mind, concerns the relation between creator and
creation:
[I]f mathematics were our free creation, ignorance as to the objects we
created, it is true, might still occur, but only through lack of a clear real-
ization as to what we have really created (or perhaps, due to the practical
difficulty of too complicated computations). Therefore it would have to
disappear (at least in principle, although perhaps not in practice) as
soon as we attain perfect clearness. However, modern developments in
the foundations of mathematics have accomplished an insurmountable
degree of exactness, but this has helped practically nothing for the solu-
tion of mathematical problems. (1951, p.314)
The idea is that, with respect to concepts of our own devising, a perfectly clear
and exact axiomatization should be sufficient for complete knowledge. Thanks to
the incompleteness theorems then, mathematical concepts (or at least, sufficiently
rich mathematical concepts) are not our own ‘free creation’, but rather they have
objective content.
Sense can be made of this argument outside the context of conceptual platonism,
but it is significant that Go¨del moves seamlessly between the idea of mathematics
being our own creation, and that of mathematical objects being so created. Just as
Go¨del’s platonism about mathematical concepts or mathematical truth is the source
of his platonism about mathematical objects, his hypothetical anti-platonism about
mathematical objects is founded on the supposition that mathematical concepts lack
objective content.
Though this is Go¨del’s most compelling argument that the incompleteness the-
orems support platonism, it might initially seem that there is a problem with the
inference made by Go¨del, that if we created mathematical objects, then conceptual
clarity with respect to them would result in all questions about them being decidable
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in-principle. It seems perfectly consistent to think that sets are ‘of our own making’,
and that perfect conceptual clarity would not result in complete knowledge about
them. Chairs, for instance, are of our own making, and yet perfectly clear blueprints
for the construction of a chair are not sufficient for a complete theory of its physical
properties. As Go¨del points out (1951, p.312), this argument should not be pressed
by the creationist; the reason that clarity about physical constructions is insufficient
for knowledge of their physical properties is precisely because the physical material
from which they are constructed is objective.
Even in the mathematical case though, for a creationist who does not take math-
ematical objects to be constructed from something objective, it might seem dubious
to suppose that perfect clarity would be sufficient for complete knowledge. For ex-
ample, no amount of reflection on the concept set could decide the cardinality of
the set of urelements.
I think such a response to Go¨del would be much too quick. Our commitment
to the soundness of some sufficiently strong mathematical theory commits us to ac-
cepting as further axioms some sentences expressing this soundness (e.g. instances
of Feferman’s reflection principle), as well as sentences expressing consequences of
the system’s soundness (e.g. its Go¨del sentence and canonical consistency sentence).
Despite Go¨del’s focus in the above passage on the objects of a mathematical theory,
the problem is much more pressing when formulated in terms of axiomatic consider-
ations: can the philosopher who believes that mathematics is our own free creation
make sense of the idea that certain axioms are ‘missing’ from a theory?
It’s quite important that the missing axioms are ones that we are obligated to
regard as valid. The formulation of ZFC does not, for instance, force us to regard
any axiom candidate stating the number of the urelements as valid, whether or not
the other axioms are sound. But accepting that the axioms are sound does force
us to regard an axiom expressing the consistency of ZFC as valid. It is not so
obvious that the advocate of free creation can make sense of this situation, or of
this distinction between such different kinds of axiom candidates. Why can’t the
free creator simply stop at some desired theory, such as ZFC and refuse to accept
further axioms like the relevant Go¨del sentence?
The kind of response that we can offer to Go¨del on the creationist’s behalf will
depend critically on the kind of creationist view being considered. It’s plausible
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that Go¨del’s argument roundly defeats the crudest kind of creationism, whereby the
truth of any axiom in mathematics is up to the mathematician, on a case-by-case
basis. It simply can’t be that the axioms of some theory are sound, and that its
consistency sentence isn’t valid. There are, however, issues with offering Go¨del’s
argument as a response to platonism’s rivals that are less permissive than this crude
creationsim.
The turning point of the issue is whether our hypothetical creationist can make
sense of the notion of unfinished creation, in the sense that the construction of
objects answering to the theory has not been achieved to the intended extent. Con-
sider a creationst who believes that the content of the concept set is at least partially
determined in advance, so that the creative process is not completely free,40 or at
least that the creative process is constrained by previous creative decisions made.
Is there any obstacle to such a creationist believing that mathematical existence is
just construction by mathematical proof?41 It seems to me that there is no such
obstacle.
According to this imagined creationist, the concept being axiomatized would
function like a blueprint, and the construction of objects would proceed by showing
them to satisfy increasingly strong approximations to the blueprint. Axiom can-
didates which are not made valid by our constructions can be distinguished into
kinds by this creationist similarly to how they can be distinguished by the platonist.
Obligatory axioms, such as Go¨del sentences, are those which figure in the blueprint
and must later in the creative process be valid with respect to our creations. Op-
tional axioms, such as those asserting the number of urelements, are those which
needn’t guide our creative process at any stage.
Go¨del, of course, would not be satisfied with such a creationist position, since
according to him the concept acting as blueprint would, at least in the case of the
concept set, already determine that some objects fell under it, making any creative
process redundant. But this particular response to the creationist is not at all mo-
tivated by the incompleteness theorems, rather it is a consequence of Go¨del’s view
40This needn’t entail that the concept has anything like ‘real content’ in the platonist’s sense.
It might, for instance, simply be that our established patterns of use of the term ‘natural number’
determine that nothing could count as an axiomatization of the concept it expresses without
meeting certain constraints.
41The notion of proof at work here needn’t correspond to proof in any given formal system.
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that platonism about the objects of mathematics is entailed by platonism about the
concepts. It is not much to say that, on the assumption of conceptual platonism,
the incompleteness theorems support conceptual platonism.
However, this is still something of a victory for Go¨del; as we’ve seen the in-
completeness theorems do seem to rule out a kind of view where the validity of
mathematical axiom candidates is simply a matter of decision on a case-by-case
basis. To that extent then, the theorems support platonism about mathematical
concepts. Our grasp of such concepts is reflected in the axioms we take to be valid
with respect to it. If those axioms aren’t ‘up to us’, then there should be something
in the content of the concept which is correspondingly not at our discretion. But
it isn’t obvious that one can’t think that mathematical concepts are to some extent
determinate without being a platonist with respect to them. That we can only
axiomatize arithmetic and set theory in certain ways could perhaps be explained
in terms of linguistic behaviour or psychology, for instance, without recourse to
Go¨delian platonism.
The significance of the clarity argument for platonism will then rest on whether
rival philosophical views, such as formalism and intuitionism, are committed to the
creationist principle the incompleteness theorems refute. But on the face of it, the
main rivals are committed to no such principle. For example, the intuitionist should
not think that we are entitled to choose the axiom of foundation to be true, since
it violates the principles of constructive reasoning. According to the formalist, we
can’t freely choose which axioms are valid where they have implications for the ‘real’
or ‘concrete’ parts of mathematics, whatever those may be identified as.
Quite apart from this central difficulty, the argument made by Go¨del is in tension
with his views elsewhere in the paper. Despite claiming here that we have attained
perfect conceptual clarity in order to push the creationist into a corner, his later re-
marks contradict this. He claims, only a few pages later, that it is ‘undeniable that
this knowledge [of the world of concepts], in certain cases, not only is incomplete,
but even indistinct’ (1951, p.321). This may be unfortunate, but it does not strike
me as particularly damaging to Go¨del’s case; the crude creationist will have a hard
time explaining our obligation to regard certain axioms as valid, regardless of the
current state of our conceptual knowledge.
In conclusion, Go¨del’s argument can claim some success, in that the incomplete-
4.4. Platonism and Incompleteness 127
ness theorems refute the crudest form of anti-platonism as imagined by Go¨del. A
further anti-platonist view which seems to come under serious pressure from the
clarity argument is a Wittgensteinian identification of mathematical truth with for-
mal provability. But it is unclear that we should regard the theorems as supporting
Go¨del’s platonism over other anti-platonist positions that place greater constraints
on the creative abilities of the mathematician.
The Argument from Freedom
Go¨del’s second argument for platonism concerns the kind of freedom that a creator
should allegedly enjoy with respect to their creation:
[T]he activity of the mathematician shows very little of the freedom a
creator should enjoy. Even if, for example, the axioms about integers
were a free invention, still it must be admitted that the mathematician,
after he has imagined the first few properties of his objects, is at an
end with his creative ability, and he is not in a position to create the
validity of the theorems at his will. If anything like creation exists at all
in mathematics, then what any theorem does is exactly to restrict the
freedom of creation. That, however, which restricts it must evidently
exist independently of the creation. (1951, p.314)
Go¨del goes on to clarify in a footnote that the restrictions cannot themselves be
freely chosen, because a genuinely free creator could will such restrictions to be sat-
isfied (e.g. consistency) and will simultaneously that certain sentences be theorems.
Go¨del’s argument here is persuasive for a similar reason to the previous, namely
that we plainly do not enjoy the kind of radical freedom envisaged in this passage.
The main problem, however, with this argument is also similar to that of the
previous argument; it lends only limited credibility to a platonist interpretation of
mathematics in virtue of its conclusion being consistent with the vast majority of
platonism’s major rivals. No anti-realist position in the offing is incompatible with
the existence of theorems in mathematics. The main target, conventionalism, is only
taken by Go¨del to be inconsistent with certain theorems, namely the incompleteness
theorems (as argued later in (1953/9)), so it is difficult to see what this argument
128 Chapter 4. Intuition and Reflection Principles
adds to his case against Carnap and co. With respect to other anti-platonist posi-
tions, all of them incorporate from the beginning some serious external restrictions
on the ‘freedom’ of the mathematician.
In Hilbert’s formalism, for instance, infinitary theories are constrained by the re-
quirement to be conservative over finitary mathematics, and it is no part of Hilbert’s
account of the latter area that we have any freedom over what the theorems are.
In the case of intuitionism, the creative powers of the mathematician are from the
outset constrained by the canons of constructivist reasoning; if it weren’t then there
would be nothing to stop the intuitionist constructing the reals via standard meth-
ods, for example, and the disagreement between the intuitionist and the ‘classicist’
would never get off the ground.
None of this is to say that the argument from freedom is not a good starting
point for an argument against these positions. The idea that theorems provide in-
dependent limitations on our creative freedom is certainly a persuasive one. But
more is needed to persuade the formalist and the intuitionist that those theorems
which Go¨del, or a classicist more generally, takes to be limiting our creative powers
should be regarded as such. For instance, ZFC is radically non-conservative over
finitary mathematics, and classical set theory is deeply non-constructive. So what is
needed for the argument from freedom to work is an account of why the theorems of
ZFC, and other such theories, should be regarded as genuine theorems, regardless
of one’s prior position on the nature of mathematical objects. But even if Go¨del’s
argument isn’t sufficient to resolve the debate between platonism and its rivals, it
perhaps offers a fresh light in which to view it.
The second argument is therefore, like Go¨del’s first, a partial success: it refutes
the crudest form of anti-platonism, but it seems to miss the bigger targets against
which Go¨del is primarily concerned to defend platonism.
The Argument from Strangeness
Go¨del’s third argument is perhaps the most puzzling; it concerns the relationship
between integers and sets of integers:
[I]f mathematical objects are our creations, then evidently integers and
sets of integers will have to be two different creations, the first of which
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does not necessitate the second. However, in order to prove certain
propositions about integers, the concept of set of integers is necessary.
So here, in order to find out what properties we have given to certain
objects of our imagination, [we] must first create other objects—a very
strange situation indeed! (1951, p.314)
This argument, though certainly interesting, is difficult to assess. Not least because,
despite its being one of the ‘main arguments’ for platonism (1951 p.341), its conclu-
sion is merely that the situation would be very ‘strange’ if some form of anti-realism
were true. But something stronger can be made out of this passage, I think. Can
the radical creationist make sense of the idea that the integers are wholly their own
creation, and yet think that certain propositions about them remain opaque without
the creation of some distinct further objects? Much like the previous arguments, I
think this one does force the creationist to cede some ground. But that said, there
are still a number of points on which the argument can be criticized. For one thing,
it is quite normal to rely on one creation in order to ascertain the properties of
another; for instance the use of a meter stick to measure the dimensions of a table.
A likely reply from Go¨del would be that this response already gives the game to the
platonist, since tables are built from something objective (wood, metal etc.), so if
the analogy between the table and the integers hold good, then there is ‘something
objective’ in the latter after all.
Even so, a creationist of the sort envisaged by Go¨del here could protest against
the assertion that the creation of the integers does not necessitate the creation of
sets of integers. Perhaps according to the creationist, the integers are sets, and the
concept set dictates that we always construct further sets where possible.42 Hence
the (set-theoretic) construction of the integers simply does necessitate the construc-
tion of the sets of integers.
This creator does not, of course, have the absolutely radical freedom imagined
by Go¨del, since the creator is bound by some maximality principle satisfied by the
relevant mathematical concepts. Furthermore, if the response I’ve provided is the
42The problem of multiple reductions doesn’t occur in this context. Given the sort of mental
construction envisaged by Go¨del, where the objects are ‘imagined’ into existence, presumably the
mathematician can simply imagine that the integers are one specific set-theoretic construction
satisfying the relevant axioms, rather than another.
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best response on behalf of the anti-platonists, then Go¨del’s argument seems to imply
that the only mathematical objects we can construct are set-theoretic, on pain of
strangeness. But this does little to seriously undermine the anti-realist’s case, since
any standard mathematical objects taken to be constructed can just be identified
with certain sets.
Once again, the argument is a partial victory, showing that the creationist must,
in order to avoid an explanatorily strange situation, regard their possible creations
as of a single homogeneous kind, sets. Further, they must regard the concept set as
satisfying some maximality principle (though perhaps only a fairly weak one). But
this need not mean that the concept has any ‘objective content’ in anything like
the Go¨delian sense, if the constraints on the concept set arise merely from linguistic
convention, mathematical practice, human psychology, or patterns of language use.
In summary then, the arguments which Go¨del takes to be the main arguments
in favour of platonism (1951, p.314), constitute a successful refutation of a kind
of anti-platonism, according to which axioms and theorems can be created at will,
such that our knowledge of one kind of mathematical object does not depend upon
knowledge of any other. But as support for platonism, the arguments are somewhat
unconvincing. In the main, this is because the commitments that Go¨del ascribes
to his opponent are not commitments recognizable in many of platonism’s major
rivals. Hence, it is entirely unclear that the incompleteness theorems substantially
support platonism, as Go¨del claims.
Even if we accept Go¨del’s refutation of conventionalism (which is thoroughly
grounded in the incompleteness theorems), it doesn’t seem as if that argument
lends any more support to platonism than it does to any of its non-conventionalist
rivals. Go¨del’s arguments establish that the axiomatization of a (sufficiently rich)
mathematical concept is not entirely arbitrary, and perhaps also that mental con-
structions must all be of a single kind. These constraints seem consistent with the
major anti-platonist positions. But all of these arguments rely on a very generic
conception of platonism and its rivals. To properly assess Go¨del’s claim, we need to
examine the possibility of an argument based on the specific features of conceptual
platonism.
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Conceptual Platonism and Incompleteness
As I’ve reconstructed Go¨del’s platonism, the vindication of his claim that the in-
completeness theorems support it would require showing that those theorems should
increase our confidence that the concept set has objective content. Go¨del is not just a
platonist about sets; he also takes it that the urelements are integers (1964, pp.258-
9), so some weaker support for his platonism could be had if the incompleteness
theorems supported our belief in the objectivity of the content of the concept inte-
ger. I’ll deviate slightly from Go¨del here and explore the possibility that conceptual
platonism gains some support by increasing our confidence that the concept natural
number has objective content instead; plainly nothing philosophically significant is
sacrificed here, and some gain in clarity is had, given the familiarity of PA.
The difficulty, of course, is in assessing just how it is we become confident that a
given concept has objective content. In the context of set theory, we have seen that
Go¨del cites two factors: that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true,
and that the axiomatization of the concept is a non-arbitrary matter. Presumably,
these criteria for judging the concept set also apply to the concept natural number.
With respect to the first criterion, it is difficult to see how the incompleteness of
some axiomatization of a concept could further any self-evident force those axioms
might have. After all, the force of the axioms is a consequence of our pre-axiomatic
conception of the relevant concept, and nothing at all to do with metatheoretic
properties like incompleteness. But the two criteria together offer more promise.
In the spirit of the previous three arguments, we might offer something along the
following lines: if the concept of set or number weren’t objective, it would be (at
least to a substantial extent) ‘up to us’ how to axiomatize it. However, it is not up
to us how to axiomatize those concepts. In the first instance, the axioms of ZFC
and PA strike us as intuitively correct. Since the axioms in question are evidently
true, it follows that they are consistent, and hence the incompleteness theorems
show that arithmetic and set theory are incomplete. The extension of these axiom
systems is therefore a non-arbitrary matter; thanks to the incompleteness of our
axiomatization, we are rationally constrained to supplement the axioms by further
principles that can be derived via reflection on the concept in question which reduce
this incompleteness.
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So the idea is that, if a theory has self-evident axioms, the incompleteness the-
orems give us further reason to think that the concept axiomatized has objective
content. If we accept that argument, then to some extent the incompleteness the-
orems do support platonism. In the specific cases where we have a concept whose
axiomatization is intuitively sound, and hence consistent, the incompleteness the-
orems show that the axiom system will be extendible by non-arbitrary means via
reflection principles, provided that the axiomatization is sufficiently strong.
But this degree of support for platonism is unfortuantely rather weak. Namely,
it only applies to cases where we are already convinced that a concept has an ax-
iomatization the axioms of which ‘force themselves on us as being true’. This is
required to infer the consistency of the axioms, which is required in turn for the
incompleteness theorems to be relevant. But having such self-evident axioms was
already one of central means by which to judge that the axiomatized concept has
objective content. Hence, the incompleteness theorems will support conceptual pla-
tonism only when there is already good cause to be a platonist with respect to the
concept in question. And we’ve already seen such ‘good cause’ is difficult to come
by, since the central weakness of conceptual platonism is the lack of clarity provided
by Go¨del on what the objectivity of concepts amounts to.
Another thing to note about the argument offered on Go¨del’s behalf is that it is
substantially more convincing in the case of platonism about numbers than of sets.
This is primarily because the intuitive force of the axioms is much greater in the
case of arithmetic than of set theory, as demonstrated by the ongoing controversy
over the proper axiomatization of the concept set.
To conclude, Go¨del’s claim that the incompleteness theorems support platon-
ism can be modestly sustained. Although the form of anti-platonism which the
incompleteness theorems refute is perhaps not a serious candidate for an account of
mathematics, the incompleteness theorems do impose constraints on our account of
mathematical objects. Those constraints are certainly satisfied by platonism, but
are also satisfied by a number of serious rivals. We’ve also seen that the theorems
more particularly support one specific kind of platonism, namely conceptual platon-
ism. Unfortunately they do very little to remedy the lack of clarity from which that
position suffers.
Another serious limitation is that the incompleteness phenomenon only lends
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support to conceptual platonism in cases where we already have good reason to
be conceptual platonists, lessening the importance of the support offered. Finally,
where it does lend such support, it is more substantial in the case of arithmetic
than set theory. My view is that such slender support cannot possibly outweigh the
serious lack of clarity from which conceptual platonism suffers in its account of the
content of concepts. If such a gap could be filled in adequately, then some further
support for the position is forthcoming on the basis of the incompleteness theorems.
But this support is somewhat less substantial than we might have hoped for.
Conclusion
This chapter had two central goals, each of which shall be reviewed in turn. The
first was to assess whether reflection principles were any more effective at reducing
set-theoretic incompleteness than were soundness reflection principles at reducing
Go¨delian incompleteness in arithmetic. The second was to assess whether (concep-
tual) platonism is supported by the incompleteness theorems, which is one of the
major claims made by Go¨del in the Gibbs lecture.
Firstly, we saw at work Go¨del’s claim that certain set-theoretic axioms can be
justified by appeal to propositional intuition. Far from being mystical, this is simply
the view that reflecting on the iterative conception of set can go some way towards
telling us which axioms are justified. In particular, we saw that Go¨del takes inex-
haustibility to be a crucial part of the concept set, and that this principle potentially
licences a strong series of reflection principles. However, we saw that such axioms
could not succeed in eliminating incompleteness, since Koellner’s theorems make
it extremely likely that the strongest consistent reflection principles cannot justify
axioms stronger than those asserting the existence of the Erdo˝s cardinal κ(ω). This
leaves plenty of incompleteness, such as the undecidability of axioms asserting the
existence of even larger cardinals, together with strong reasons to believe that such
undecidability cannot be removed by appeal to axioms with only intrinsic or intu-
itive justification.
We then turned to the question of whether reflection on the concept set can li-
cence even such a modest reduction in incompleteness. I defended consistent higher-
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order reflection principles against Potter’s charge of theologicality, showing that the
priciples are well-motivated according to a class-free conception of set theory accord-
ing to which the hierarchy is an unbounded series of models, and not some particular
higher-order object.
A more serious problem is how to account for the supposed fact that first- and
second-order reflection follow from the concept set, but that higher-order reflection
principles do not. I argued that restricting our attention to vocabulary demarcated
as ‘fundamental’ would be unlikely to solve this problem, and suggested that the
Go¨delian would be better-served by abandoning platonism about properties of prop-
erties of sets, on the ground that we have an insufficiently clear conception of the
axioms of third-order set theory. The proposal is not wholly satisfactory, since it ex-
ploits the ambiguity in the conceptual platonist’s position regarding which concepts
have objective content. My own inclination is to think that the reflection principles
should be rejected as axiom candidates, but I conceded that the conceptual platon-
ist has some means of justifying the existence of (at most) κ(ω) by propositional
intuition, if they are willing to pay the philosophical price and abandon platonism
about third+-order objects. But even this proposal awaits a satisfactory clarification
of the idea of the objectivity of a concept’s content. So for now, even these relatively
modest reflection principles must be regarded as without sufficient justification.
Turning to our second question, we saw that even by Go¨del’s own lights, it is
mistaken to think that the incompleteness theorems provide very substantial sup-
port for conceptual platonism. The main arguments offered in the Gibbs lecture
were shown to be quite persuasive, but not against platonism’s most credible rivals.
An attempt to construct a tailor-made argument from the incompleteness theo-
rems to conceptual platonism met with equally limited success. Even here, the best
that could be achieved was the conclusion that the incompleteness theorems should
strengthen conviction in conceptual platonism when a substantial level of support
for that position is already available. Worse still, the argument from the incom-
pleteness theorems is more convincing in the case of platonism about the numbers,
falling short of substantially increasing our confidence in the existence of sets.
So far then, we’ve seen that there are at least two sources of incompleteness which
can aﬄict a formal theory, and that neither can be eliminated by the use of reflection
principles. In the next chapter, I’ll examine whether the distinctively set-theoretic
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element of incompleteness can be justifiably reduced by the use of large cardinal
axioms stronger than any consistent reflection principle, a programme launched by
Go¨del on the basis of a perceived analogy between mathematics and natural science.

Chapter 5
Quasi-Scientific Methods of Justification in Set Theory
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued that the conceptual platonist could deploy intrin-
sic methods of justification to posit the truth of axioms asserting the existence of
cardinal numbers of at most the consistency strength of the axiom that there is a
partition cardinal κ(ω) (though not, as we saw, without some cost). But stronger
axioms for larger cardinals certainly can be formulated, and according to Go¨del’s
view, justified by extrinsic, or quasi-scientific means. In this chapter, I’ll refer to
such axioms which cannot, on the Go¨delian view previously sketched, be justified
by appeals to intuition as large large cardinal axioms.1
According to Go¨del, platonism about set theory is the primary foundation for
the use of quasi-scientific methods in justifying large large cardinal axioms. In the
case of the natural sciences, the real existence of the objects concerned justifies the
use of ‘probabilistic’ or inductive methods to reach decisions about the nature of
those objects, which would not make sense if they were regarded as useful fictions or
mental constructions. According to Go¨del, the same realistic attitude to the objects
of set theory establishes an analogy between mathematics and natural science which
is sufficient to employ analogous methods in establishing an over-all picture of the
1It is important to bear in mind that such talk is loose, in an important sense. Large cardinal
axioms appear to be linearly ordered by consistency strength, but there is no theorem to this effect
(and there is no agreed definition of ‘large cardinal property’ which would be required for the
formulation of such a theorem). Secondly, although I’ll speak of large large cardinals and large
large cardinal axioms more-or-less interchangeably, it is important to remember that the ordering
of such axioms by consistency strength is not identical to the ordering of the cardinals concerned
by size. A cardinal κ is huge iff it is the critical point of a non-trivial elementary embedding j
from V into a transitive inner model M containing all functions f : j(κ) → M (Kanamori 2009,
p.331). κ is supercompact iff for all λ ≥ κ, there is some elementary embedding j from V to a
transitive inner model M containing all f : λ→M and j(κ) > λ (Kanamori 2009, p.298). If ZFC
plus an axiom for the existence of a huge cardinal is consistent, then so is ZFC plus an axiom for
the existence of a supercompact cardinal. However, if cardinals of each kind exist, then the least
supercompact cardinal is far larger than the least huge cardinal (Jech 2003, p.381).
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hierarchy.
The §1, I’ll introduce a strong analogy that Go¨del draws between sets and mate-
rial bodies, namely that the former are required to make sense of our mathematical
experience in the same way that the later are required to make sense of our empirical
experience. I’ll argue that no such analogy can be used to justify a belief in large
large cardinals.
In §2, I’ll introduce Russell’s regressive method, which accords well with part of
Go¨del’s thinking on the justification of axioms in set theory, whereby axioms are
verified by permitting the deduction of elementary mathematical ‘data’, just as laws
of nature in the sciences are justified by facilitating the prediction of data drawn
from sense experience.
In §3, I’ll examine the various options for what might constitute the mathemat-
ical data for the purposes of Go¨del’s analogy. These include the deliverances of
so-called mathematical perception, the theorems of ordinary mathematics, and Π01
arithmetical consequences. I’ll argue that of these candidates, some selection of Π01
sentences offers the only plausible option. Not all sentences of this form can act as
data, but a reasonable delineation of some privileged such sentences can be isolated
(though this delineation is perhaps not sharp).
In §4, I’ll then argue that, on this construal of the data, no large large cardinal
axiom gains any strictly regressive support by accounting for the data. By that, I
mean that no large large cardinal axiom is such that it permits the deduction of
a datum that cannot be deduced with help only from weaker assumptions. Hence
we can’t regard such posits as analogous to laws of nature with strictly regressive
support.
So the only plausible respect in which they could possibly be justified by quasi-
scientific means is by being regarded as principles which seek to maximise the the-
oretical virtues of set theories to which they might be added. Though I don’t have
a means of weighing and evaluating the contribution of various such virtues, I’ll
make the case in §5 that under no scheme for evaluating theoretical virtues should
we expect large large cardinal axioms to perform well, if the virtues in question are
broadly scientific as Go¨del suggests. Indeed, the closer the analogy between mathe-
matics and science, the less well-supported by the analogy are large cardinal axioms,
and hence the prospects for justification of these principles by analogical reasoning
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are bleak.
5.1 The Material Bodies Analogy
The use of quasi-scientific methods for justifying axioms of set theory is now com-
monplace in the philosophy of mathematics. Most famously, the indispensability
arguments of Quine (implicit in his (1951a)) and Putnam (explicit in his (1975))
justify the truth of set-theoretic axioms by examining the role they play in formulat-
ing adequate theories in natural science. Maddy’s later work (e.g. (1997)) seeks to
legitimise large large cardinal axioms via the empirical study of the behaviour of ac-
tual set theorists. In contrast with the Quine–Putnam approach, which attempts to
found mathematical platonism on an empirical basis, Go¨del’s use of quasi-scientific
methods is largely internal to mathematics. The role of large cardinals is examined
in terms of their contribution to a wider mathematical theory; little more than lip
service is paid by Go¨del to the applications of such theories in the sciences. And
in contrast to Maddy’s approach, which sees the methods of set theorists as essen-
tially autonomous, Go¨del attempts to justify set-theoretic modes of theory choice by
showing them to be analogous to sound methods found in the natural sciences. So
Go¨del’s approach to the problem has not survived the decades in its original form,
despite the fact that this aspect of his thought has undoubtedly had the greatest im-
pact in later analytic philosophy, far eclipsing the reception of his anti-mechanism,
rationalistic optimism, and conceptual platonism.
Go¨del’s quasi-scientific approach does not annex mathematics to the sciences,
and nor does it insulate the former from the latter. Rather, it imports some ele-
ments of scientific methodology into mathematics, by finding a structural similarity
between the two. There is not, in Go¨del’s remarks, a unique analogy to this effect, so
first I’d like to disambiguate two distinct analogical arguments presented by Go¨del.
The analogical argument that is the primary concern of this chapter takes it that
large cardinal axioms play the role in a mathematical theory that laws of nature play
in a scientific theory. It is common enough to conceive of natural-scientific proposi-
tions as being divided into two broad kinds (whether or not we take those kinds to
be disjoint or sharply delimited): the data and the laws. On this standard concep-
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tion, the data are empirical propositions that we take to be the facts, and the laws
are those propositions which are formulated in order to predict the facts. Indeed,
the prediction of the data is the primary means of verifying these laws; whether or
not they are intrinsically plausible, we take them to be true if they predict all the
data and don’t predict anything false. By analogy, certain large cardinal axioms
are supposed to be verified by ‘predicting’ (which is to say, deductively implying)
mathematical propositions of some privileged kind identified as the data. This is
broadly the Russellian view of the matter, and we shall return to it in due course.
Distinctly, Go¨del sometimes speaks as if sets themselves, that is, the particular
objects asserted to exist by the axioms, play the role in our understanding of a
mathematical theory that physical objects play in understanding our phenomenal
experience (1944, p.128). It may seem that these views are not substantially dif-
ferent; perhaps it matters little to natural science, for instance, whether we posit
the existence of physical bodies or assent to the truth of sentences asserting them
to exist. I’ll argue that there is, however, a substantial difference between the two
views in the case of large large cardinals, and that an analogy between mathematical
and physical objects cannot justify any large large cardinal axioms.
The analogy between sets and material bodies first appears when Go¨del dis-
cusses his platonism about sets (though not large large cardinals in particular) and
properties of sets. He writes:
It seems to me that the assumption of such objects is quite as legitimate
as the assumption of physical bodies, and there is quite as much reason
to believe in their existence. They are in the same sense necessary to a
satisfactory system of mathematics as physical bodies are necessary for
a satisfactory theory of our sense perceptions (1944, p.128).
Although Go¨del does not elaborate here on the sense in which he thinks the assump-
tion of physical bodies is necessary for a satisfactory theory of perception, I think it
is safe to assume that it is something along the lines of the following now-standard
explanation from Russell:
[A]lthough this is not logically impossible [that there are no physical
bodies], there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that it is true; and
5.1. The Material Bodies Analogy 141
it is, in fact, a less simple hypothesis, viewed as a means of accounting
for the facts of our own life, than the common-sense hypothesis that
there really are objects independent of us, whose action on us causes our
sensations (1912, p.10).
Russell describes the ‘simplicity’ as stemming from the fact that it would be a ‘mir-
acle’ (1912, p.9) if objects came and went from existence as we started and finished
perceiving them. Obviating the need to believe in this miracle by positing physical
bodies is described as a ‘natural’ theoretical move, rather than an account of how
we acquired our belief that there are physical objects (1912, p.11).
Can a similar account be given of the posit that there are sets in general, and
large large cardinals in particular? In an early presentation of the regressive method
(which will shortly be examined in more detail), Russell (1907, p.573), takes it that
‘accounting for’ or ‘predicting’ the relevant data amounts, in the case of mathemat-
ics, to proving some given privileged propositions. In the case of large cardinals,
we have it that the addition to ZFC of an axiom stating that there is a cardinal
of some particular kind allows for the deduction of certain sentences which are not
provable from ZFC alone. Some of those sentences might plausibly count as data,
while others should not be considered as such. In particular large cardinal axioms
have set-theoretic consequences (which may or may not count as data depending on
the case in hand), but also arithmetical consequences which are much more plausible
candidates for data. Consider, for example, the theory ZFC + ∃x x is measurable.2
This proves that there is an inaccessible cardinal, which can hardly count as an ele-
mentary datum, but it also proves Π01 arithmetical sentences not provable in ZFC,
for example ConZFC, which are much more plausible candidates for mathematical
data.
Suppose I posit the existence of a measurable cardinal in order to prove some
Π01 arithmetical sentence which I believe to be true. There is an important respect
in which positing material bodies in order to systematize our sense data differs rad-
ically from this. Consider, for example, the case of positing a table to account for
the coherence and continuity of my table-ish experiences with respect to leaving and
2κ is measurable iff it is the critical point of some elementary embedding from V to a transitive
class M (Martin and Steel 1989, p.73).
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re-entering a particular room. In the case of the table-posit, the particular material
body being posited, that table, plays a crucial role in the systematizing of my table-
ish experiences. If ‘accounting for the facts of our own life’ (as Russell puts it) is to
be made any simpler by this posit, it is because that particular table is there. The
mere truth of the sentence ‘there are tables’ is insufficient for such purposes. Ac-
counting for the facts of my experience is no simpler, for instance, if there is a table
somewhere else, but that this is merely a series of sense data. Indeed that seems to
rather complicate the story if some table-ish experiences are of actual tables, and
some are merely of sense data. The existential generalisation over tables does not
on its own systematize our experience, it is the particular posits of particular tables
that perform such a function on a case-by-case basis.
In the case of the measurable cardinal, however, things are not so. It is merely
the increase in the strength of our set theory that accounts for the elementary
arithmetical consequences. Although it might seem natural to think that it is the
least measurable cardinal which accounts for the arithmetical data in this scenario,
in truth no particular measurable cardinal explains the arithmetical consequences.
Unlike in the case of tables, the existence of any witness to the existential generali-
sation will do the job. Worse still, the role played by even the posit of a measurable
cardinal is dispensable with respect to the elementary consequences, because it is
only the consistency strength of the assertion which matters. For example, the addi-
tion of a measurable cardinal allows us to prove ConZFC. But positing any stronger
axiom of infinity, such as the existence of a Woodin cardinal, would do the job just
as well. Arguably, it would do the job better since it would prove further Π01 arith-
metical sentences which are not accounted for by the weaker theory (e.g. it proves
ConZFC+∃x x is measurable).3
Something quite substantial is at stake here, because if large cardinals really
were required to make sense of mathematics in the same way that material bodies
are required to make sense of our ordinary sense experience, that would afford to
them a massive degree of quasi-scientific justification, because the existence of ma-
3As long as we are considering the facts of common experience here, the argument can even be
re-run with respect to theoretical physical entities. For example, some particular arrangement of
elementary particles at a particular spatial location is required to explain why I see a table every
time I go into the room. The mere existence of some such particles somewhere is insufficient.
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terial bodies is a far more certain proposition than any particular natural law in the
sciences. Even well-established scientific laws are at times overthrown or precisi-
fied in the face of new experimental data, as occurred with Newtonian mechanics.
Moreover, even the most well-established scientific laws can rest uneasily with one
another, as is the case with general relativity and quantum mechanics. By contrast,
our belief in material bodies is practically certain. Most of us are inclined to agree
with Russell that we can’t prove that we are not dreaming; and yet I am more
certain, for instance, that the experience of writing this chapter is veridical than I
am of any philosophical conclusion reached in it. Since elementary mathematics is
no less evident than the experiences we have in the ordinary course of life, if large
cardinals were like material bodies in this sense, then we could be overwhelmingly
confident that they exist.
This is not to say that Go¨del ever seriously entertained the justification of large
large cardinal axioms in this sense; where he makes these kinds of assertions he is
speaking of sets generally. Although this of course includes such cardinals if they
exist, a more charitable reading of the passage would interpret these remarks as di-
rected toward the elementary parts of set theory. It is an interesting question which
parts of set theory, if any, can be justified by appeal to an analogy with material
bodies, though for my purposes it is redundant.4 Although Go¨del’s argument for
the existence of small large cardinals on the basis of the iterative conception of set is
in certain respects problematic, the aim in this chapter is to examine whether larger
cardinal axioms can be justified by quasi-scientific methods. The material bodies
analogy, even though not offered as a specific defence of large large cardinal axioms,
promises a huge degree of regressive support for the existence of certain sets, so it
is significant that it cannot be used to justify large large cardinals in particular.5
4Chihara (1982) takes very seriously Go¨del’s claim that we have as much reason to believe in
sets as in material bodies, and rejects it wholesale. I think this conclusion is probably correct, but
Chihara gives little consideration to the possibility that we have a good justification for the belief
in sets of a similar kind as the justification of the belief in material bodies, even if the quality of
the justification is not equal in both cases. Given what Go¨del says elsewhere about quasi-scientific
justification, it seems probable to me that he suffers from an uncharacteristic lapse of caution in
the passage quoted by Chihara, and that the slightly weaker position is Go¨del’s own. Even if not,
it strikes me as an interesting possibility in its own right.
5Maddy (1990, p.31) takes it that the primary function of intuition in Go¨del’s epistemology
is to provide intuitive data that is accounted for by mathematical theories by way of analogy to
physical bodies. Needless to say, this assessment does not accord with the reading of Go¨del offered
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Rather, a more modest quasi-scientific justification for large large cardinal axioms
must be sought, in the form of something like Russell’s regressive method in which
axioms are taken to be analogous to scientific laws.
5.2 Go¨del and the Regressive Method
The version of the science–mathematics analogy that Go¨del draws on most heavily
has its origins in Russell’s regressive method of finding justification for axioms. The
similarity between Go¨del and Russell runs deep here. Russell had in 1907 drawn a
‘close analogy between the methods of pure mathematics and the methods of the
sciences of observation’ (1907, p.572). Here Russell claims that mathematics, like
every science, has a body of commonly accepted propositions for which broader the-
ory is supposed to account. These are known as ‘data’ or ‘facts’. In the empirical
sciences, the facts are accounted for by proposing laws of nature which collectively
predict them. Analogously, in mathematics the most elementary facts are accounted
for by proposing axioms which deductively imply them.
Go¨del cites firm approval of this method, and predicts that it will be even more
successful in the future (1944, p.121), so a more thorough analysis of Russell will as-
sist in our evaluation of Go¨del here. Of course in the 1944 article, Go¨del is discussing
sets generally, not large large cardinals in particular (as noted above in connection
with his first analogy). Nonetheless, we’ll see whether the considerations at work in
the regressive method can be put to use in justifying large large cardinal axioms.
Russell sharply separates the epistemological problem, which is the problem
of the present chapter, from the psychological and historical (in some cases pre-
historical) problem of how we come to believe the propositions identified as data.
The empirical premises of a belief are those propositions which cause us to believe
the data, whereas the logical premises are logically less complex propositions from
which the data is to be deduced. Take, for example, the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4,
which ought to count as common fact if anything does. Russell conjectures that the
empirical premises of this belief will be various beliefs acquired from everyday life,
such as ancient shepherds repeatedly noticing that two pairs of sheep is always four
here.
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sheep, and similar. By contrast, the logical premises of this data will be formulae in
a system of mathematical logic or axiomatic arithmetic from which ‘2 + 2 = 4’ can
be derived.
The point of interest for Russell is that, for the greater part of mathematics, the
simple picture on which the empirical premises and logical premises coincide holds
good. In other words, we believe a mathematical proposition precisely because we
have a proof of it from simpler propositions which we already accept. With respect
to elementary propositions, including 2 + 2 = 4, however, this is plainly a mislead-
ing picture, since the truths of elementary arithmetic are far more evident than
the axioms of any system from which they could be derived. This leads Russell to
conclude that the method of discovering and justifying foundational principles in
mathematics is ‘substantially the same as the method of discovering general laws in
any other science’ (1907, p.573).
Given the similarity of methods of justification, it is unsurprising that for Russell
the degree of verification obtained by axioms in mathematics is alike to the degree
which may be claimed for the laws of physics. As he puts it ‘when the general laws
are neither obvious, nor demonstrably the only possible hypotheses to account for
the [data] then the general laws remain merely probable’ (1907, p.573).
There is some lack of clarity as to which general laws can be, or should be, jus-
tified regressively, and hence potentially without complete certainty. In the original
paper, Russell seems to think that general logical laws like φ → φ can be justified
in this way (1907, p.576). This strikes me as somewhat bizarre, since such a law
seems as evident as a proposition about one’s present sense data. Later on, however,
Russell appears to shift into thinking that the laws of logic are self-evident upon
reflection, and do not require regressive justification (Russell 1914, pp.70–71). This
idea is much more appealing, since the most obvious logical laws can then be them-
selves considered as data on a par with elementary mathematical propositions. But
it is still unclear where exactly to draw the boundary between generalities like φ→ φ
which may be considered part of the data, and generalities which are designed to
account for the data, like the Peano axioms. Despite this, the proposal constitutes
a radically non-traditional epistemology of axiomatic systems, in that axioms may
be afforded fallible justification in the absence of any intuitive evidence.
Go¨del’s view is in many respects similar to Russell’s. An element of Go¨del’s ap-
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proach to the issue that differs from Russell’s is that he is more concerned with the
verification of axioms by the enhancement of what today would be called ‘theoreti-
cal virtues’. In discussions of the regressive method, Russell focuses on confirmation
which flows from two sources: the obvious truths which axioms or laws entail, and
the obvious falsehoods which they do not (1907, p.578). Where an axiom candidate
is justified because it accounts for some data which have no proof in the unsupple-
mented theory, I’ll call such justification strictly regressive. But there is another
respect in which posits in science can contribute to verification of a theory beyond
its observational consequences, by discriminating between the virtues of competing
empirically adequate theories.
To take a famous example, Einstein’s theory of general relativity describes space-
time as curved. Logically speaking, we could maintain that spacetime is actually
flat, and posit compensating fields. The result is a theory which has the same obser-
vational consequences as Einstein’s, but which preservs our pre-theoretic Euclidean
conception of the geometry of physical space. However, corresponding to each rel-
ativistic model there are infinitely many distinct but empirically indistinguishable
alternative Euclidean worlds. So despite their empirical equivalence, the Euclidean
alternative is not seen as a genuine competitor to general relativity, because of the
latter’s tremendous advantage in terms of simplicity, naturalness, and other theo-
retical virtues (Sklar 1992, pp.62–63).
Russell does give consideration to theoretical virtue in cases like this, where there
are multiple candidate hypotheses which can account for certain data. For instance,
in (1908, pp.242–243), he adopts the axiom of reducibility on the grounds that it
does the work required of a theory of classes, but is considerably more convenient
than a theory of classes suitably modified to avoid the paradoxes. More generally,
he emphasises that axiomatic theories which predict the data serve to organize our
knowledge and make it more manageable (1907, p.580). It is not apparent to me,
however, that Russell regarded it as possible to justify mathematical axioms solely
on the grounds that they substantially enhance virtue. He never, to my knowledge,
offers an explicit justification for adding an axiom to a theory which has no strictly
regressive support (i.e. one that is not sufficient to take account of any data not ac-
counted for by the unsupplemented theory), but which does substantially enhance
the the theoretical virtues of the unsupplemented theory. On the other hand, Go¨del’s
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remarks strongly suggest that he does believe such justification to be possible (see
§5). In general, Go¨del places much more emphasis on this element of the analogy
between mathematics and science than does Russell.
We’ll postpone for now the discussion of what such theoretical virtues might
be in the mathematical case. The important point is that Go¨del is quite alive to
the degree of revisionism in this epistemological picture. At the time of writing
(1964), Go¨del was sceptical about mathematicians’ present ability to verify large
cardinal axioms by quasi-scientific methods, though he does claim that in principle
they could be verified ‘at least in the same sense as any well-established physical
theory’, even in cases where the axioms entirely lack intuitive justification (1964,
p.261). Go¨del, much like Russell, is clear that certain axioms may possess both intu-
itive and quasi-scientific justification (1944, p.121), but the main focus is on axioms
without any intuitive force, such as large large cardinal principles. The verification
of such axioms is described as being ‘only probable’ (1964, p.269).
This all stands in sharp contrast to the epistemology of intuition discussed in
the previous chapter; although Go¨del did not take intuition to be infallible, it seems
he thought that the existence of certain large cardinals could be established defini-
tively by such methods. If however, our mathematics were to make use of axioms
possessing only quasi-scientific justification, ‘mathematics may lose a good deal of
its “absolute certainty”’ (1944, p.121). Go¨del’s confidence in his revisionist epis-
temology is such that in the Gibbs lecture he even claims that the monopoly of
deriving ‘everything by cogent proofs from the definitions’ may turn out to be ‘as
mistaken in mathematics as it was in physics’ (1951, p.313).
In summary, Go¨del’s introduction of quasi-scientific methods into the theory of
large cardinals constitutes a stark departure from his more traditional epistemol-
ogy of arithmetic and the more basic elements of set theory. He hopes that some
justification of set theory can be offered based on two analogies. The first is that
sets help us systematize mathematical experience just as material bodies do our
sensory experience. We saw that this analogy was ill-founded, at least in the case
of large large cardinals. The second analogy is between large large cardinal axioms
and scientific laws, derived from the work of Russell. The central elements of the
analogy are as follows:
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1. Certain mathematical truths stand to set theory as elementary data stand to
physical theories.
2. Positing large cardinals can account for this data, similarly to how laws of
nature can account for the data of scientific theories.
3. Such posits can be justified either by being necessary for the deduction of
elementary data, or by enhancing the theoretical virtues of theory to which
they are added.
4. Consideration of such theoretical virtues can be so significant as to admit
into mathematics axioms (and hence theorems) which only have a probable
justification.
The next few sections of this chapter will aim to clarify the central elements of this
analogy: what mathematical truths count as data? In what way can large cardinals
account for this data? How do large cardinal axioms enhance theoretical virtue?
5.3 Mathematical Data
If large large cardinal axioms are to find their justification in accounting for the
mathematical data in a certain way, then some delineation of which mathematical
propositions constitute that data is plainly required. Though such a delineation need
not be made entirely precise in order to see the force of Go¨del’s analogy, we clearly
need some account of what the large cardinal axioms are supposed to be accounting
for if the analogy with the natural sciences is to be informative at all. At the very
least, some delineation of the data is required for the account to be non-trivial; if
any mathematical truth qualified as data, then any true large cardinal axiom would
be self-certifying in a way that could not be considered scientifically respectable. In
this section of the chapter, I’ll examine various possible accounts of mathematical
data that are suggested in Go¨del’s writings and elsewhere, and argue that only one
of these has any hope of being plausibly seen as analogous to data in natural science,
if Go¨del’s argument is to be of any use in justifying large large cardinal axioms.
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Perception and Objectual Intuition
Given the attention that has been given to Go¨del’s remarks on ‘a kind of perception’
in mathematics by later readers, we might expect that the data to be accounted for
are mathematical perceptions, and set theory is verified to the extent that it ‘pre-
dicts’, i.e. proves, the propositions which we can perceive to be true. On such a
view, there would indeed be an overwhelming analogy between mathematical and
scientific theory, namely that both of them are a means of systematizing and stream-
lining the data we experience into a cohesive theory.6
I’ve already argued (in chapter 3) that we should understand Go¨del’s remarks
about perception in mathematics as referring to Kantian or Hilbertian intuition,
and not to perception in a literal sense. Moreover, I’ve argued that intuition of
(i.e. singular objectual intuition) doesn’t play a significant role in Go¨del’s platon-
istic epistemology. That said, some view whereby this faculty provides data to be
accounted for regressively may still be worth considering, given the enormous degree
to which it renders science and mathematics analogous. A clear statement of the
view is given by Maddy (1990, pp.44–45). She claims that if we are persuaded of
some kind of platonism or realism, then we should expect scientific and mathemat-
ical epistemology to be analogous. Since some scientific beliefs are pre-theoretical
and non-inferential, so too should we expect this in mathematics. In science, these
beliefs are formed by perception, and so in mathematics they should also be formed
by perception, or something perception-like. The real problem with this view, at
least with respect to the justification of large large cardinal axioms, is that it is
unstable between the two main ways of thinking about mathematical perception:
on one account it is far too weak, and on the other it is so strong as to be trivial.
Firstly, we might imagine that deliverances of singular objectual intuition, some-
thing like perception (but not perception itself), must be accounted for by a math-
ematical theory. That is, we need to provide a formal theory T such that φ ∈ T
if the truth of φ is apparent given intuition of the objects concerned (much as the
6This is not to be confused with Quine’s view (Quine 1951a, p.45), according to which mathe-
matics is also an attempt to systematize and streamline the data of experience. On Quine’s view,
there is a single kind of data, which is accounted for by scientific (including mathematical) theo-
rizing as a whole. The view presently being considered however, posits two kinds of data, which
are accounted for by the natural sciences on the one hand, and mathematics on the other.
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truth of colour-ascriptions are made apparent by looking at the relevant objects in
favourable visual conditions). There are of course questions to be raised about how
such a faculty of intuition might function, but on anything analogous to Hilbert’s
view of intuition, what is given by this faculty will be such a tiny fraction of math-
ematics that no large cardinal axioms will have a role to play in accounting for it.
If for example, deliverances of intuition concerning number are captured by primi-
tive recursive arithmetic (i.e. quantifier-free arithmetic), then no objects other than
the natural numbers are required to explain the data.7 Of course, set theory with
a large cardinal axiom would also explain this, and would also solve lots of open
set-theoretic problems besides. But such an explanation would surely fall foul of
considerations of simplicity and economy of both ontology and ideology.
For example, Newtonian mechanics is a simpler theory than Newtonian mechan-
ics plus evolution by natural selection. In a perfectly Newtonian world with no living
creatures, the supplemented theory would do all the explaining of the base theory,
and would additionally answer lots of questions about the heritable traits of living
things. But that would not make the theory any better because, by our assumption,
there is no data for the complicated theory to account for that the basic theory
could not. And similarly for large cardinal axioms (indeed, set theory in general),
if we take the data to be limited in advance to what is given in singular objectual
intuition.8
Alternatively, we might follow Maddy and think that sets themselves can be lit-
erally perceived, with no need for the surrogate faculty of intuition. As discussed in
chapter 3, this gives a much richer relation between us and the objects of mathemat-
7The qualification ‘concerning number’ is required to avoid questions that could be raised about
geometric intuition, which plausibly requires resources going beyond those available in primitive
recursive arithmetic. Though there are interesting questions about such cases, here is not the
place to discuss them. Complications immediately arise concerning geometrical intuition when
one considers the modern conception of geometry as lacking an intended interpretation, or the
possibility that geometric intuition could be explained as a spatio-perceptual faculty, rather than
a genuinely mathematical one.
8I don’t want to commit myself to the view that singular objectual intuition is captured by
primitive recursive arithmetic. But it does seem to be a reasonable approximation (the classic
presentation of this view is (Tait 1981), though Tait rejects the Hilbertian claim that the security
of finitary arithmetic is grounded on our ability to represent its objects in intuition). Furthermore,
I expect any account of objectual mathematical intuition in the vicinity would equally support a
slightly modified argument to the same conclusion.
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ics than traditional Kantian or Hilbertian intuition, but indeed the relation is much
too rich. Since perception requires a causal connection between the perceiver and
the object of perception, the only sets we can see, according to Maddy, are those
with physical objects in their transitive closure. Moreover, any sets with the same
physical objects in their transitive closure are co-located. A consequence of this is
that for any ordinal α, there is a set of rank α where any physical object is (Maddy
1990, p.59).
When it comes to data then, there are two options. If, for whatever reason, we
can only see sets of low rank, then it is hard to see how perception would fare any
better than objectual intuition did. On the other hand, if we can see any set in
our visual field, then there is no need for large cardinal axioms to account for the
data, since, for any true large cardinal axiom, we’d just be able to see sets of any
rank necessary to validate the axiom. I take it that the existence of large cardinals
shouldn’t be considered part of the data that large cardinal axioms account for, so
it seems that the science–mathematics analogy cannot support large large cardinal
axioms if we take the data to be given by either singular intuition or perception of
sets.
Although a proper discussion would take us too far afield, I want to make it clear
that I think objectual intuition is insufficient as a source of data for which large large
cardinal axioms specifically are required to account. Perhaps objectual intuition is
well-suited to providing regressive support for much weaker axioms; but according
to our Go¨delian account, such weaker theories can be validated by propositional
intuition, hence there is no need for such a discussion here. We’ll also discuss below
the possibility that objectual intuition can still contribute to the data, even if it is
insufficient to provide all of it.
Ordinary Mathematics
If the analogy between mathematics and natural science is to validate a large large
cardinal axiom, we need a collection of data more expansive than what is given in
intuition that does not include statements about sets of arbitrary rank. An initially
promising class that appears to fall between these two extremes would be ‘ordinary’
mathematics. In emphasising the foundational role of set theory, we might examine
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the theorems accepted by mathematicians in other areas, and see how strong set
theory is required to be to account for these theorems.9
However, as a source of data, ordinary mathematics suffers the same defect as
objectual intuition, because very little set theory is strictly required to account for
ordinary mathematics. Go¨del’s own view in 1964 was that the lack of observable
consequences in other fields was such that ‘it is not possible to make the truth of any
set-theoretical axiom reasonably probable in this manner’ (1964, p.269). We find
similar views decades later in the work of Quine (1990, pp.94–95), asserting that
the higher reaches of set theory should indeed be pruned on account of their irrele-
vance (although Quine was of course concerned with their relevance only to applied
mathematics). And decades after Quine, it is still difficult to find an example of a
mathematical result from outside set theory which requires a large cardinal axiom
for its verification. As Potter puts it ‘the overwhelming majority of 20th century
mathematics is straightforwardly representable by sets of fairly low infinite rank,
certainly less than ω + 20’ (2004, p.220). So far, the 21st century shows no sign of
being any different.
This is not to say that large cardinal axioms don’t have any consequences that
are of significant interest to mathematicians working outside set theory; large car-
dinal axioms all have number-theoretic consequences, and can at times be used to
solve open mathematical problems (see §5 below). The point to note for now, how-
ever, is that such consequences are not regarded as true in advance of positing a
large cardinal axiom, so cannot be seen as data for which such an axiom might
account. They could, perhaps, be seen as analogous to the additional consequences
that scientific theories have which are not themselves data. That is, perhaps such
propositions are analogous to scientific discoveries. But such a proposition is not
to be believed unless we believe the theory of which it is a consequence, and hence
it cannot play the same role as the data do in establishing the truth of the theory.
Outside of the context of large cardinals, Russell writes that ‘the logical premises
have, as a rule, many more consequences than the empirical premises, and thus lead
to the discovery of many things which could not otherwise be known’ (1907, p.574).
9In proposing this conception of data, is it convenient also to relegate category theory to the
realm of extra-ordinary mathematics along with set theory, for the same kinds of reason in each
case.
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Large cardinal axioms certainly have many such consequences, but the point is that
they cannot properly be considered logical premises for mathematics at large, since
ordinary mathematics can do perfectly well without them.
As with the case of objectual intuition, it may well be that a study of ordinary
mathematics would provide strong regressive support for certain set-theoretic ax-
ioms. However, those axioms would be substantially weaker than the large large
cardinal axioms which are our present concern.10
Arithmetical Data: Primary and Secondary
Go¨del’s own suggestion is that the data should come from arithmetic, ‘the domain
of the kind of elementary indisputable evidence that may be most fittingly com-
pared with sense perception’ (1944, p.121).11 This is a distinct proposal from the
one just discussed. After all, not all verified propositions in ordinary mathematics
are arithmetical; conversely not all verified arithmetical propositions are found in
ordinary mathematics, since many of them are distinctly meta-mathematical.
On the face of it, arithmetic is a much more promising source of data than sin-
gular intuition: if the data are sufficiently rich that an incomplete theory is required
to account for them, then this opens up the possibility of formulating a sequence of
increasingly powerful theories accounting for more and more of the data, with no
limit to the strengthening process. This is exactly what the large cardinal hierarchy
promises to provide.12
10It’s perhaps worth emphasising that here I’m only discussing the strictly regressive justification
of large large cardinal axioms, not the quasi-scientific justification of them overall. At this stage,
I do not consider myself to have said anything against the view that large large cardinal axioms
can be verified by evaluating their ‘theoretical virtues’, which might include the ability of these
axioms to solve open problems. This issue will be taken up below in §5.
11It is worth clarifying that Go¨del is here using the term ‘sense perception’ is a specialized
way, in the context of discussing Russell’s regressive method. Hence ‘sense perception’ should
here be taken to mean a proposition functioning as data that should be deducible from the wider
explanatory theory.
12It may at first sight appear that the growth of the large cardinal hierarchy does have a limit.
We know, for example, that Reinhardt cardinals are too large to exist if the axiom of choice is
true. This is an easy consequence of Kunen’s theorem that there is no non-trivial elementary
embedding from the universe into itself, since a Reinhardt cardinal is the critical point of just
such an embedding (Kanamori 2009, pp.318–319). While such cardinals are too large, I can’t
see how this differs from the requirement that the large cardinal axioms must be consistent. The
formulation of cardinal axioms too strong for ZFC does not imply that within the class of large
154 Chapter 5. Quasi-Scientific Methods of Justification in Set Theory
Since there are a great many arithmetical truths yet to be formulated, let alone
believed, not all arithmetical truths can function as data. In identifying a select
few of these truths as data, a promising suggestion would be those arithmetical
truths expressed by a Π01 sentence. On the one hand, such sentences form a natural
class of arithmetical sentences which can be considered suitably elementary, given
that they are of the form of universal generalizations over the numbers. Secondly,
Go¨del’s theorems imply that any recursively axiomatized consistent set theory will
be Π01-incomplete, guaranteeing that the data are of a suitably inexhaustible kind.
Finally, all large cardinal axioms have Π01 arithmetical consequences, meaning that
the positing of increasingly strong axioms is guaranteed to have relevance to the
data. Hence identifying the data with this class seems most likely to justify the
kind of maximalism about the height of the hierarchy that Go¨del and others hope
to found in terms of the science–mathematics analogy.
Of course, ∆00 and Σ
0
1 arithmetical sentences are just as elementary, and may well
merit consideration as data. But for the purposes of large large cardinal axioms,
such sentences won’t matter much. The ∆00 arithmetical sentences are all equiva-
lent to Σ01 arithmetical sentences (by prefixing redundant quantifiers), and PA is
complete with respect to this latter class, so we know in advance that no consistent
large cardinal axioms will settle any of these sentences that we could not have settled
without their help.
An identification of the data along these lines is made by Koellner (2009a, p.98).
He distinguishes the ‘primary’ data, which are previously verified ∆01 sentences, and
the ‘secondary’ data, which are the Π01 universal generalisations of these. Koellner’s
motivation for this selection is that verified ∆01 sentences are analogous to observa-
tion sentences in the sciences, and hence their Π01 generalisations are analogous to
observational generalisations in the sciences. He claims further that ‘in mathematics
the secondary data can be definitely refuted but never definitely verified’ (2009a,
p.98). This claim is made on the basis of the analogy with physics, yet it is deeply
implausible in the case of mathematics. After all, any ∆00 sentence is also ∆
0
1 (since
it is logically equivalent to itself prefixed with redundant quantifiers), and we seem
to able to verify all sorts of Π01 sentences which are universal generalisations of ∆
0
0
cardinal axioms consistent with ZFC, there is a limit to the process of strengthening ZFC by
successive large cardinal posits.
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formulae (e.g. that every prime is odd or is identical to 2). Given this implausibility,
it is perhaps tempting to think that the data are meant to be some restricted class
of Π01 sentences which generalise verified ∆
0
1 sentences. But Koellner’s remarks tell
against this. For example, he claims that ‘[t]wo theories are mutually interpretable
if and only if they prove the same Π01-sentences, that is, if and only if they agree on
the secondary data’ (2009a, p.98). This means that there is no room for theories to
agree on the secondary data and disagree on the full class of Π01 sentences.
A further problem with Koellner’s suggestion, and indeed with the more general
identification of the data with the Π01 arithmetical data, is that we are no more
persuaded of the truth of every true Π01 arithmetical sentence in advance than we
are of the truth of every true arithmetical sentence. Take, for example, the even per-
fect number conjecture (EPN). This states that all numbers which are perfect (i.e.
are the sum of their proper positive divisors) are even. This conjecture is clearly
Π01, however it is well-documented that mathematicians are (at least collectively)
ambivalent regarding the truth of EPN (Baker 2007, p.63). So, if the conjecture is
true and a theory proves it, we should regard the proof as analogous to a surprising
scientific discovery, and not as an account of any data.
Given the faults in Koellner’s primary/secondary classification, the important
question now is how to delimit in advance which true arithmetical sentences at most
as complex as Π01 are to be considered data. It’s entirely possible that no sharp
delimitation is possible; indeed the closer the analogy between mathematics and the
sciences, the less we should expect a sharp delimitation to be possible. Nonetheless,
we can give a preliminary taxonomy of the kinds of arithmetical proposition which
should pass muster.
Arithmetical Data: Hard and Soft
Firstly, there are those sentences originally discussed by Russell, which gain their
status as data for broadly Millian reasons, the original example being that two sheep
and two sheep are always observed by shepherds to yield four sheep. Since ‘2+2 = 4’
is ∆00, it is also Π
0
1, and hence is of the right shape for our data class. Moreover,
we believe it to be true pre-theoretically, and indeed with more certainty than the
axioms themselves. Hence these Russellian data should be admissible for Go¨del’s
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analogy too.
We previously saw in the exposition of conceptual platonism that Go¨del takes a
perception-like relation to hold between us and mathematical objects. I argued that
this element of Go¨del’s thought is of little significance, since whatever perception-
like relation holds, it holds in virtue of our grasp of the truth of axioms quantifying
over the objects concerned. Nonetheless, such a perception-like relation is most
plausibly construed along Kantian or Hilbertian lines as the singular representation
of an object to a thinking subject. If this has any significant role to play in Go¨del’s
philosophy, it is in providing some of the mathematical data (though for reasons
discussed above, it cannot provide all the data).
Such intuitive data, like the basic Russellian data, will no doubt be restricted
to propositions of a fairly simple sort. Since intuitive representation is supposed to
be singular, even without a thorough account of how such intuition is supposed to
work, we can tentatively say that arithmetical propositions which we can verify on
the basis of this faculty should be equivalent to to a Π01 or Σ
0
1 sentence, as required
here. I won’t dwell on this issue, since it’s fairly clear that Go¨del’s scant remarks on
singular intuition radically underdetermine the theory required to account for them.
I mention the issue only because Kantian intuition is a plausible source of data going
slightly beyond the Russellian. There might, for example, be simple additions such
as 51, 000, 000, 000, 000 + 1 = 51, 000, 000, 000, 001 which could plausibly be verified
in intuition, but of which no plausible Millian account can be offered. It would be
a wealthy shepherd indeed whose work necessitated repeated exposure to concrete
instances of the addition above!
In the non-mathematical context, Russell distinguishes between hard and soft
data (1914, lecture III). The distinction is broadly psychological in nature, and is not
supposed to be exhaustive or exclusive. But as a heuristic it is still helpful for our
purposes to consider the degree to which data can be classified as hard or soft. The
paradigmatic hard data for Russell are the laws of logic, Russellian mathematical
data in the above sense, and facts about one’s own sense data. We can also, for the
sake of thoroughness, include propositions verifiable in intuition here. The common
characteristic is that Cartesian reflection on propositions of this kind do not induce
doubt in us as regards their truth. Soft data are, by contrast, those which are open
to at least philosophical doubt, such as the existence of material objects or other
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minds. Though he does not put it in quite these terms, in the Gibbs Lecture Go¨del
suggests that soft data in mathematics are admissible for quasi-scientific purposes.
In particular, he argues that a platonist should feel comfortable with the ver-
ification of number-theoretic claims by enumerative induction (i.e. verification of
universal number-theoretic claims by verification of instances up to large integer
values). He writes:
I admit that every mathematician has an inborn abhorrence to giving
more than heuristic significance to such inductive arguments. I think,
however, that this is due to the very prejudice that mathematical objects
somehow have no real existence. If mathematics describes an objective
world just like physics, there is no reason why inductive methods should
not be applied in mathematics just the same as in physics (Go¨del 1951,
p.313).
In trying to reconstruct a Go¨delian conception of mathematical data then, it is
reasonable to suppose that Π01 arithmetical sentences verified in a sufficiently large
number of instances should be considered as soft data. Hence if, for example, Gold-
bach’s conjecture were derivable from a large cardinal axiom, we should count that
as regressive support for the axiom candidate.13 This is because most mathemati-
cians believe the conjecture to be true despite lack of a proof (Echeverria 1996,
p.42). The obvious explanation as to why is that the conjecture has been verified
in an enormous number of instances.14
Of course, there are a number of philosophical issues with soft data of this kind.
For one thing, it isn’t even known whether Goldbach’s conjecture is independent of
PA (and indeed, if it is false, its negation is provable in PA). If it is provable in PA,
then it’s possible that the proof is so complex that nobody could feasibly carry it
out. If this is the case, then a simpler proof from a large cardinal axiom would pro-
vide justification for that axiom merely in terms enhancement of theoretical virtue,
rather than a more compelling strictly regressive justification (we’ll return to issues
around the ‘speed-up’ of proofs in §5).
13In modern form, Goldbach’s conjecture states that any even number greater than 2 is the sum
of two primes.
14At least 2× 1017 instances have been checked. Up to date information is available at Toma´s
Oliveira e Silva’s website at ‘http://sweet.ua.pt/tos/goldbach.html’. Accessed 05/04/2019.
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Secondly, Go¨del’s statement that ‘there is is no reason why inductive methods
should not be applied in mathematics’ is false. A very good such reason was offered
by Frege, namely that induction in physics is lent plausibility by the fact that ceteris
paribus any region of space and time can be supposed similar in the relevant physi-
cal respects. However the same is not true of the numbers, since the position they
occupy in the number series makes a great deal of difference to their arithmetical
properties, such as their divisors, primality, and so on (Frege 1884, pp.14–15).
I think that as far as reconstruction of Go¨del goes, the results of sufficiently ex-
tensive enumerative induction should be admitted as soft mathematical data. Philo-
sophically, however, I think this is mistaken, a view which appears to accord with
mathematical practice. Although much work has gone into verifying large numbers
of its instances, Baker (2007, pp.69–70) makes a compelling case that enumerative
induction is not the source of widespread belief in Goldbach’s conjecture.
Baker argues instead that the belief has its origins in Cantor’s partition function.
With a given even number ≥ 4 as its argument, the partition function takes as its
value the number of ways it can be decomposed into the sum of two primes. Though
this function does not increase monotonically, its graph, displayed below for even
arguments from 4 to 100,000, is certainly suggestive.15
15The graph is taken from Mark Herkommer’s Goldbach research site at
‘http://www.herkommer.org/goldbach/goldbach.htm’. Accessed 07/09/2018. c© Copyright,
1998-2014 Mark Herkommer. Permission to reproduce this graph has been kindly granted by the
copyright holder.
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Baker argues that the increase in mathematicians’ confidence of the truth of Gold-
bach’s conjecture coincides with investigation of the partition function, and hence
that this confidence is not based on enumerative induction alone (which Baker takes
to be illegitimate for the Fregean reason above). Rather, the confidence comes from
the apparently increasing cone-like pattern exhibited by the graph of the partition
function.
At this point, one might be tempted to think that enumerative induction is after
all the source of the mathematicians’ beliefs here, with a small change in perspec-
tive: the induction is that for many even arguments from 4 onward, the value of
Cantor’s function isn’t 0, therefore Goldbach’s conjecture is true. But this would be
too quick: as Baker argues, there is more than enumerative induction going on here.
Given the apparently-increasing pattern of the graph, the ‘hard’ cases for Goldbach’s
conjecture should be amongst very small numbers already tested manually. In other
words, the sample cases observed are biased against Goldbach’s conjecture, and if it
were false, we should have found the counterexample amongst the previously stud-
ied instances. So mathematicians don’t need to be seen as accepting the result of
simple enumerative induction here, but rather as accepting the result of enumera-
tive induction over a sample biased against the conjecture. Baker takes this to be a
distinct kind of non-enumerative inductive evidence for the conjecture (2007, p.71).
Therefore, even if we do not wish to countenance soft data of the kind envisaged
by Go¨del, we may be inclined to think that some Π01 arithmetical sentences should
be admitted into our class of data on the basis of such non-deductive plausibility
considerations.
Lastly, there is a kind of data with which a number of previous chapters have
been preoccupied, namely the Π01 arithmetical sentences constructed in the proof of
Go¨del’s theorems, like Go¨del sentences, canonical consistency sentences, and Dio-
phantine sentences. When sentences of these kinds are constructed effectively from
an axiomatic system which we recognize to be sound, it follows immediately that
they are true, and that they are not ‘accounted for’ by the axiom system in ques-
tion. However, given the previous argument that certain such sentences are abso-
lutely undecidable, the data will not include all true consistency sentences, all true
Diophantine sentences, etc.
Moreover, such sentences constructed from the axioms of a system which we do
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not believe in advance to be sound will not pass muster either. Since the justifi-
cation of such propositions is parasitic on the axiomatic system from which they
are obtained, data of this kind will be harder the higher our degree of confidence in
the soundness of the relevant axiom system. A proposition such as ConPA should
be regarded as data of the hardest kind, with ConZFC as perhaps somewhat softer.
Something like ConZF+∃x x is Reinhardt should not be considered data at all.16
In summary, ‘ordinary’ mathematics, mathematical perception, and singular in-
tuition cannot supply a collection of data by which the analogy between mathematics
and natural science could justify the positing of large large cardinal axioms. The
elementary part of mathematics which most plausibly can behave as data is num-
ber theory. A restriction on which number-theoretic sentences can be considered
data is nonetheless required. Although we cannot determine which statements pre-
cisely are data, a natural class consists of Russellian data, together with the Π01
sentences generated by Go¨delian incompleteness that we have reason to believe are
true. Go¨del’s writings suggest that he thought the results of certain enumerative
inductions should be considered as well; although I’ve expressed scepticism on the
matter, it is plausible that some Π01 arithmetical sentences should be considered data
even in the absence of (formal or informal) proof, namely where there are strong
heuristic reasons to suspect they are true. In the next sections, we’ll examine the
sense in which large large cardinals might be thought to account for such data.
5.4 The Laws of Nature Analogy
Since large cardinals themselves are not analogous to material bodies as Go¨del ini-
tially suggested, the alternative is that the axioms which assert the existence of
such sets are analogous to ‘laws of nature’ or other theoretical posits. One respect
in which an axiom playing the role of a law can be successful is strictly regressive, if
it allows for the deduction of data which could not be obtained by weaker principles.
16Although the existence of Reinhardt cardinals is known to be inconsistent with ZFC, it
is unknown whether they are consistent with ZF. A recent attempt by Rupert McCallum to
prove Kunen’s inconsistency theorem without the axiom of choice (which would settle the question
negatively) almost succeeded, though not quite. The saga is documented by Joel Hamkins on his
website at ‘http://jdh.hamkins.org/tag/rupert-mccallum/’. Accessed 05/04/2019.
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The other possibility is that large cardinal axioms function as laws of nature the
positing of which enhances the theoretical virtues of set theory. This section will be
concerned with the strictly regressive justification of large large cardinal axioms, by
analogy to laws of nature. Our key question is whether large cardinal axioms can
account for any data that cannot be obtained without them, according to the delim-
itation of the data given in the last section. If so, that would give strong regressive
support to the large cardinals project, since in the sciences we certainly do accept
natural laws which are posited for such reasons. However, I’ll argue that Go¨del’s
analogy cannot be sustained in this case.
Whether the adoption of large large cardinal axioms can account for data not
accountable for without them (or alternative axioms of similar strength) is of course
tremendously sensitive to what we take the data to consist of. The outline of the
data just given is neither sharply delimited, nor precisely defined. But critically,
the sentences expressing such propositions are all provable in PA, or else are of
a restricted kind of Π01 arithmetical sentences independent of PA. So we can say
something relatively precise about the sentences expressing the data (though admit-
tedly not as precise as in Koellner’s account), and hence can say something quite
definite about the role large cardinals might play in accounting for them. As one
would expect in advance, the data are (at least in one respect) not very complicated
sentences, and their simple form might give us good reason to suppose that large
cardinal axioms do allow us to account for data which cannot be accounted for in
their absence. This is because the addition of any large cardinal axiom to ZFC will
reduce the degree to which it is Π01-incomplete, as can be seen from the arrangement
of large cardinal axioms in a hierarchy of consistency strength.17
Indeed, we may even think that the inclusion of sentences constructed by
Go¨delian methods in our selection of data guarantees that positing a large car-
dinal axiom will relevantly account for some of the data, in the following way:
suppose you are persuaded that intuitive considerations justify the belief that
the theory ZFC + ∃x x = κ(ω) is sound, as discussed in the previous chapter.
You’ll then certainly believe that the theory is consistent, but by Go¨del’s theorem
ZFC + ∃x x = κ(ω) 6` ConZFC+∃x x=κ(ω). So ConZFC+∃x x=κ(ω) is a relevant piece
17As in fn.1 (above), it simply appears that the large cardinal axioms are so arranged. There is
no theorem to this effect.
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of data, namely a Π01 arithmetical sentence that we take to be true and subject to
Go¨delian incompleteness. The adoption of a large cardinal axiom stronger than one
asserting the existence of κ(ω) will allow you to prove the consistency sentence, and
hence account for more data than the unsupplemented theory.
Since our newly supplemented theory accounts for more of the data, the analogy
between science and set theory justifies (albeit not with certainty) a belief that it is
sound, and hence that it is consistent. And the whole process starts again, justifying
a set theory of ever increasing strength by extension with stronger and stronger large
cardinal axioms.18 The fact that a large cardinal axiom ‘accounts for the data’ gives
us only probable reason to believe that it’s true, so we have the expected gradual
loss of certainty as we move up the hierarchy of large cardinal axioms as well.
In my view, this is the most persuasive quasi-scientific argument for large cardi-
nal axioms in which those axioms are afforded strictly regressive support (as opposed
to being merely virtue-enhancing), and as a point of interpretation it fits well with
Go¨del’s general remarks on the issue. Firstly, the initial step of the argument requires
the use of intuition to found the truth of the axioms of some strong set theory.19
Secondly, the incompleteness theorems play a crucial role in the argument, since
they are required to establish the need for a series of extensions via large cardi-
nals, as outlined at (1964, pp.260–261). Thirdly, there is a clear sense in which the
large cardinals ‘account’ for the data, since they do so directly via increasing the
deductive strength of the base theory. Finally, the picture accords well with Go¨del’s
twin claims that such axioms need no intuitive justification, and thereby introduce
axioms and theorems into mathematics the truth of which can only be maintained
as probable.
Compelling though it may be, this argument suffers from a serious philosophical
flaw, as well as creating a secondary issue for Go¨del in particular. We saw in chapter
2 that Go¨del’s rationalistic optimism required him to accept that, with respect to a
recursive reflection progression of PA, we could select a path ∆ within O such that
18The argument here is inspired by Go¨del’s remarks (1964, p.269), though the idea there is
actually about intuitive justification, and does not mention large cardinals in particular.
19Even in papers like (1964), where the quasi-scientific programme is well underway, Go¨del
maintains that intuition has an important role in founding the general platonist interpretation of
the axioms, suggesting that he does not think quasi-scientific justification is alone sufficient for
developing such a picture.
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⋃
n∈∆:|n|<ωω2+1 Tn is arithmetically complete. I argued that the possession of such
an ability by even idealised mathematicians is a deeply implausible hypothesis, and
I won’t rehearse the argument here. The main point, however, is that for Go¨del,
large large cardinal axioms shouldn’t have any strictly regressive justification. This
is because the data are arithmetical sentences, and so according to the rationalis-
tic optimist, can be accounted for by reflection on arithmetic. Even if it is hard
to imagine an actual mathematician doing so, rationalistic optimism entails that,
if it is consistent to add a measurable cardinal, for instance, to ZFC, this can be
determined merely by reflecting on the soundness of PA in the right way.
Some set theory is required for this, of course, since constructing the required
reflection sequence relies crucially on the representation of recursive ordinals via a
subset of the natural numbers. But for the optimist, regressive justification shouldn’t
extend beyond the segment of set theory required to validate the existence of the
recursive ordinals, which constitute merely a proper initial segment of the countable
ordinals. Unless an argument could be provided that large large cardinal axioms
were essential to recognising suitable notations, nothing even approaching such an
axiom is required for the relevant construction. We have some tension, therefore,
between two key Go¨delian thoughts: if rationalistic optimism is correct, it is unclear
how large cardinal axioms could have any strictly regressive justification (though
justification by virtue-enhancement is still a live possibility for such axioms).
That problem, however, only applies to the rationalistic optimist. For those who
share my scepticism, it may seem as if the selection of data made affords power-
ful regressive support for the large cardinals programme. According to the picture
sketched above, it looks as if we might come close to a hierarchy of regressively
justified large cardinal axioms constrained only by consistency. A potential problem
is that the progressive decrease in the certainty of our axioms could perhaps lead
to a decrease in regressive support such that we stop being justified in positing new
cardinals rather early in this process. But that is merely a possibility. In reality,
there are more substantial issues in the vicinity.
A first point to note is that, as we’ve seen, much of the mathematical data will be
consistency sentences, or sentences which are equivalent to consistency sentences.
An immediate problem that raises doubts about the need for large cardinal hy-
potheses with respect to such data is related to ordinal analysis. If the consistency
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sentences we can take to be data are those of sound recursive theories, then the
consistency sentence should be provable via Gentzen’s method of transfinite induc-
tion up to the theory’s proof-theoretic ordinal. Since the proof-theoretic ordinal of
a theory T is the supremum of ordinals for which there is a notation in O which T
verifies is a notation, it follows that any proof-theoretic ordinal is < ωCK1 . The initial
worry then, is that for the purposes of verifying elementary data, large cardinals are
excessive; much of the work could be done using much more conservative resources
in the large countable ordinals. That said, identifying the proof-theoretic ordinal of
a theory is often far from straightforward. And moreover, we admitted that other
Π01 arithmetical sentences besides consistency sentences might pass muster as data,
so the picture outlined above remains intact. There is, however, a much more se-
vere problem with the proposal, to the effect that large cardinal axioms cannot be
required to account for the data as construed.
In particular, the problem is that when a large large cardinal axiom ‘accounts’
for some otherwise unaccounted for piece of data, that gives us no reason to believe
that the axiom is true. The key reasons are that PA is sound, and is complete
with respect to Σ01 arithmetical sentences, although this requires a little explana-
tion. Suppose that δ is some large cardinal axiom consistent with ZFC, and that
φ is a Π01 datum such that ZFC 6` φ and ZFC + δ ` φ. Suppose φ is false; in
that case ¬φ is equivalent to a true Σ01 arithmetical sentence. Since PA proves
all true Σ01 arithmetical sentences, PA ` ¬φ. However, since ZFC extends PA,
ZFC ` ¬φ. This contradicts our assumption that δ is consistent relative to ZFC,
since ZFC + δ ` (φ ∧ ¬φ). So (assuming ZFC is consistent), φ is true. Hence,
we have accounted for a new piece of data, namely φ, by proving that it is true.
Crucially, however, at no point was the truth of δ required. All that was used in the
argument was the assumption that δ was consistent with ZFC.
To see this, suppose that γ is some axiom candidate consistent with ZFC such
that ZFC+γ+δ ` 0 = 1. Suppose further that ψ is a Π01 datum such that ZFC 6` ψ
and ZFC + γ ` ψ. The same argument as before suffices to show that ψ is true: if
it is false, ¬ψ is equivalent to a true Σ01 arithmetical sentence. Hence, PA ` ¬ψ,
so ZFC ` ¬ψ. This contradicts our assumptions, hence ψ is indeed true. Now
γ and δ, by construction, are not both true. Yet the data for which these axioms
were supposed to account are both true regardless. So the deduction of data which
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are not derivable in ZFC by large cardinals axioms provides no regressive support
for the truth of these axioms; rather it at best supports the assumption of their
consistency relative to ZFC.20
It seems that this observation should be of some interest to both Go¨delians and
formalists. If, as I have argued we must, we restrict mathematical data to a special
class of Π01 arithmetical sentences, then as far as these data are concerned, we seem
to be in a Hilbertian scenario with respect to large cardinal axioms. In other words,
as far as large cardinal axioms go, their consistency is as good as their truth. This
is not, of course, true in general as regards their distinctively set-theoretic conse-
quences.21 But such set-theoretic consequences are liable to be interpreted as merely
ideal by a Hilbertian formalist anyhow.
The interest here is limited, however, by the fact that for a truly Hilbertian for-
malist, basic ZFC would likely be regarded as itself merely ideal, so it’s not as if
this argument will persuade them that this theory extended by a relative consistency
statement is the correct formulation of the foundations of mathematics. Neverthe-
less, the formalist could take some comfort from the fact that the Go¨delian analogy
cannot establish the truth of wildly infinitary large cardinal axioms.
Moreover, I think that for the platonist with a substantial notion of mathematical
truth going beyond mere consistency, the argument presented should be troubling.
If we want to put the large cardinals programme on solid philosophical ground, it
won’t do to think that the open series of extensions of ZFC that we ought to believe
consists simply of ZFC extended by propositions asserting the consistency of ZFC
with certain large cardinal statements. But that picture is all that is regressively
supported by the data, so the idea that the methods of theory choice in science can
be applied in set theory is placed under considerable strain.
To put it the other way, recall that the analogy between mathematics and nat-
ural science was founded on the view that the subject matter of mathematics was
analogous to the subject matter of natural science, such that some version of the
methods of the latter was thereby admissible in the former. Given that the theories
20Technical details relevant to this point are explained further in (Potter 2004, pp.217–218).
21There are, however, scattered examples to be found, e.g. Solovay’s theorem that ZFC doesn’t
refute the proposition that all uncountable Π12 sets have a perfect subset. The proof relies on the
assumption that an axiom asserting the existence of an inaccessible is consistent; the existence of
such a cardinal is irrelevant (Maddy 1990, p.127 fn.60).
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of natural science are certainly not confirmed by mere consistency, the platonist’s
case for large large cardinals is substantially undermined. The science–mathematics
analogy prevents the Go¨delian from taking up a Hilbertian conception of axioms,
according to which consistency and truth coincide. The argument that I’ve pre-
sented shows that elementary mathematical data will at best support the view that
large cardinal axioms are consistent, and not that they are true. So either the laws
of nature analogy must be abandoned, or else the platonist must admit that it fails
to justify a belief in large large cardinals.
None of this is to say that the Go¨delian cannot justify the truth of large large
cardinal axioms by other quasi-scientific methods; after all they can still argue that
the truth of such an axiom can enhance the theoretical virtues of set theory to a
greater extent than can the corresponding consistency sentence. But this is a much
weaker kind of support far more open to doubt. Indeed, the situation for quasi-
scientific justification keeps getting worse: the strongest form of regressive support
that has been offered for large cardinal axioms was that the existence of large cardi-
nals was only as open to doubt as the existence of medium-sized dry goods. But as
we saw, that analogy could not be sustained. Now we have seen that large cardinal
axioms do not even contribute to the adequacy of set theory with respect to its data,
since the statement that they are consistent relative to ZFC will do that just as
well. Making a case that the truth of large cardinal axioms is substantially more
virtue-enhancing than their mere consistency relative to ZFC is the only option left
for the platonist who takes Go¨del’s analogy seriously.
On the other hand, the argument above is unlikely to trouble platonists who
don’t share Go¨del’s view that theory confirmation within mathematics is analogous
to theory confirmation in physics. You could of course be both a platonist and a
maximalist of a less naturalistic persuasion; for instance, if you thought that the
concept set mandated the adoption of any consistent maximising principle, large
cardinal axioms included, the argument above would be of little consequence.22 It’s
22Certain remarks of Go¨del’s do at times suggest that he is tempted by such a position. For
example, footnote 23 in the 1964 version of the continuum paper cautiously suggests that the
concept set dictates a maximality principle inconsistent with V = L. If this is correct, then
mathematical intuition would verify a principle considerably stronger than the reflection principles
previously examined; this is because the existence of κ(ω) is consistent with V = L (Jech 2003,
p.304). The corresponding footnote in the 1947 version is number 22, which contains no such
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clear however, that such a position can make no room for a substantial analogy
between mathematics and natural science, since in the natural sciences there is no
sense in which the consistency of a theory amounts to its truth. In summary, the
platonist who takes the analogy between mathematics and natural science seriously
cannot maintain that large cardinal axioms function analogously to laws of nature
which are necessary to account for the data.
It is worth noting that the argument offered here is of some relevance beyond
the narrow confines of the large cardinals debate. The only plausible candidates for
mathematical data are arithmetical sentences of at most Π01 complexity that we have
prior reason to believe are true. If I’m correct about this, then the completeness of
PA with respect to Σ01 arithmetical sentences places severe constraints on the re-
gressive justification of any axioms which are stronger with respect to arithmetical
sentences than the axioms of PA themselves. Therefore any regressive epistemology
in the vicinity should have at most modest aspirations. The problem then, is that
weaker axioms are more likely to be persuasive candidates for self-evidence, and
therefore the significance of the regressive project as a whole is put into question by
the arguments of this section.
This point certainly has some relevance for Koellner’s account of axiom selec-
tion in set theory (2009a, p.98). As mentioned above, he is an advocate of a Π01
account of the data. Invoking a theorem due to Guaspari and Lindstro¨m, Koell-
ner highlights that extensions of ZFC by new axiom candidates will prove exactly
the same Π01 data iff they are mutually interpretable.
23 For Koellner, the correct
method of selecting axiom candidates in set theory is thus to partition the exten-
sions of ZFC into equivalence classes under sameness of Π01-consequences and to
select, from each class where these consequences are independently verified, the ax-
iom candidate which possesses the greatest theoretical virtues. What the argument
of the present section shows is that none of the axioms so considered are actually
required to account for this data at all.
I make no claim that Koellner’s project as a whole collapses under the weight
of this observation. A central part of his project is to argue that certain axiom
suggestion, possibly indicating a shift in Go¨del’s view over the intervening years.
23See Button and Walsh 2018, pp.113-114 for the definition of mutual interpretability, and p.124
for full details of how the Gauspari-Lindsto¨m theorem fits into Koellner’s programme.
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candidates are much more strongly supported by ‘theoretical reason’ than others.
Theoretical reason is left largely undefined by Koellner, but he explicitly contrasts
considerations of theoretical reason with those of expediency or convenience, and it
is clear that theoretical reason in mathematics is supposed to play a similar role to
the standard principles of theory choice in the sciences. In the case of one partic-
ular axiom candidate,24 he provides a detailed account of eight theoretical virtues
possessed by the axiom candidate over its mutually interpretatable rivals (2009a,
pp.101-102). According to him, these virtues make it clear that the axiom is highly
favoured by theoretical reason, at the expense of rival principles with incompatible
set-theoretic consequences.
None of what I have said contradicts any of Koellner’s claims about the virtues
of specific axiom candidates. However, my argument above serves to show just how
much work is being done in his account of mathematical theory choice by the the-
oretical virtues. If indeed we should adopt any large large cardinal axioms, it will
not be because they must be adopted to account for any of the data, since that
data can be equally accounted for by much weaker consistency sentences. This is
significant because, prima facie, the ability of a theory to account for the relevant
data in the sciences offers a strong reason for accepting it. But no such justification
is available to large large cardinal axioms if we have a conception of the data similar
to Koellner’s. This not only weakens the case for adopting such axiom candidates,
but also places a good deal of strain on the overall analogy that he wishes to draw
between mathematics and the natural sciences.
5.5 Theoretical Virtues
Things are not looking promising for the analogy between mathematics and natural
science as a means of justifying the large cardinals programme in full generality.
We’ve seen that, although a plausible delineation of the data is possible, there is
no sense in which accounting for this data can give large large cardinal hypotheses
strong regressive support. On the one hand, such cardinals themselves are not
24The axiom in question is the determinacy principle ADL(R). Determinacy principles are
discussed in greater detail below.
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required for the prevention of a philosophical miracle, as material bodies plausibly
are. This is because no particular cardinal plays the right explanatory role; all that
is required is the truth of some existential generalisation of a certain consistency
strength or greater. On the other hand, large large cardinal axioms do not receive
strictly regressive support by accounting for the data in the relevant way, since
demonstrably only their consistency is required for this.
There is another respect in which large large cardinal axioms can be quasi-
scientifically successful, namely by enhancing the theoretical virtues of set theories
to which they are added. This aspect of the analogy is by far the most often
discussed in the literature, and appears to be the central justification for large large
cardinal axioms, as far as several mathematicians and philosophers are concerned.
The classic exposition of the view, unsurprisingly, comes from Go¨del:
Success here means fruitfulness in consequences, in particular in “veri-
fiable” consequences, i.e., consequences demonstrable without the new
axiom, whose proofs with the help of the new axiom, however, are con-
siderably simpler and easier to discover, and make it possible to contract
into one proof many different proofs... A much higher degree of veri-
fication than that, however, is conceivable. There might exist axioms
so abundant in their verifiable consequences, shedding so much light on
a whole field, and yielding such powerful methods for solving problems
(and even solving them constructively, as far as that is possible) that, no
matter whether or not they are intrinsically necessary, they would have
to be accepted at least in the same sense as any well-established physical
theory (1964, p.261).
Although Go¨del thought that the verification of large cardinal axioms by such means
could only ever be probable, and that at the time of writing no proposition had been
so verified, the core idea of this passage has been remarkably influential in the phi-
losophy of mathematics. Quine (1990, pp.94–95), Maddy (1997, p.233), Koellner
(2010, p.190) and others have all adopted the idea that a decision on the truth of
at least some axiom candidates can be reached on the basis of analysing the extent
to which these axioms enhance the theoretical virtues of ZFC when they are added
to it.
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As is the case with respect to the natural sciences, it isn’t clear exactly what
properties are to count as theoretical virtues, and there are difficult questions in
the vicinity about how such virtues are to be weighted, and how virtues collectively
should fare against other criteria for theory choice. Nonetheless, there are canoni-
cal examples of theoretical virtues in mathematics that should prove sufficient for
our discussion. In the passage above, Go¨del focuses on the contraction of exist-
ing proofs, the proof of new theorems, and the solution of open problems. Other
virtues discussed include the ‘naturalness’ of an axiom candidate (Go¨del 1938, p.27),
the naturalness or expectedness of its deductive consequences (Moschovakis 1980,
p.610), and the ‘effective completeness’ of the supplemented theory (Koellner 2010,
p.204).25 Other mathematical theoretical virtues which have been proposed include
the speed-up of proofs, maximisation of interpretative power, and many more be-
sides. Far too many virtues have been proposed in the literature to canvass here,
however the most important examples will be explored in some detail. The ability
to solve open problems is the most prominent theoretical virtue discussed in con-
nection with mathematics, and likewise parsimony takes center-stage in discussions
of scientific theories. I’ll argue that with respect to these theoretical virtues (and
also the speed-up of proofs), large large cardinal axioms should not expect a very
positive evaluation.
Open Problems
The solution of open problems is a virtue of strong set theories that has received an
enormous amount of attention, from Go¨del onwards. The initial axiom candidate
lauded with this virtue was V = L. Although the virtues of several large cardi-
nal axioms inconsistent with this principle are now well-regarded in the literature,
V = L does indeed have the virtue of solving many open problems, both within set
theory and without.26 Within set theory, it solves GCH affirmatively, as proved by
25This is perhaps a theoretical virtue that has no strong analogue in the natural sciences. A the-
ory is said to be ‘effectively complete’ with respect to a given class of statements if it decides every
statement in the class except the undecidable statements generated by Go¨delian incompleteness.
26Large large cardinal axioms become inconsistent with V = L quite rapidly. If the Erdo˝s
cardinal κ(ω1) exists (a rather small large large cardinal), then so does 0
#, the set coding true
statements about indiscernibles in L (Kanamori 2009, p.107). A theorem of Kunen shows that if
0# exists, then there is a non-trivial elementary embedding j : L → L (Kanamori 2009, p.XX).
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Go¨del. Perhaps slightly less well-known is that V = L implies that every Whitehead
group is free, solving a famous open conjecture in algebra (Shelah 1974).
Nowadays, the focus is on the ability of large cardinal hypotheses to solve open
problems in descriptive set theory. A proliferation of results exist using large cardi-
nals to prove that sets of reals have various separability and measurability properties,
and that particular games on sets of reals are determinate. The most famous such
result is probably Martin and Steel’s proof (Martin and Steel 1989) of the projective
determinacy axiom,27 which follows from the existence of infinitely many Woodin
cardinals. There are many other well-known examples of open problems solved by
large cardinal hypotheses, and there is no need for my purposes to report them all.
It is important to note that even where large cardinals have consequences for more
concrete areas of mathematics, the decision of open problems can only be taken to
enhance the theoretical virtue of set theory including such an axiom. We cannot
take the extension of set theory by such an axiom as having strict regressive sup-
port on this basis, since the solved problems are viewed as being genuinely open
in advance of positing the large cardinal axioms which facilitate their solution. As
remarked above, the solution to open problems should be viewed as analogous to
the making of a novel scientific discovery: the discovery is to be trusted only if the
theory from which it follows is already believed to be sound.
This is not, of course, to say that the ability of an axiom candidate to provide
solutions to open problems should not be considered highly virtuous. But there are
a number of considerations which should make us regard this kind of justification
with some caution. In the first instance, the strength of this kind of support is
sensitive to whether the problem solved is one about which mathematicians have a
strong prior view. For example, it may be that a large cardinal axiom which proved
Goldbach’s conjecture would be very virtuous indeed due to the widespread belief
in the truth of that conjecture. But the solutions to open problems that we see in
reality are by no means so persuasive.
For example, Maddy favourably cites the result that if there is a measurable
Another theorem of Kunen shows that there is no such embedding j : V → V in models of ZFC
(Kanamori 2009, pp.318–319).
27This axiom, PD, states that in every two-player game of length ω with perfect information on
a projective set of reals, one of the players has a winning strategy (i.e. the game is determined).
See (Moschovakis 1980, ch.6) for the relevant details.
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cardinal, then there is no projective well-ordering of the reals (Maddy 1990, p.138).
But it is not as if the mathematical community at large suspected in advance there
should be no such well-order. She cites Martin as expressing the view that this
result, and others like it, are ‘pleasing’. But hypotheses in science are not, to my
knowledge, accepted on a regular basis for having pleasing consequences. Indeed
what we find pleasing is highly contingent of the history on the discipline, not to
mention personal taste: perhaps to some, the implication from V = L that there is
a relatively simple ∆12 well-ordering of the reals would be pleasing. Indeed V = L
was described by Go¨del as being a very natural principle at the time of his relative
consistency proofs. Of course many open problems are such that the mathemati-
cal community is overall undecided with respect to their solution. The continuum
hypothesis is a good example of such a problem. The collective ambivalence of
mathematicians as regards it partly explains how it is possible that the most pop-
ular axiom candidates leave it open, where it is settled positively by the unpopular
V = L.
Secondly, it is clear that the strength of support lent to an axiom by the solution
of an open problem is related to the urgency within the mathematical community of
solving the problem in question. And this matter is clearly relative to the interests
of the community under consideration. As Potter highlights, (2004, p.221), the open
problems solved by large cardinals are typically set-theoretic in nature, and not part
of ‘ordinary mathematics’. Examples such as V = L solving the Whitehead con-
jecture are not easy to come by; in most cases, large cardinal axioms are typically
used to solve problems and conjectures raised by set theorists themselves, rather
than by practitioners in more mainstream areas of mathematics. If a large cardi-
nal axiom could be used to solve a live conjecture posed by a number theorist, that
should count as a greater theoretical virtue than the ability to solve a set-theoretical
problem. As of yet, no example of such a conjecture has been found. The closest
example of a genuinely mathematical open problem solved using large cardinals is
that of Borel determinacy, proved by Martin (1970), under the assumption of a
measurable cardinal. However, Martin subsequently proved the Borel determinacy
axiom in unaugmented ZFC (1975), so the example should not inspire us with con-
fidence that large cardinal axioms are useful in the solution of problems outside of
set theory. So, for now at least, we should not in general place too great an emphasis
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on the solution of open problems as a theoretical virtue of large cardinal axioms.
Moreover, there is a much deeper problem for a platonist with the idea that the
solution of open problems can confirm a large cardinal hypothesis. The reason is
that, as mentioned above, this kind of support is interest-relative, and hence the so-
lution of open problems provides us only with interest-relative justification for those
axioms. But for a platonist, such interest-relative justification cannot be considered
justification proper, since the hierarchy is surely indifferent to the questions that
interest us mathematically.
For example, it is quite possible that there be some mathematical community,
exactly similar to ours except with respect to their interests, who place overwhelm-
ing value on the kinds of determinacy problems that appear in descriptive set theory.
Suppose such people regard the solution of determinacy problems as the proper goal
of all mathematical enquiry. To such a community, the full Axiom of Determinacy,
AD, would have overwhelming theoretical virtue in respect of solving open prob-
lems.28
Actual mathematicians don’t typically consider AD to be viable, since it con-
tradicts the axiom of choice (Kanamori 2009, p.368). And if faced with such a
community, we could certainly try to dissuade them by highlighting the merits of
the axiom of choice, both intuitive and quasi-scientific. Indeed, for the platonist,
this would be the only honest course of action. A pluralist might think that the
imagined community have a perfectly good justification for studying set theory with
AD, and that the actual community of today is quite right to ignore it. But for a
Go¨delian platonist, AD is simply a blatant falsehood. It is not merely that for the
imagined community, AD has many virtues which (according to a choice-favouring
platonist) ought to be out-weighed by other considerations. It is rather that the
imagined community has misleading interests, in that the pursuit of such interests
is counter-productive to uncovering the truth about sets. So it is hard to see how a
platonist could make sense of the idea that mathematicians in another community
have any reason to believe that AD is true, merely in light of their bizarre mathe-
matical interests. After all, their position is assumed to be epistemically similar to
ours in all ways other than with respect to their interests.
28This axiom is a generalisation of PD, and states that that every two-player game of length ω
with perfect information on any set of reals is determined.
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Moreover, when we get past the axiom candidates which possess intuitive sup-
port, and consider large large cardinal axioms with only quasi-scientific justification,
it is hard to know how we could verify whether or not our own interests are mis-
leading in this way. So I think that the platonist in particular should not take the
solution of open problems too seriously when it comes to justifying axiom candi-
dates, especially given the narrowly focused achievements of large large cardinal
axioms in this regard to date.
Speed-Up Results
One theoretical virtue, mentioned by Go¨del above, is the ability of more powerful
systems to speed up the proof of theorems in weaker theories. While this virtue
is discussed much less often that either the solution of open problems (above) or
parsimony (below), I have chosen to include a discussion of it because the ability
of an axiom candidate to speed-up proofs can do much more than simply make a
theory more virtuous. In the right circumstances, the effect that speed-up has on a
system can close a genuine and pressing explanatory gap.
A classic presentation of the issues at stake can be found in (Boolos 1987). In
that paper, Boolos presents an argument which is essentially a Sorites-paradox-style
inference appended with a definition of a very fast-growing function. The number
of steps of the shortest proof of this result in first-order logic is given by an expo-
nential stack of 64 ‘2’s, far greater than the number of particles in the universe.
Yet the proof is not difficult in second-order logic; indeed Boolos provides this in
a short appendix to the paper. Moreover, the reasoning is obviously valid, as can
be seen from its appropriate arithmetical interpretation. The moral of the story is
that, since we should be able to prove the conclusion of the argument, given that
it obviously follows from the premises, the fact that we can’t (in the relevant sense)
give a first-order proof of it is evidence that second-order logic is logic. After all,
second-order resources are required for a feasible proof, which we seem perfectly able
to provide.
We might hope to find similar support for a large large cardinal axiom. For this,
we would need to find a genuine mathematical example of an agreed-upon theorem,
such that the formal proof is unfeasibly long without the axiom, but is completely
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feasible when the axiom is used. This would offer some powerful support for thinking
that the axiom was true. If the informal justification for the theorem is obviously
valid, this demands an explanation. In particular, if the formal proof of the theorem
in our unsupplemented set theory is so long that it would take more than a human
lifetime to complete, then the ability to follow the reasoning of that proof cannot
explain our recognition of the theorem’s validity. If a simple, feasible proof relies
critically on a large cardinal assumption, then the large cardinal assumption gains
a good degree of support from the fact that its truth is required to explain why a
piece of reasoning which we all recognize to be valid and appear to be able to follow
has these properties.
There are, however, several reasons to think that such an example will be ex-
tremely difficult to come across for our current purposes. In the first instance, given
that we have an intuitive basis for believing in small large cardinals (according to the
conceptual platonist, at least), the example would have to be one where a natural
mathematical theorem from outside set theory was plainly valid, had an unfeasibly
long proof without assuming the existence of a large large cardinal, and had a fea-
sible proof with the assumption of such a large large cardinal. I certainly know of
no example of a theorem meeting such specific constraints.29
Another limitation on the use of speed-up results to verify the existence of large
large cardinals is that, according to the Go¨delian conception of set theory being
considered, we have already benefited from a huge amount of speed-up by using a
second-order theory. Combining results from Go¨del (1936) and Buss (1994), we get
the following theorem:
Speed-Up Theorem: For any function f , there are infinitely many
formulae such that for any one of them, φ, PA ` φ and PA2 ` φ and
29Tim Button has pointed out to me that in other circumstances, speed-up provided by a large
large cardinal axiom could perhaps enhance the virtue of a theory even where the sped-up proof
was not of a theorem the truth of which we were convinced of in advance. Namely, if we could
show that the large large cardinal axiom was conservative over ZFC with respect to some class
of statements, a proof of feasible length of some theorem T belonging to this class using the large
cardinal axiom should convince us that T is true. If no feasible proof in ZFC of T can be found,
then the speed-up of the proof of T could then be counted in the axiom’s favour, as normal. This
strikes me as correct, though I am pessimistic about the prospects of finding a concrete example of
the phenomenon; especially since large large cardinal axioms tend to be radically non-conservative
even over very simple classes of statements.
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where n is the number of lines of the PA proof, and m is the number of
lines of the PA2 proof, n > f(m).
Hence the move to a second-order theory has already vastly increased our proof
speed, at least with respect to arithmetical sentences. So, more specifically, verify-
ing a large cardinal axiom θ via speed-up would require a formula φ which math-
ematicians regard as being informally valid, has an unfeasibly long proof in ZFC2
supplemented by any intuitively verifiable large cardinal axioms, and has a feasibly
long proof in ZFC2 + θ. This is a tall order indeed, but it is not impossible that
such an example could be found. To my mind, finding such an example would offer
the strongest quasi-scientific justification available for a large large cardinal axiom.
Sadly, most of the available research on speed-up results relates to the order of the
logical apparatus of a theory, rather than the large cardinal axioms it includes, so
it is difficult to say anything conclusive on the subject of such axioms specifically.30
For now, at least, we have good reason to believe that large large cardinal axioms
are not substantially supported by the speed-up of proofs they provide, and that
such support could be earned only in very exacting circumstances.
Parsimony
Another central theoretical virtue, more often discussed in connection with the sci-
ences than with mathematics, is parsimony, or simplicity, of both ontology and
ideology.31 As I noted above, there is a difficult question about how to weight
the virtues against each other, but I’ll argue for a form of pessimism about the
quasi-scientific justification of large large cardinal axioms, on the basis of parsimony
considerations. To be clear, I’m not going to argue against the existence of such
cardinals tout court ; rather I’m going to argue that we have prior reason to believe
30In the more general area, Potter (2004, p.235) gives a very nice example of speed-up at
work in enhancing the virtues of set-theoretic axioms: for large values of m, that the Goodstein
sequence with m as its starting value terminates is provable in PA, but the proof is unfeasibly long.
Since every Goodstein sequence terminates, it is obvious that the sequence which starts with m
terminates. Replacement-free first-order set theory gives a feasible proof of Goodstein’s theorem,
and a proof of it for m by universal quantifier elimination. In this case, speed-up certainly supports
the belief that certain first-order set theoretic axioms are true.
31Although it is not often discussed in connection with large large cardinals, the idea has been
in circulation since at least (Quine 1951a, p.45).
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that axioms positing them will score poorly on the front of theoretical virtues, as
construed by the analogy with the natural sciences.32
The first ingredient in my argument is merely the observation that considera-
tions of both ontological and ideological parsimony play an important role in the
justification of theories in natural science. The two principles under consideration
are:
1. Ockham’s Razor: Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.
2. Kant’s Razor: Principles are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.
Both of these principles are no doubt familiar, and widely deployed within philosophy
and elsewhere.33 Similar principles have been endorsed by philosophers at least since
Aristotle, but much more significantly they have been strongly endorsed within
the natural sciences themselves. Galileo, in his critique of the Ptolemaic system,
deployed the principle that ‘Nature does not multiply things unnecessarily; that she
makes use of the easiest and simplest means for producing her effects; that she does
nothing in vain, and the like’ (Galileo 1632, p.397). A similar principle appears
under the heading of ‘Rule I’ in Newton’s Principia (1687, p.320). More recently,
the sentiment was echoed by Einstein:
[T]he grand aim of all science. . . is to cover the greatest possible number
of empirical facts by logical deductions from the smallest possible number
of hypotheses or axioms (Einstein, in (Nash 1963, p. 173)).
These examples are all taken from physicists, since physics is the science to which
Go¨del thought mathematics most analogous. There are examples to be found from
across the range of the sciences, however.34 While a full sociological or historical
32There is a distinct view, proposed by Maddy (1997), that mathematics has its own autonomous
theoretical virtues, and that at least certain large large cardinal axioms score very well on this front.
My argument will have nothing to say for or against such a view; here I am just focusing on the
theoretical virtues that drop out of the analogy with the natural sciences.
33Of course, Kant didn’t invent the principle that the non-ontological aspect of a theory should
be a simple as possible. But then again, Ockham didn’t invent the corresponding ontological
principle. The formulation of Kant’s razor here is taken from remarks at A652/B680 of the Critique
of Pure Reason (1787, p.595).
34Baker’s article (2016) contains a veritable trove of such examples, from many sub-fields of
both philosophy and science.
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investigation is out of the question here, it is sufficient for my purposes merely that
theoretical and ontological simplicity are important virtues in the natural sciences.
Since that is a rather unremarkable claim, I’ll proceed with the argument that large
large cardinal axioms should automatically score poorly when evaluated with re-
spect to parsimony (of both relevant kinds).
Firstly, the adoption of large cardinal axioms will substantially bloat the ontol-
ogy of mathematics in a fairly straightforward way: such axioms tell us that there
are more sets than were previously thought. Indeed, large large cardinal axioms
often tell us that there will be drastically many more levels in the hierarchy than
previously thought, since a relatively common feature of such axioms is that they
imply the existence of an unbounded class of cardinals satisfying weaker large car-
dinal hypotheses.
On a straightforward reading of Ockham’s principle, this observation is sufficient
to show that large large cardinal axioms will score poorly on the front of ontological
parsimony. Adding a large large cardinal axiom to ZFC involves massively bloat-
ing the size of the ontology of the theory, and these entities will, in a strict sense,
have been multiplied ‘beyond necessity’. After all, the arithmetical data accounted
for by a large cardinal principle will equally be accounted for by a corresponding
consistency sentence. In a more general sense, ZFC is already powerful enough to
reproduce all of ‘ordinary’ (i.e. non-foundational) classical mathematics; so even if
the multiplication of entities brought about by a large cardinal axiom is in some
way desirable, or virtuous, it is certainly beyond necessity.
An immediate objection would be that Ockham’s razor, as a general principle,
is not supposed to count against theories which posit more entities (all else being
equal), rather it is supposed to count against theories which posit more kinds of en-
tities (all else being equal).35 An objector might claim then, that large large cardinal
axioms do not at all imply the existence of new kinds of entities; rather they imply
the existence of (many, many) more entities of the same kind, namely sets. It would
not count against a theory in physics, the objector might say, if it entailed that
there are more entities than previously supposed of a kind we already countenance,
such as electrons. So why should positing more sets count against large cardinal
35This qualitative version of Ockham’s Razor was famously championed by Lewis (1973, p.87).
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hypotheses in set theory, since set theory is itself analogous to a natural science?
The problem with this suggestion is that Ockham’s razor can be rendered trivial
by permitting sufficiently wide kinds. There is clearly a good deal of slack in the no-
tion of a kind of entity, at least for the purposes of considering parsimony principles,
but the delineation of kinds for such purposes appears constrained, at least in prac-
tice. Violation of Ockham’s razor played an important role in Lavoisier’s critique of
phlogiston theory, for instance (Baker 2016, §1). It would have been no defence to
claim that phlogiston is of a kind we already accept, since it is a physical substance
or similar. In scientific cases such as this, Ockham’s razor is applied non-trivially,
and so if the science–mathematics analogy is appropriate, as Go¨del argues, some
parallel restriction should also be in place when considering mathematics.
While I don’t want to make any grand claims about what kinds of set there are,
it is clear that set is too general a kind for the meaningful use of Ockham’s razor as
a principle of theory choice within mathematics. Indeed, since the universe is class-
free, according to the Go¨delian platonist, the ontology of set theory is exclusively
given in terms of sets (or perhaps sets with numbers or integers as urelements).
Hence the admissibility of set as a kind for the purposes of Ockham’s razor would
render that principle trivial within the domain of mathematics. That should not be
an acceptable conclusion for the advocate of the science–mathematics analogy, since
the application of the principle in the former domain is highly non-trivial.
I certainly don’t want to claim that Nature Herself divides sets up into certain
kinds, which are or are not subject to Ockham’s razor. It is more plausible that the
appropriate evaluative kinds should be based on salience for mathematical purposes,
and hence sensitive to the investigative context. But sets come in many mathemat-
ically salient kinds. Some are ordinals, some are cardinals, some are arithmetical,
some analytical, some Borel, some projective, and so on. The fact that they are
all sets certainly does not mean that a large cardinal with hitherto uninstantiated
properties does not constitute a new kind of entity. Indeed, the significant increase
in the strength of set theory that is offered by large cardinal hypotheses render it
all but certain that in any investigative context, the adoption of large large cardinal
axioms will bloat the ontology of set theory beyond necessity, even if we envisage
the evaluation as being about the number of kinds of entities in the ontology.
Similar points can be made about the increase in theoretical complexity incurred
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by the addition of large large cardinal axioms. As we’ve seen, such posits are not
necessary to account for the data, since it is sufficient that they are consistent rel-
ative to ZFC. So the addition of complexity to the theory is not automatically
legitimate. And similarly to the case of Ockham’s razor, Kant’s razor tells quite
strongly against the addition of large large cardinal axioms to set theory. On a
straightforward understanding of the virtue of ideological simplicity, ZFC will fare
better than its extension by any large cardinal principle, since those extra principles
go beyond what is necessary to account for the mathematical data.
However, it is not entirely clear when one theory is more ideologically complex
than another. Instead of looking just at the number of axioms or schemata in a
theory (as on the straightforward understanding of this virtue), Quine (1951, p.14)
considers the ‘ideology’ of a theory to be the range of ideas expressible within the
theory. This corresponds roughly to the kinds-based understanding of Ockham’s ra-
zor, since on this understanding one theory can contain more principles than other
without having a more bloated ideology, as long as no further ‘ideas’ are express-
ible in the more verbose theory. Quine’s notion of ideology is a primarily linguistic
matter, the formulation in terms of ideas being (hopefully) eliminable (Quine 1951,
p.15). Nonetheless, there is an ambiguity here. Are we to understand parsimony
as favouring overall less expressively powerful theories, or merely theories with a
smaller number of primitive expressions?
If we understand the ‘expressible ideas’ of a theory in terms of its primitive vo-
cabulary, large large cardinal axioms will score neutrally with respect to ideological
parsimony. This is because the addition of a large cardinal principle to set theory
leaves the undefined primitives of the theory (logical vocabulary, ‘∈’, and possibly
a symbol to distinguish sets from urelements) undisturbed.36
Things are very different, however, on the former disambiguation, according to
which the extent of the ideology of a theory corresponds to its general expressive
power. On this understanding, large large cardinal axioms will score poorly with re-
36If our set theory contains urelements and the empty set, the inclusion of a further non-logical
primitive is required to distinguish sets from urelements. There are several means by which this
can be achieved: a distinguished predicate for sets, a distinguished predicate for urelements, or a
singular term for the empty set. This works straightforwardly in the first two cases. In the third
case, one can formally define the predicates S (‘is a set’) and U (‘is an urelement’) stipulating that
∀x(Sx↔ ∃y y ∈ x ∨ x = ∅) and ∀x(Ux↔ ¬∃y y ∈ x ∧ x 6= ∅).
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spect to ideological simplicity. The addition of a large cardinal principle to set theory
increases the range of definable sets lower down in the hierarchy, and correspondingly
the theory will be able to express, and prove, many more ‘ideas’ about sets than its
unsupplemented counterpart. The very reason that large cardinal axioms have Π01
arithmetical consequences which are independent of ZFC is that more and more
subsets of ω are definable under stronger and stronger large cardinal assumptions.
If Quine’s notion of an ‘expressible idea’ is cashed out in terms of propositions about
definabile sets, then large cardinal axioms will be largely uneconomical. It seems
likely to me that this disambiguation corresponds closely to Quine’s intentions, since
he claims that the classical theory of the reals has a denumerable ideology, and claims
that investigation of primitive ideology is a ‘subdivision’ of the overall investigation
(1951a, p.14). Both comments would be misleading if his intention had been to re-
fer to the finite number of analytical primitives, and considered the investigation of
primitive ideology to be an improper subdivision of overall ideological investigation!
Given the lack of clarity in Quine’s suggestion, perhaps a broader notion of an
ideologically parsimonious theory is required. However, on any reasonable construal
of a theory’s ideology (other than as consisting of its primitive vocabulary), large
cardinals will bloat it: more properties of sets will be instantiated, new embeddings
between the universe and transitive classes appear, new sets are definable, and so
on. Given that large large cardinals can be used to solve set-theoretic problems
not solvable in ZFC alone, a large large cardinal axiom will always give a richer
picture of the hierarchy than is strictly required to explain the data, since the data
is accounted for by only positing the consistency of large cardinal axioms relative to
ZFC, without the need for any further increase in the power of the theory.
However exactly you construe the notions of ontology and ideology, a very basic
problem for the large cardinal advocate appears: large cardinals axioms posit new
sets (bloating its ontology), with new and remarkable properties (bloating its ide-
ology). So, large large cardinal axioms are always purchased at the expense of two
theoretical virtues which have historically played a central role in scientific theory
choice. A conception of set theory which places overwhelming value on maximal
ontology and richness of the structure of the hierarchy needn’t be concerned by such
issues at all. But on such a picture, the theoretical virtues of set theory become
more distant from those of natural science.
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I don’t want to claim that there is no analogy between set theory and natural
science; any things are analogous if you squint hard enough. But nor do I want to
claim that set theory and natural science are strongly analogous. Rather, I’m claim-
ing that the more analogous you think the two disciplines are, the more difficult the
justification of large large cardinal axioms becomes. And that point spells doom for
Go¨del’s attempt to find the justification for large large cardinal axioms in any kind
of an analogy between set theory and natural science.
It’s important to note, however, that parsimony considerations come with a ce-
teris paribus clause: the bloating of ontology and ideology only tells against a theory
if the other virtues of the theory don’t compensate. I expect that it is possible that
the virtues of large cardinal axioms could be so overwhelming as to compensate for
a bad score in both kinds of parsimony. An example of the right kind of speed-up
result discussed earlier would be a possible example of this. But in actuality there
is room for much scepticism of the theoretical virtues which are commonly ascribed
to large cardinal axioms. Most importantly, the solution of open problems is not
to be valued for its own sake when the solution provided for by an axiom does not
itself enjoy extensive support from elsewhere.
I think it’s worth distinguishing the argument offered here from that presented
by Quine (1990, pp.94–95). The argument there is somewhat ambiguous. On the
one hand, Quine suggests that ‘higher’ set theory is meaningless, because, whatever
the axioms that constitute higher set theory are supposed to be, they never have
any implications for natural science. They are treated by us as meaningful only be-
cause to do otherwise would constitute an ‘unnatural gerrymandering of grammar’.
Another argument offered, however, is that the questions of higher set theory are, at
least in part, settled by parsimony considerations. In particular, Quine argues that
considerations of simplicity, economy, and naturalness compel us to adopt V = L as
a new axiom, since it ‘inactivates the more gratuitous flights of higher set theory’.
I take it that this is a reference to the inconsistency of V = L with most large large
cardinal axioms, though Quine is not specific. I’m unsure how to reconcile these two
arguments, since a decision of the kind Quine envisages seemingly involves regarding
the relevant axiom candidates as meaningful. After all, it is hard to see how one
uninterpreted string of symbols can give a more natural or economical picture of the
hierarchy than another. In any case, Quine claims that considerations of theoretical
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virtue tell decisively against large large cardinal axioms.
My argument, on the contrary, involves no such claim, and approaches the prob-
lem from an entirely different perspective. In the first instance, Quine subjects set
theory to evaluation in terms of the theoretical virtues of natural science and with
respect to scientific applications, since presumably his holistic naturalism implies
that this is the only appropriate set of virtues to figure in any theory choice, re-
gardless of the subject matter. Go¨del’s analogy, on the other hand, requires only
that the means of theory choice be analogous between mathematics and science,
and does not require that the theoretical virtues of a putative axiom of set theory
be considered in relation to its application in natural science. Since I’m here in the
business of assessing Go¨del’s position, my argument does not consider the virtues
of set theory as they relate to scientific applications.
Secondly, and more significantly, I have not attempted to offer an argument
that V = L is true, nor have I even offered an argument that we shouldn’t accept
large large cardinal axioms in general. Rather, I have argued for the much weaker
claim that, however such axioms are justified (if at all), it does not look much like
how theoretical posits are justified in natural science. The argument presented here
therefore should certainly not be confused with the one offered by Quine, despite
the central role played by considerations of economy in each.
Conclusion
I’ve argued that whatever analogy the conceptual platonist might see between math-
ematics and the natural sciences, it cannot serve as a justification for large large
cardinal axioms. Three attempts were offered to provide these axioms with a vi-
able quasi-scientific justification, inspired by remarks made by Go¨del. None of them
proved to be successful. Although this is not to say that such arguments cannot
justify the existence of any sets, such an account would be redundant for the concep-
tual platonist who thinks that the weaker axioms follow directly from the iterative
conception.
Firstly, we saw that large large cardinal axioms cannot have roughly the status of
propositions asserting the existence of ordinary material bodies. This would afford
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us an enormous degree of confidence in the existence of larger cardinals, but the
account is not viable. In particular, the large cardinals cannot play the same kind
of explanatory role that posited material bodies do.
More promisingly, we investigated the idea that large cardinal axioms could play
the role within mathematics played by laws of nature in science, as pioneered by
Russell. The statements of scientific laws are strongly supported because they allow
us to predict the initial data, regardless of the degree of intuitive appeal such prin-
ciples may have. I argued, however, that large cardinal axioms cannot enjoy this
same degree of regressive support.
Various candidates for the mathematical data were considered. The only viable
conception of the data on offer is that propositions acting as data are expressed by
Π01 arithmetical sentences and are either hard data in Russell’s sense, are generated
by the Go¨delian incompleteness of a theory we believe to be sound, or perhaps are
such that a strong heuristic justification can be offered for their truth, as with Gold-
bach’s conjecture.
The problem for the Go¨delian is that accounting for such data affords justifica-
tion only to the propositions that such large cardinal axioms are consistent relative
to ZFC, and not to the truth of the axioms themselves. The trouble is not that we
don’t know whether such axioms are consistent; the independence results that pro-
liferate in modern set theory should teach us to be less ambitious than that. Rather
it is that the consistency of a large cardinal axiom is a strictly weaker proposition
than its truth, and is alone sufficient to account for any data in the relevant sense.
Quite aside from considerations of data, I’ve argued further that the justifi-
cation of large large cardinal axioms does not look much like the justification of
virtue-enhancing principles in science, since adding a large cardinal axiom to a the-
ory always causes significant bloating to the ontology and ideology of a theory, a
practice which is anathema to the modes of theory choice in natural science where
simplicity and parsimony are highly respected arbitrators between competing em-
pirically equivalent theories.
The problem here can be put in quite simple terms: between empirically equiva-
lent theories, the mode of theory choice in natural science is minimising and conser-
vative with respect to ontology and ideology. Since large large cardinal axioms are
maximising with respect to ontology and ideology, it follows that either the modes
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of theory choice in mathematics are not much like their scientific counterparts, or
that large large cardinal axioms fail to be justified. Unlike Quine, I don’t wish to
take a side on this matter; the disjunction is sufficient to make my point, which is
that this well-received aspect of Go¨del’s thought is ultimately not fit for purpose as
regards large large cardinal axioms.
Unlike the case with Go¨delian incompleteness, we do not here have a strong rea-
son to believe that set-theoretic incompleteness is absolutely ineliminable. Rather,
we simply have good cause to think that the means of alleviating it proposed by
Go¨del have met with at most a modest degree of success. The need to find a com-
pelling justification for the larger large cardinal axioms is of some urgency, however.
The general programme of formulating large cardinal axioms and investigating the
consequences of their assumption is one of the central research areas in the founda-
tions of mathematics. It would be a philosophical scandal if we could say no more
than that this programme involved its practitioners in mere ‘if-then-ist’ thumb-
twiddling. The mathematical significance of the large cardinals enterprise demands
philosophical explanation, preferably one which justifies a contentful interpretation
of the consistency-constrained maximalism at work in current set-theoretic practice.
Unfortunately, this explanation cannot be given by means of an analogy between




The overarching question of this thesis has been: how can we strengthen our ax-
iomatic mathematical theories so as to reduce the degree to which they are incom-
plete? I’ve argued that there are two distinct kinds of incompleteness; Go¨delian and
set-theoretic, and addressed various attempts to eliminate or reduce both kinds. I’ve
approached the question via close engagement with four themes found in the writings
of Kurt Go¨del: anti-mechanism, rationalistic optimist, conceptual platonism, and
quasi-scientific methods. At times, the views with which I’ve engaged have been,
of necessity, only tentative reconstructions of Go¨del’s views based on the scarcity
of available material. Nevertheless such views are recognizably Go¨delian. Indeed,
if I’ve convinced you only that Go¨del’s philosophical views are richer and more de-
serving of attention than you thought they were before, I can count my efforts as
a success. But nonetheless, I hope to have convinced you that the prospects for
eliminating either kind of incompleteness look bleak, and our attempts at justifiably
strengthening the axioms of arithmetic and set theory by any of these methods can
hope only for a modest degree of success. That is my answer to the central question
of this discussion. A good deal more than that was argued for, however:
Anti-Mechanism
Mechanism is most neutrally described as the view that our mathematical out-
put is, under idealisation, coextensive with the output of a Turing machine. Anti-
mechanism, most neutrally stated, is the view that our idealised mathematical out-
put is more extensive than that of any Turing machine. It is a view to which Go¨del
was inclined, but one for which he offered no comprehensive philosophical argument.
We are entitled, however, not just to an argument for the view, but also to an expla-
nation of how the idealised mind proves things in a way that could not be executed
by any Turing machine.
Since Go¨del believed that any arithmetical proposition could be proved by the
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human mind, under suitable idealisation, I suggested that a natural model of our
in-principle arithmetical capacities on such a view would be a reflection sequence
obtained by the transfinite iteration of a soundness reflection principle. Feferman’s
completeness theorem guarantees that, by reflecting on the soundness of PA, any
arithmetical truth can be proved, making this a plausible fleshing-out of Go¨del’s
hopes that our arithmetical capacities outstrip those of any Turing machine.
I argued however, that thinking of our arithmetical abilities in this way is in-
consistent with any plausible epistemology of arithmetic, since it presupposes that
the idealised mathematician already possesses (some of) the arithmetical knowledge
that the account was supposed to explain. Go¨delian anti-mechanism was therefore
rejected, despite the significant (indeed, total) reduction in Go¨delian incompleteness
the theory promised. I argued further that similar criticisms could be levelled at
much weaker forms of anti-mechanism, based on a study of Turing’s completeness
theorem.
Absolute Undecidability
There may be more palatable forms of anti-mechanism in the vicinity, so the argu-
ment of the previous chapter doesn’t establish anything definitive about the nature
of the human mind. However, it does allow us to build up a positive argument for
the absolute undecidability of certain arithmetical propositions.
We saw that Go¨del’s two main arguments against the existence of absolutely un-
decidable arithmetical propositions were very persuasive in a limited range of cases,
but failed to establish their conclusion in sufficient generality. In particular, we saw
that they relied on the assumption that we possess an ability to select ordinal nota-
tions in a very particular way, or else an ability equivalent to this. However, there is
no reason to suppose that we possess this ability (and no argument for it has been
offered to my knowledge), as well as several reasons to suppose we don’t: the ability
provably corresponds to no recursive procedure, and any epistemology of arithmetic
according to which we possess such an ability would suffer from the same problems
as Go¨delian anti-mechanism.
If we lack this recursive ordinal selection ability, it follows that certain arithmeti-
cal propositions are absolutely undecidable, and hence that Go¨delian incompleteness
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is ineliminable. It does not follow, as Go¨del feared, that human reason is ‘irrational’
or ‘inconsistent’, since the undecidable propositions are not ones that we could ever
recognize to be such.
Feferman’s theorem, in addition to playing a central role in my arguments for
absolute undecidability and anti-anti-mechanism, can also be used to refute Dum-
mett’s argument for the vagueness of the concept natural number. The ordinal bound
required for an arithmetically complete theory is so low that it is intuitionistically
acceptable. Coupled with an argument that adding Feferman’s reflection principle
to a theory is intuitionistically justified by the soundness of the theory, I argued
that even by Dummett’s own lights, the concept grounds for asserting something
of all natural numbers is not indefinitely extensible, and that therefore the concept
natural number is not vague.
I finally argued that the ineliminability of Go¨delian incompleteness should
prompt us to accept a kind of quietism about the limits of our arithmetical knowl-
edge.
Conceptual Platonism
The remainder of the thesis was dedicated to questions of reducing set-theoretic
incompleteness. Go¨del’s approach to the problem makes sense only in terms of his
platonist interpretation of mathematics: his notion of intrinsic justification is bound
up with his view of mathematical intuition, and his use of extrinsic justification is
grounded in realism about sets. I argued that, although Go¨del’s position shifted
substantially over time, we can isolate a Go¨delian position called conceptual platon-
ism. According to this view, certain mathematical concepts are such that we can
gain intuitive (i.e. non-deductive and non-empirical) knowledge of axioms quantify-
ing over the objects falling under such concepts by reflecting on what the concepts
commit us to. Hence, Go¨del’s platonism about concepts is prior to his platonism
about objects, and intuitive knowledge plays a crucial role in determining how our
mathematical theories are to be axiomatized, since it is in axiomatic theories that
our grasp of mathematical concepts is expressed.
Although I defended this theory against charges of mysticism and theology, I
argued that it is insufficiently developed to merit endorsement since, although we
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are given examples by Go¨del of concepts which have the required kind of objective
content, it is unclear what the having of such content amounts to. Go¨del claims that
concepts of the relevant kind are axiomatized in a non-arbitrary way, such that the
system strikes us as clearly sound; while this is somewhat helpful, the criterion will
not allow us to precisely distinguishing concepts with objective content from those
which lack it. However, conceptual platonism is clear enough to examine Go¨del’s
attempts to reduce set-theoretic incompleteness by means which are closely related
to it.
Small Large Cardinals
Distinctively set-theoretic incompleteness perhaps cannot be isolated from a first-
order perspective. But from a second-order perspective we can see that the inability
of set-theoretic axioms to determine the height of the hierarchy is not of a piece
with the inability of PA to prove that it is consistent. Given that Go¨del thought
some set-theoretic axioms can be known on the basis of intuition, a natural attempt
to reduce set-theoretic incompleteness is by certifying certain large cardinal axioms
as following the concept set.
I argued, against Potter, that the conceptual platonist can justifiably regard
second-order reflection principles as following from the concept set, but only if they
are willing to abandon platonism about values of any variables of third-order and
higher. We saw, however, that Koellner’s theorems make it extremely unlikely that
any large cardinal axiom stronger than the existence of the Erdo˝s cardinal κ(ω)
could be justified by these means. Hence the prospects for reducing incompleteness
substantially by mathematical intuition is somewhat bleak, since by modern stan-
dards the cardinals that could perhaps be known to exist intuitively would be rather
small.
Having clarified the shape that Go¨delian platonism takes in the case of set theory,
I argued that Go¨del’s claim in the Gibbs lecture that such platonism is supported by
the incompleteness theorems is vindicated. However, the degree of support which
the incompleteness theorems lend to platonism is very limited, as the constraints
they impose on anti-platonist theories are consistent with most of platonism’s main
rivals. Moreover, the incompleteness of a theory should only support a platonist
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interpretation of it in cases where, by Go¨del’s own lights, we already have good
cause to be a platonist.
Large Large Cardinals
According to Go¨del, our means of justifying set-theoretic axioms is by no means
exhausted by our faculty of intuition. Given that the entities of mathematics are
ontologically on a par with those of the natural sciences, Go¨del supposes that the
kinds of reasoning that license belief in the latter can be also applied in the mathe-
matical case. If such methods could be used to justify large cardinal axioms going
beyond what is justifiable using intuition, then a substantial reduction in incom-
pleteness could be effected.
We saw that the very strongest justification that we have for belief in material
bodies is inapplicable in the case of large large cardinals. I also argued that the
regressive method of justifying laws of nature in science is inapplicable in mathe-
matics, at least as far as such axioms are concerned. This is because mathematical
propositions which might plausibly function as data are expressible by Π01 arithmeti-
cal sentences, and in this restricted arena, the consistency of a large cardinal axiom
relative to ZFC is as good as its truth.
Lastly, I argued that the prospects for justifying large cardinal axioms via an
analysis of their theoretical virtues were extremely limited. In the natural sciences,
principles which minimize the richness of the theory and the size of its ontology are
highly valued, and large large cardinal axioms are guaranteed to score poorly on
this front. Hence the methods for reducing set-theoretic incompleteness suggested
by Go¨del are of very limited use. This gives us some cause to think that set-theoretic
incompleteness might be just as much an essential part of mathematics as Go¨delian
incompleteness was shown to be.
The Large Cardinals Programme
I’d like to end by considering, albeit briefly, how a platonist might try to place the
consistency-constrained maximalism of the large cardinals programme on a solid
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philosophical footing, since that can’t be achieved by means of an analogy between
set theory and the sciences, nor by intuition. Throughout several of Go¨del’s writings,
we find him comparing the axioms of set theory with those in geometry, in general
finding their similarities more striking earlier in his career and less persuasive later
on.
A philosophical interpretation of geometry that has become relatively well-
accepted is offered by Einstein (1921), according to which each consistent geom-
etry is true, though not perhaps true of physical space. Rather, each consistent
geometry determines its own kind of space in which the axioms are true. In his
lecture at Go¨ttingen (1939, p.155), Go¨del notes that the use of V = L to prove the
consistency of the continuum hypothesis is very similar to results obtained in recent
axiomatic geometry. More significantly, he proposes that a proof of the independence
of CH from ZFC would demonstrate its absolute undecidability, and thus set theory
would ‘bifurcate’ into multiple different legitimate systems, as with Euclidean and
non-Euclidean geometry, presumably at each absolutely undecidable proposition.
Of course, Go¨del retreats from this view as his confidence in rationalistic opti-
mism and the quasi-scientific justification of set-theoretic axioms increases; by 1966
his view was that the independence of CH from ZFC had no substantial philo-
sophical implications (1966, p.372).37 But the ‘geometric view’ entertained in the
Go¨ttingen lecture might be a means of justifying extensions of ZFC by large cardi-
nal axioms without a direct intuitive justification.
The idea would be that many distinct set-theoretic universes are consistent with
iterative conception, none of which can be said to privileged over another as the
universe. One reason for this might be that many different concepts constitute an
admissible precisification of the ill-defined maximality principle behind the iterative
conception. All of these concepts might be such that their axiomatizations overlap
considerably as regards a range of core principles, and diverge only in the strength of
axioms embodying the idea that it is possible to iterate the ‘set-of’ operation at least
37Which is not to say that Go¨del had ceased to find the analogy between set theory and geometry
illuminating; despite having claimed in 1938 that V = L was a ‘natural completion of the axioms of
set theory’ (1938, p.27), Go¨del later claim to think that V = L should be rejected on the grounds
that it states a minimum property of the hierarchy. A more favourable axiom stating a maximum
principle would be a set-theoretic analogue of Hilbert’s completeness axiom in geometry (1964,
pp.262–263, fn.23).
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a certain distance through the ordinals. A somewhat similar view has recently been
proposed by Hamkins (2012), according to whom a proliferation of set-theoretic uni-
verses obtained by forcing exist. A Go¨delian view inspired by the Go¨ttingen lecture
needn’t be quite so extreme.
It is possible, for instance, that large cardinals be given a special place in de-
termining the existence conditions for universes, thanks to the quasi-categoricity
theorem and Go¨del’s second-order conception of the axioms. If everything about
the iterative conception except for the strength of its maximality principle is deter-
minate, then the Go¨delain multiverse will be substantially smaller than that envis-
aged by Hamkins, because the universes will disagree only with respect to height.
He denies that we have so determinate a second-order conception of property as is
required to make such an idea work, but this is certainly up for debate, especially
since the crucial properties are those of a well-order and natural number (according,
at least, to Martin (2001)). The argument presented in chapter 2 against one kind
of indeterminacy in the concept natural number can be expected to be of use here.
This is a significant retreat from any ‘bifurcation’ in set theory at an absolutely
undecidable proposition; if we view set-theoretic universes from a second-order per-
spective there is of course no room for disagreement about CH, for example. Some
pluralism is maintained, but Go¨del’s mature platonism is better-represented; as
Hamkins puts it, multiverse views are a kind of ‘higher-order platonism’ (2012,
p.417). Absolutely undecidable propositions of the kind discussed in chapter 2
would all have a determinate truth-value, and the smallest universes in the mul-
tiverse would be isomorphic models of the minimal set theory delivered by the iter-
ative conception.38 This will be no stronger that ZFC2 + Γ
2
n reflection, though as I
argued in chapter 4, Go¨del might be safer with a weaker theory, abandoning these
reflection principles in favour of maintaining realism about higher-order properties.
Either way, it is likely that a Go¨delian multiverse would be more restricted than
Zermelo’s unbounded series of models of set theory, given that the minimal theory
considered in (Zermelo 1930) (i.e. second-order ZF without the axiom of infinity) is
somewhat weaker than what Go¨del thought could be intuitively justified.
Given the special place of large cardinal axioms on the view sketched, the large
38Of course, height-sensitive propositions such as GCH might not be settled here.
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cardinals programme is thus given a secure philosophical basis: all large cardinal
axioms consistent with the basic iterative conception can be seen as explicating a
kind of maximality principle, and are true in some universes. The project of artic-
ulating a (somewhat) Go¨delian multiverse view therefore strikes me as a promising
one, but it is a project for another day.
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